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The Medical Research Council has experienced a consistent decrease of capital 
funding over the recent decade. But capital is essential for the purchase of scientific 
equipment and the upkeep, updating and expansion of the research facilities. Hence, 
the development of accurate project estimates and the selection of the proposals most 
beneficial to the scientific advancement is an increasingly critical aspect of delivering 
Value for Money to the taxpayer.  
Action Research, using interviews and questionnaires has been undertaken to 
understand the processes and dynamics within the MRC, motivations of bidders and 
reasoning of approvers. A database has been developed to test the effectiveness of 
Reference Class Forecasting, heavily promoted by the UK Government, around 
science facilities.  
It was found that a distinct lack of communication between the involved parties led to 
a failure of understanding of both the bidding process and evaluation criteria as well 
as project drivers, priorities and assumptions made in the development of the 
estimates. Furthermore, the charge of strategic misrepresentation should be reviewed 
considering the way in which government departments distribute funds and/ or award 
specific projects. Arbitrary budget awards force project teams to engineer the 
requirements to fit in those envelopes. The environment of projects in the public sector 
was found to be very complex and have a significant influence on project strategies.  
More research needs to be done to understand these complexities better and consider 
appropriate actions to mitigate detrimental effects. A programme of continuous 
improvement within the MRC concluded the first two research cycles and has resulted 
in a specific strategy to target improvements of project performance. Data from the 
research is being used to bid for an increase of capital funding to ensure the MRC can 
deliver the cutting edge, world leading science, which the government expects.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Term Explanation   
workhorse Equipment, which is highly utilised and provides the or a 
basis for the research functions. These tend not to be super 
high tech, but ensure basic functions, such as centrifuges, 
microscopes, sampling machines, etc.  
leap-frogging Overcoming hurdles in research methodology through 
technology or opening new areas of research due to 
availability of innovative technology;  
opportunity to overtake rival research organizations by 
investing in the newest technology. 
annuality of funds requirement by HM Treasury that prohibits to carry unspent 
funds over the financial year threshold or to accumulate 
unspent funding over several financial years. 
electromagnetic 
shielding 
methods of protecting highly sensitive imaging equipment, 
such as Electron microscopes, Cryo-Electron Microscopes, 
etc. from electromagnetic interference/influences. 
Resource funds current expenditure, such as pay or procurement and 
including depreciation, which is the current cost associated 
with the ownership of assets (HM Treasury, 2015a) 
Capital funds funding for new investment and net policy lending (HM 
Treasury, 2015a) 
failed project projects, which do not deliver the expected benefits, are 
terminated and/or expended more than 100% over the 
approved budget. 
Capital Roadmap planning of the MRC capital investments on a larger scale 
for the next 5 years (within government spending review 
terms) 
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Containment Level 3 Categorisation used for defining biosafety in the context of 
working with biological agents. Containment level 3 is a 
higher level of biosafety applied for working with pathogens, 
such as viruses, bacteria, which are infectious and cause 
disease (Medical Research Council, 2014).  
core funding Funding of research agreed as part of the QQR. This allows 
for the costs associated with the research of the research 
programs recommended by the QQR until the next QQR (5 
years). Non-core funding would be any funding that is 
awarded externally or via specific calls from MRC.  
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1.1. Capital funding needs for facilities in the UK life science  
Medical research is carried out in specialist laboratories which contain a range of 
distinct functions tailored to the respective discipline or field of research. To support 
high quality research, these laboratories need to be designed, constructed and 
maintained to the highest standards.  
The estate in the life science sector is dependent on complex technical provisions in 
mechanical, electrical and public health solutions to enable a very wide range of 
research activities. These facilities are expensive to design, construct and operate.  
Estates and facilities are not the priority for investment decisions in science. Across 
the public and university sector the focus for investment in science is directed towards 
enhancing science through funding research programmes and/ or procuring scientific 
equipment.  
The UK Government has put science and innovation as one of the key elements of 
future planning. This commitment is focused on large investments in new facilities, 
such as the Sir Francis Crick Institute (new science building in the centre of London 
with project costs of over £600m) or the Big Data Institute (Great Britain. HM Treasury, 
2013). Whilst this is hugely welcomed in the science community, public organisations 
concerned with science activities continue to lobby for better funding for the existing 
research estate.  
Many research facilities in the public sector have suffered decades of 
underinvestment, partially due to the lack of available funding, inability to ringfence 
estates budgets and the science community prioritising to invest in scientific 
equipment over estates related aspects.  
Maintenance of high-tech buildings requires significant budgets. Additionally, 
modernisation must be allowed for to keep abreast with scientific and technological 
developments. Some of the older facilities are flexible enough to be upgraded and 
given a new life, therewith reducing the need for additional estate and its maintenance.  
Subsequently, estates projects in the life science sector organisations are often 
concerned with refurbishments and upgrade projects to facilitate new recruitment, 
allow the procurement and installation of innovative technology or undertake basic 
plant replacement. Such projects generally require capital funding too. The definition 
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of capital expenditure (or capex), its actual application and management is seen as a 
key contributing factor to the difficulties of securing the funding. 
Capex is defined as ‘expenditure on substantial items (usually in the form of projects) 
that will have a benefit for the organisation beyond the current year’ (Great Britain. HM 
Treasury, 2015a) and is usually associated with purchase of land, construction of 
buildings or major refurbishments, which result in an upgrade of the facility. 
Furthermore, the UK Government has established thresholds, above which all 
procurement of equipment, plant and other assets is defined as capital with particularly 
complex rules for services and works.  
Currently, this threshold is set at £10,000. The implications of this is significant: the 
value of most plant replacement and works carried out in laboratory buildings are 
significantly above that threshold. In comparison, universities, such as Imperial 
College of London use a threshold of £50,000. With allocation of capital being subject 
to severe annual fluctuation und uncertainty, aspects of maintenance and estate 
upgrade work relies on success in project bidding processes, rather than being 
planned throughout the life of a facility.  
Over the years, this approach has resulted in rolling plant replacement programmes 
come undone, maintenance and upgrade works being deferred and, subsequently 
facilities dilapidating at a faster pace. This is evidenced by the conditions of many of 
the more technical facilities in public-sector, such as laboratory facilities in hospitals, 
schools and the higher education sector. For example, the Imperial College Healthcare 
Trust (ICHT) is trying to operate its facilities with a maintenance backlog of over £1bn 
(National Health Executive, 2016). 
In turn, this results in difficulties regarding staff retention, recruitment of senior staff 
(such as internationally renowned scientists) and lack of capability to compete for 
international grants for public sector funded research organisations.   
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1.2. Project funding in the Medical Research Council  
Since the fiscal crisis in 2007, the MRC – like many other public-sector organisations 
– has seen more restrictions in funding by the government. Amongst the UK Research 
Councils, the MRC was the largest, based on number of Units and Institutes, staff 
numbers (4,000) and total funding received from the UK Government (£1.7bn per 
annum) (Medical Research Council, 2009).  
The MRC operates with a stringent hierarchy of delegated authority, where the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is authorised to approve investments up to £10m, anything 
over and above this requires applications for funding directly to Government (either 
BEIS or HM Treasury). An example is the new Laboratory for Molecular Biology 
(“LMB”) in Cambridge, for which a direct application was made to, and funding 
approval received from, HM Treasury outside the MRC annual funding allocation.  
Capital funding allocations to individual Units and Institutes were assessed and fixed 
establishing an annual capital allocation in the Quinquennial Reviews (“QQR”). This 
ensures that capital is spent on items and projects which will support only highest 
quality research and enhance the science, because it is tested by international experts 
in the relevant field of discipline. Allocations from QQRs were binding and enabled 
appropriate planning of projects over five years until the next QQR.  
With the implementation of funding cuts by the UK Government the QQR commitments 
on capital funding could no more be honoured. In 2012 the funding for MRC overall 
dropped by over £100m and the capital funding provision available to MRC reduced 
by almost 50%. It became instantly clear that a mechanism had to be found to allocate 
capital funding in a different way, but fair and transparent manner. Thus, the capital 
bid process was established as a method for making decisions on the funding 
allocations to Units and Institutes.  
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FIGURE 1 - FUNDING AVAILABILITY IN % OF RECEVIED VALUE OF BIDS 
Since the introduction of this process the available amount of funding has been 
consistently outstripped by the value of the funding requests (see Figure 1).  The 
evaluation process is based on a system used in other areas of the organisation and 
it was therefore assumed that it is familiar both to bidders and approvers. 
1.2.1. The MRC Capital Bid Process 
MRC issues an invitation to Units and Institutes to submit funding requests with a short 
justification and indication of expected benefits for the relevant investment. Eligible are 
requests for capital funds only, defined as equipment with a value over £10k, estates 
related projects that are concerned with an upgrade or extension of existing facilities 
or replacement of major plant.  
Received bids are distributed to the review panel members, who are the Heads of 
Themes, the Director Finance and Director Capital & Estates with the task to return 
their scores in preparation of the allocation meeting. Historically, most of the bids relate 
to science equipment for which the scores are established by the MRC Research 
Programme Group (“RPG”). The estates department tends to restrict its assessment 
on those bids to the expected impact of respective investments on the estate.  
Estates related projects are scored by the Estates department with PRG commenting 
on the benefits of the project for the science of the relevant unit.   Scores are based 
on a set of criteria, which is shown in table 1. A score of ‘4’ tends to guarantee funding, 
whilst a score of ‘3’ would generally assign the bid into a group of reserves, which 
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would be funded, should additional funds become available throughout the FY. Criteria 
itself does not distinguishes between science equipment or estates bids but relies on 
aspects, which are difficult to define or measure, leaving significant room for 
interpretation.  
Some areas are not covered at all, such as legislative or statutory changes, which 
force investment – mostly experienced in Health & Safety regulations and support 
functions for research, such as operation of animal holding facilities.  
Score Criteria 
4 
• underpins leading edge, exceptional quality work 
• part of a top international programme or of exceptional national strategic 
importance 
• aids a crucial scientific question or knowledge gap in an area of strategic 
importance in the UK 
• very high return on investment 
• provides shared equipment for the nation or an area of science critical to 
novel developments 
3 
• part of an internationally competitive, world class or nationally strategic 
programme 
• highly novel, original and innovative, novel methodology and design 
• potential for high health and/ or socioeconomic impact 
• potential for very high return on investment 
• potential for leverage to aid high value for money 
2 
• potential to underpin high quality research 
• internationally competitive parts 
• robust methodology / design 
• potential for high health and/ or socioeconomic impact 
• potential for significant return on investment 
1 
• assists / enables the continuation of existing work 
• worthwhile and sound 
• methodologically sound 
• potential for significant return on investment 
TABLE 1 - CAPITAL FUNDING EVALUATION CRITERIA MRC 
The assessment process is concluded in a panel meeting. It is assumed that all bids 
with a score of ‘4’ are funded. Subject to the available budget adjustments are made 
to the scores by either omitting some top scoring projects to stay within the funding 
envelope or awarding some of the more important lower scoring bids (scoring 3). 
During this moderation process detailed discussions about the merit of each 
investment take place. The panel concludes with a review of the total awards for each 
unit, in some occasions triggering a repeat of the score assessment, when some units 
were considered to be over- or underprovided.  
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1.3. So, what? 
With insufficient funding available for the value of requests received, awards need to 
be made to the most deserving projects under the assumption that the requested 
funding is adequate to complete the project. Therefore, the evaluation must be able to 
trust provided details as objective judgements on cost, time and benefit. 
It is perceived by the organisation that projects regularly overrun time schedule and 
costs without delivering fully the promised benefits. The extent of cost overruns can 
put the funding decision into question as the relevant project may not have been 
considered as good value if the accurate cost or schedule had been known at the time 
of making the initial evaluation. Any such failed or underperforming project take away 
opportunities for other projects.  
Whilst the estate enables scientific work by providing laboratories and support 
facilities, it is judged to be an indirect contribution to research activities and is hence 
a ‘second choice’ in competition with scientific equipment. However, without the 
assurance of funding availability the estate cannot be appropriately managed, 
ultimately leading to risks for research continuity, particularly, failure of ensuring 
proactive maintenance, such as plant replacement programmes. Solutions are 
required, which allow sufficient funding of the science estate and allow investment in 
the most promising projects allowing the science to flourish. 
1.4. The author’s position to the problem 
The author’s responsibility in the organisation is to provide adequate research facilities 
to enable research activities. This includes compliance to statutory and regulatory 
standards as well as allowing innovation in both research methodology and technology 
to take place and propel research forward. A combination of lower priority of the estate 
to research activities and volatile funding provision over years has made traditional 
preventative estates management impossible. Any funding gained for the estate is 
therefore precious and must be used for the most important projects.  
The author is also part of the problem. With the responsibility for the estate, the author 
has an interest in bids for estates related projects to be successful and is supporting 
the project teams in the development of proposals. At the same time, the author is part 
of the approval process, identifying a conflict of interest. Whilst this is limited due to 
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the evaluation of the benefits for science being the critical decision point, it allows the 
author to influence the decision or at least provides insight to the approval process, 
that has an impact on the advice given to project teams.  
Throughout the last 9 year the author had to prioritise projects and make funding 
decisions based on the proposals put forward from the various units and institutes in 
the MRC. Often, these had to receive additional funds at some point throughout their 
life cycle for a wide range of reasons. It is the responsibility of the Author to ensure the 
projects are successfully completed (i.e. identifying sources for additional funding) and 
therewith justifying the increase in cost.  
Inevitably, this raises the question as to whether the relevant projects would have 
received funding approval if the true cost had been known at the time of evaluation. 
More importantly it identifies other investments, which cannot be undertaken, because 
of the additional funds that need to be allocated to projects, which have not provided 
accurate estimates as part of their project proposals.  
As a result, the author has a keen interest in ensuring that the project proposals reflect 
the potential realistic cost – allowing approvers to evaluate the expected benefits of a 
project against the required budget. Furthermore, through the work as an IPA gateway 
reviewer for high risk projects, the author is aware that this is a problem, which is 
shared throughout the public sector. Development and implementation of tools for both 
the bidders and approvers would be a significant improvement to the management of 
projects overall and therefore better appropriation of public funds. 
1.5. Research purpose 
Poor project performance in the construction sector has long been an issue targeted 
by the UK government, however with no considerable impact. Implementation of new 
project management approaches such as Prince2 and Agile have not led to better 
performance. Without significant improvement of the performance of project delivery, 
the onus is on the assessment of projects prior to the delivery phase to identify early, 
if they are likely to succeed or fail. Finding new ways of improving the funding decisions 
is therefore a critical task for the MRC in the efforts to ensure best possible investment 
in science, catapult the UK medical science to the forefront of global research and 
compete against academic organisations. 
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Whilst government spending reviews offer opportunities to lobby for additional funding, 
it is generally expected that current funding levels are maintained or reduced as a 
result of implications of the BREXT negotiations and over financial pressures. 
Consequently, the improvement of funding decisions presents itself to be the most 
appropriate way to influence this issue – not only within MRC but government wide.  
Action Research (AR) is offering a unique opportunity to research the problem 
academically and test this knowledge by implementing measures and assess the 
impact. The process therefore aims to enrich the organisational knowledge of its own 
processes and procedures and will inform others of potential solutions for similar 
issues. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
As indicated above there are two key aspects, which are intrinsically associated with 
the funding process – project estimation and the evaluation process and I am adding 
a third, the evaluation criteria. These three aspects are also within the remit of the 
MRC authority to change and improve and hence viable for the AR approach. 
1.5.1. Project estimation 
The accuracy of project estimates varies greatly. Unlike the process of purchasing 
most science equipment, estates related projects always have unique features, which 
prevent a standard estimation of both cost and time schedule. Establishing estimates 
for such projects requires a range of processes, such as definition of the requirements, 
specialist design development, surveys and /or gathering quotations for works. At 
MRC, the bids submitted by Units will usually not have had a detailed design 
developed (cost for this service will be part of the bid) and hence very rough budget 
assumptions are made resulting in potentially significant variances upon conclusion of 
the projects. 
The consequence of these differences between the value of the award and the actual 
cost is twofold. An underestimation will result in the bidder having to request additional 
funding post award. In such cases, much of the awarded funds will already have been 
spent and rejection of the additional request may render the initial commitments a 
wasted investment. It is therefore viewed as a situation where the only option is a 
further award. Such occurrences reduce any generic contingency funds that may be 
held by the Finance Department and therewith the ability to react to emergencies. 
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A more important aspect is that in projects where this overspend is exceeding 20% – 
30% of the award, the panel members feel that they would not have approved the 
project, had they known its true costs. It means that other proposals have been 
rejected for the benefit of this project and it raises the suspicion that some bidders may 
deliberately understate the cost of the project to increase the chances of success.  
This approach is termed ‘strategic misrepresentation’ (Flyvbjerg, 2009) and has been 
noted by the government as a key target, evidenced by the inclusion of this aspect in 
the MPLA courses (Sahid Business School, 2012). These courses are mandatory for 
anybody, who is likely to be appointed a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for a major 
project funded by the public. 
Similar issues exist with the calculation of timelines for the projects, in that the 
annuality of capital budgets in the public sector (Great Britain. HM Treasury, 2015a) 
causes difficulties in planning and forecasting.  Budgets – especially in relation to 
capital funding – cannot be carried over financial years. Without knowledge of levels 
of funding allocations for the next 12 months, no guaranty can be given that funds will 
be available to continue works over the end of the respective FY. Therefore, projects 
which show a programme exceeding 12 months duration can be disadvantaged in an 
annual process for funding allocation.   
One of the key terms and conditions given in the MRC funding request letters is that 
the proposed projects are to be completed within the respective current FY. This 
indicates to bidders that projects with durations of over 12 months will not have a 
significant chance of being funded and encourages more optimistic estimates of the 
works. However, projects, which cannot be completed in the given timeframe will 
inevitably require funding to be ringfenced from the next year’s allocation therewith 
reducing the funding availability further.   
Unspent funds cannot be recovered into the next FY and are lost. In the context of 
uncertainties of budget allocations beyond the current FY, it becomes a very complex 
and challenging task to manage capital allocations in compliance with the public-sector 
finance rules and to the satisfaction of the organisation.  
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1.5.2.  Evaluation Criteria 
With funding resource being scarce, the award criteria should aim to award only the 
worthiest projects. In MRC’s view this should be anything that provides maximum 
benefit to the science of its units and institutes. This is clearly reflected in the 
description of the criteria for the top score of 4 (see Table 1).  
The lowest criteria include anything, which assists/enables continuation of existing 
work. Research equipment is highly utilised and used until it becomes unreliable or 
cannot be repaired anymore. With a threshold for capital being so low (£10k), most of 
scientific equipment will fall under this category. Replacement equipment will therefore 
have to be bid for under the established process but with no chances of approval due 
to the low score that can be achieved.  
Often these replacement requests refer to real “workhorses”, which are essential to 
the research carried out, do not represent any “leap frogging” opportunities to the 
science, but if not replaced can cause the research to stop. Whilst it is desirable for 
the science to make considerable progress, it is in equal terms undesirable for 
research to stop or be interrupted. This is also an issue in relation to the awards for 
estates related projects, which have in recent years mostly been concerned with the 
replacement of major equipment to operate the facilities (for example air handling 
units, chillers, etc.). As these projects are not considered to propel science forward; 
they have a less priority. 
 
FIGURE 2 - COMPARISON AWARDS FOR SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT VS ESTATES 
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This attitude is clearly reflected in the graph shown in Figure 2. Differences between 
annual awards for scientific equipment and estates projects is significant – in some 
years they estates awards represent only a fraction of the overall equipment awards. 
Furthermore, most of the criteria under the various scores are not clearly defined and 
appears very fluid in between the scores, resulting in a risk of subjective application 
by the reviewers.  
1.5.3. Project selection and prioritisation process 
Bidders are required to identify the individual bids with an order of priority. It is 
important to understand the priorities of the unit directors as otherwise awards would 
be made without the specific unit needs in mind trying in the attempt to fit the overall 
financial envelope.  
No reasoning for the prioritisation is requested and, therefore, not given. During the 
evaluation and scoring process, assessors arrive on scores in some cases which may 
make a lower priority bid fundable and consider a bid with higher urgency not worthy.  
This has led to considerable frustration by the bidders and evaluators in equal 
measure about the process and often led to further negotiations post award. Similarly, 
rejected projects are repeatedly submitted to the panel, despite very low scores and 
little or no chances of the evaluators supporting it.  Whilst this is not a problem of 
significance for either finances or delivery of the research, it is a symptom of the 
process being inefficient and/ or a distinct lack of communication. 
The panel relies on the expertise of individuals (scientific discipline and operational 
expertise, such as estates) to assess the validity of the proposed projects in terms of 
budget, programme schedule and benefit realisation. As such, the evaluation is 
dependent on the quality of the individual and their skills in recognising and managing 
their own bias.  
1.5.4. Problem statement 
The MRC, just as all other public-sector organisations, must ensure that public funding 
is used for worthy and viable projects. This requires projects being developed with an 
appropriate degree of certainty for budgets and schedules and suitable evaluation 
processes using criteria, which reflects the aims of the organisation. In order to 
achieve this, the organisation must develop a better understanding of the underlying 
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causes of the dissatisfactory situation before making decisions on appropriate 
measures. 
The research aim arising from the issues described in this chapter is formulated as:  
Developing a fair and transparent processes for the approval of estates projects 
by establishing more accurate estimation and assessment tools for bidders and 
approving bodies.  
Throughout the research in literature, the author realised that this aim is covering a 
vast range of issues and influences and therefore had to establish three key questions 
that the research had to answer to achieve this overarching target. These will be 
presented at the end of the literature review to highlight the journey that brought the 
author to this approach.  
1.6. Summary 
The capital bid process is trying to make the best of an undesirable situation. Influence 
by the MRC on future government funding is limited (exacerbated by BREXIT) and 
hence unlikely to resolve the issues by significantly increasing the funding. There is 
also a view that this process has introduced a selection of better projects (as opposed 
to a generic allocation of capital based on the size of the Unit/ Institute) and purchases 
in view of Value for Money as each are evaluated on their merit for the science.  
But there are also issues which affect the MRC’s budgets, the relationship between 
the Units/Institutes and Head Office and, more importantly, the research work. The 
problems identified have a considerable impact on the operations and research of 
units and institutes as well as deteriorate the relationship between MRC and the 
scientists it funds.  
Establishing a transparent and fair award process as well as improving the quality and 
objectivity of the project estimates is expected to not only ensure only deserving 
projects get awarded, but also restore a mutual trust between bidders and evaluators 
in the MRC. The research activities and respective results are presented in this thesis 
by following the path the author has taken. A literature review has been undertaken, 
in which influencing factors and potential solutions were sought from both academic 
literature and publications by and for practitioners. It will demonstrate the progression 
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in thinking of the author relating to the problem and sources for the development of a 
strategy for the research design. 
The author will then describe the methodology for this research by identifying the 
reason for the choices made including academic justification and what the author 
considers to be the outcome of this approach. Outcomes of the research are presented 
in the findings. As this research is undertaken as action research the findings will 
include the conclusions and subsequent actions that have been taken chronologically 
and with respect to the research cycles completed. 
Following the description of the findings, the author then discusses these in relation to 
the problem identified and the literature that was considered to be leading academic 
discourse and informing practitioners. It will consider, whether the findings have 
resulted in a solution for the research problem. 
In conclusion, the author will summarise the outcome of the research in terms of the 
knowledge gained and consider future research areas to further the insight gained in 
aspects of this problem. Finally, the author will reflect on the research activity and the 
impact the process and the findings had on her personal and professional approach 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2.1. Introduction  
This research aims to develop fair and transparent processes for the mitigation of 
strategic misrepresentation in estates project bids by establishing assessment tools 
for bidders and approving bodies.   
From the previous explanations (Chapter 1) some key areas emerged. 
Project estimation is thought to be influenced by bias, levels of detail available, 
qualification, experience and/ or skill of estimators and so on. Some of these are 
subject to underlying, subconscious behaviours, which can only be successfully 
addressed, if fully understood. There is also mentioning of deliberate actions that 
project teams may take to enhance the chances of project approval. Determining the 
extent of such behaviours and their drivers in comparison to genuine misjudgement 
requires the view through different lenses and experiences. 
An initial review of literature yielded at least 10-12 categories of research areas 
associated with the problem, such as risk management, organisational behaviour, 
team dynamics, psychology, public accountancy or organisational development. It 
would not be realistic nor meaningful to investigate all of these categories for the 
purpose of this research. This literature review is therefore concentrating on the early 
stages of projects, i.e. the work being done up to and including the approval of project 
proposals.  
Readings of literature on evaluation process and evaluation criteria envisages an 
equally rich field of opinions, theoretical and practical knowledge. Much of the 
academic world is operated by the use of evaluation panels (most commonly in the 
awards of research grants) with different research disciplines competing for a defined 
amount of funding, not dissimilar to the approach for the capital funding approval by 
the MRC. The author will seek out knowledge of effectiveness of such processes and 
positive and negative influences.   
Furthermore, there are two additional aspects which is expected to contribute to the 
understanding of the problem. First, the author wants to understand the influence of 
governance in the context of the project estimation and approvals. This focuses on the 
responsibility and accountability for decisions being made during these activities. 
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Again, the views of the academic researchers and the understanding and experiences 
from practitioners will be analysed and applied to the problem.  
Secondly, a clear understanding of the term ‘value’ and subsequently ‘Value for 
Money’ (VfM) is required because it drives funding decisions.   The term is subject to 
interpretation and hence holds very different viewpoints of bidders and approvers or 
indeed any associated stakeholders. In the context of science, particularly in the area 
of medical research, the definition of value may be on opposing ends. This literature 
review will seek out definitions based on different perspectives and consider them in 
the context of this research question.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Key elements of literature review 
 
The author is using both academic literature and publications from practitioners, 
professional organisations as well as guidance and regulation from government 
bodies. They are not separated but used to highlight the differences or similarities in 
the subjects investigated.  It is important because practitioners in the public sector 
are directed by the UK Government to comply with these throughout the whole life 
cycle of projects.  
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2.2. Governance  
Projects require good governance, making users accountable for the accuracy of their 
requirements, estimates, etc. and establish mechanisms to control and minimise 
changes.  Despite the PM guidance by professional bodies (The Chartered Institute of 
Building, 2002; Bentley, 2010) highlighting the need for good governance; explaining 
what this term entails and how it interlinks with accountability, it is not clearly 
understood.  Typical examples are the confusion of the definitions of responsibility and 
accountability in governance and issues surrounding the nature of project structures.   
Project organisations are temporary (Office of Government Commerce, 2009) and just 
like in any other organisational environment, suitability and effectiveness of 
governance structures and processes are critical for the chances of success. Using 
established methodologies can help in this, as supporters of project management 
standardisation claim (Kostelac, Matriljan and Dobovicek, 2011).   
UK Government is driving the implementation of standardised methodologies, such as 
PRINCE2 and Agile to embed similar methodologies and skill levels across 
government departments. However, organisations and departments adapt these 
methodologies to their needs, expertise and skill.  It is argued, that this may be a key 
contributor for the lack of improvement in the project performance across government 
(Joslin and Müller, 2016).  Ng (2018) argues that a mix of methodologies is necessary 
to design an approach that is suitable for the organisational and wider context of 
projects.  
Various methodologies provide governance models which define the organisational 
structure and do not tailor for the differences in environment, such as organisational 
culture. Brunet and Aubry (2019) highlights that governance exists in different levels 
(institutional, organisation and project level) and must be considered in the context of 
accountability and responsibility for project performance.  
Better evaluation of the cultural aspects (both external and internal) when starting up 
projects and implementing a management approach (Högberg and Adamsson, 1983) 
is being called for, very similar to the process prior to attempting organisational 
change.  Project governance is a key element of this aspect. 
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Moreover, difficulties in managing projects, specifically complex projects are not only 
caused by the technical challenges, but barriers for understanding of the project which 
supervisors encounter caused by jargon, desire to succeed, too much reliance on 
experts, lack of time to learn about the project details (Loch, Mähring and Sommer, 
2017).  
2.2.1. Starting a project 
A key element in this early development is the implementation of appropriate 
governance.  This aids decision making, which in a fast-changing project environment 
is often under constraint from both the schedule and the budget.  
The aforementioned focus by the UK government on the implementation of formal 
project management methodologies (PRINCE2, Agile, etc.) has led to considerable 
inflexibility of project managers and project teams, hindering project success.  It was 
found that although there is a positive relationship between the use of project 
management methodologies and performance of projects. But unless it goes along 
with the clear understanding of the environmental influences and adapting according 
(Joslin and Müller, 2016) to the specific circumstances, success is not guaranteed.  
Careful consideration must be undertaken to set a project up with reference to these 
circumstances (Bentley, 2010; Cooke and Williams, 1998; The Chartered Institute of 
Building, 2002).  This is by no means a new concept: Avots (1969) highlights in his 
article in 1969 the need for taking time to prepare a project by establishing project 
definitions and structures as well as realistic estimations of the work.  
There is a trend in public sector areas to use projects as a convenient approach to 
organise a wide range of tasks, historically not associated with project management, 
such as policy making and implementation.  It is felt that this may have had unexpected 
consequences, which are detrimental for the relevant organisations, such as loss of 
innovation and flexibility (Godenhjelm, Lundin and Sjöblam, 2015).  Project 
management standards have originally been developed by the private sector to deal 
with specific areas, specifically IT and construction. The application of these standards 
without altering to suit public sector characteristics could have contributed to the poor 
performance of public sector projects. 
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I. Defining the “PROJECT START” 
The understanding of the term “project start” is different from the viewpoint of the 
various stakeholders and participants.  A supplier may see this point as the date when 
an order is received, whilst a client would consider the day of first approvals as the 
start, if not earlier (Savolainen, Ahonen and Richardson, 2015).  
Even within individual teams exist often different opinions as to when their projects 
started.  There are many activities to be completed before a project is formally 
established, including implementation of a governance structure, identification of 
potential team members, and many, many more.  At times, there may be various 
attempts to gain a mandate for the plans or this phase takes a long time to complete, 
leading to the loss of knowledge as team members move on to other tasks or 
organisations.  It is paradoxical that on one hand projects are defined by having a 
specific start and endpoint and on the other hand find it difficult to agree on what the 
starting point may be (Eduardo and De Freitas, 2014).  
The issue of understanding the exact starting point of a project is important to use 
comparable and exact data in order to develop statistical evidence for project 
performance. Planning and shaping activities take place long before any contracts are 
signed. With increased complexity of the projects the difficulty to define a specific 
project start point increases (Eduardo and de Freitas, 2014). The birth of a project 
involves gaining an understanding of business needs and achieving consensus 
between relevant key parties over options which provide the best solution (Smith, 
Wyatt and Love, 2008).  A conversion from strategic thinking to a definition of 
requirements for a construction project also often needs input by professionals. These 
should advice on or follow processes that are suitable for the environment in which the 
project takes place.  Techniques such as “Strategic Need Analysis” (SNA) can be 
deployed to ensure the formative stage of the project is managed appropriately and 
addresses all aspects required to fulfil the strategy. 
Lund et al. (2016) have identified that a key aspect for success of projects lays in the 
clear definition of project start, finish and the activities that are required. Furthermore, 
the definition of approval milestones is supporting the project development and 
prevents activities moving too far to be stopped.  
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Project methodologies, such as PRINCE2, provide a very structured approach to the 
project start.  In the PRINCE2 context, the point of the start-up phase is to assess if a 
project is viable to be further pursued before committing resources.  If so, it provides 
a project mandate by gaining approval of a business case and/or project brief (Office 
of Government Commerce, 2009).  This marks the first auditable approval point of a 
project.  With a relatively wide acceptance and adoption of the PRINCE2 methodology 
as the preferred approach, the public sector should therefore in theory have no 
problems to define the start of their project.  
2.2.2. Accountability 
Governance is an important argument for a tailored approach to 
project management.  Good governance in projects not only 
includes the hierarchical definition of approvals and delegated 
authority, but clarity in responsibilities that enables making tough 
decisions in an appropriate time frame (Office of Government 
Commerce, 2009).  
Often there are no agreed decision points within the project cycle at which the activity 
could be stopped or re-directed.  Motivation of individuals, social pressures and 
organisational politics can prevent objective decision making and result in ‘over-
commitment’ (Staw and Ross, 1987).  Avoidance of suffering sunken costs is used as 
an argument to continue unviable projects (Northcraft and Wolf, 1984), sometimes to 
serve reputational issues of individuals and organisations.   
Failing to align governance with the relevant project environment is resulting in making 
the wrong decisions, not making them in time or not making decisions at all (Joslin 
and Müller, 2016). The push for rigid standardised approaches to project management 
and their slavish application leaves little room to adjust the governance to the project 
environment. The need to implement effective governance at the earliest possible 
point is considered good practice by industry (Sundes, 2014).  However, this does not 
work without accountability.  
I. Accountability of the individual 
Understanding the accountability of individuals in charge of projects is multifaceted 
(Lupson and Partington, 2011).  Some individuals feel only accountable to their own 
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project stakeholders and will not make decisions that could be detrimental for the 
project even though the wider impact would be undesirable.  Somebody who feels 
accountable for the wider public would see a project in a wider context, in which it may 
not provide any or very little benefits. 
The heightened focus on management accountability has a direct link to concerns 
about personal reputation and career prospects resulting in an increase of escalation 
commitment (Mahlendorf, 2015).  Correlation has been identified between the strength 
of capital market orientation and the unwillingness to fail projects, effectively displaying 
dysfunctional decision making.  It also implies that this occurs less in the public sector, 
where there is little or no focus on capital markets.  This, however, does not appear to 
be the case (Hayhow, 2017) as examples, such as the Airport Berlin demonstrate 
(Landesrechnungshof Brandenburg, 2015).  
The government preferred PRINCE2 approach, establishes a single point of authority 
as project owner (in PRINCE2 language the SRO = Senior Responsible Owner) to 
assign resources and funds (Zwikael and Smyrk, 2015) in an aim to  define clear 
accountability to project roles. However, existing project governance models are 
deemed to be outdated and incomplete with steering boards consisting of key 
stakeholders are being thought to be more effective in their ownership of the project 
and holding the project manager accountable. 
Governance issues are not the only detrimental influences and constraints, which hold 
performance of public sector projects back. Not only is the public sector hindered by 
slow decision making, stifling procurement rules, established and inflexible 
jurisdictions; it also has retained an intrinsic distrust of private sector entities holding 
back the development of good project teams (Ning and Ling, 2013).  
II. Accountability and responsibility 
Accountability and responsibility are terms which are widely used in literature and day-
to-day language.  However, they have different meanings affecting the context of the 
research.  
The difference is very subtle and in the universal use of everyday language almost 
non-existent. In the Oxford English Dictionary, responsibility is defined as: 
“accountability”, whilst accountability is described as “answerability, chargeability, 
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liability and responsibility” (Soanes, 2003).  Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner, 1999)  
refers to responsibility as “Liability” or “a person’s mental fitness to answer in court for 
his or her actions, see competency”.  Accountability is defined as “responsibility, 
answerable”.  The terms are either mutually exchangeable or so closely associated 
that one cannot exist without the other. This confusion is addressed by McGrath & 
Whitty (2018) defining responsibility as an obligation to satisfactory perform a task, 
whilst accountability is the liability to ensure that a task is performed satisfactorily.  
Some researchers see responsibility as a causal attribution, whilst accountability is 
referred to as the potential for punishment (Brees and Martinko, 2015).  One could not 
be held accountable where no responsibility was attributed, but one could be 
responsible and not been held accountable.  Both terms are often subject to 
perception, particularly within the public sector.  Judgements of accountability are 
heavily influenced by the dynamics within organisations and/or project teams.  
Burga and Rezania (2017) point out that project accountability is not realised in the 
way it is suggested in relevant guidance. They state that the accountability in projects 
is often based on individuals taking ownership.  Furthermore Burga & Rezania 
recognise the influences, character, relationships, social environment, etc. form the 
project governance and accountability more than theoretical management principles.  
III. Accountability and the civil service 
Accountability in the public sector is ultimately associated with transparency and the 
absence of both would allow individuals or groups to act with impunity (Adam et al., 
2012). The public sector provides services that are deemed to be unsuitable for 
mechanisms used in the private sector.  Benefactors are often vulnerable individuals 
with low income and there is a need to separate services from market interests and 
fluctuations. Other services have rescue functions and are provided with powers (such 
as the justice system) and require therefore to remain in the public sector.  Whichever 
purpose it may be, these services are funded through taxation and must be subject to 
maximum transparency.   
Kieslich & Littlejohns (2015) note that transparency, consistency and specific 
conditions of the decision-making environment, such as publicity, relevance make 
decisions legitimate. This does not only include the aspect of the decision making but 
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establish options for the enforcement of conditions associated with the award and 
processes that allow bidders to challenge the decision makers. 
Reports and investigations in failures of public sector organisations, such as the NHS, 
have raised concerns about the lack of accountability for decision makers in the public 
sector.  However, accountability is judged from different perspectives, which seems to 
direct to different judges (Ferlie et al., 1996).  The sense of being accountable to 
somebody is also associated with individual loyalties, rather through means of an 
established governance.  Consequently, the term requires explicit definition when 
implementing governance on a project. 
2.2.3. Transparency 
Democratic governments all over the world are seeking to 
find workable solutions for ensuring accountability and 
transparency across their activities.  In the USA, the Federal 
Funding Accountability & Transparency Act (Hatch, 2008) 
was implemented, but experienced problems with the release 
of information on federal grants, loans and contracts.  The 
intention was to provide the public access to data on these awards to focus decision 
makers on public value and reduce wasteful expenditure.  
In his review of the impact of this Act, Hatch (2008) revealed that exposure of the 
range of bids for public funding resulted in pushing decision makers towards lowest 
bidders with a detrimental effect on quality.  It also highlighted that the public 
perception of value was subjective and therefore the view of wastefulness on federal 
spending by the public did not improve.  It concluded that the drive towards 
transparency can have unintended consequences. 
However, the public sector should work on the premise of maximum transparency, 
which includes accountability for project approvals, funding, resource and 
procurement decisions.  This can create ethical dilemmas for managers in the public-
sector environment: regulations and policies are explicit and detailed, for example, 
public procurement regulations (The Public Contracts Regulations 2015, SI 
2014/2705), and leave no discretion for adjustments to the process when additional 
information comes to light, which alters significantly the quality of the outcome.   
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Fear of falling foul of the processes encourages risk aversity, particularly in fear of 
future audits and reviews.  Ultimately, this has a detrimental effect on the performance. 
There is even an argument that there may be circumstances, in which less 
accountability would prevent escalation commitment as managers feel less threatened 
by a project failing (Mahlendorf, 2015). 
2.2.4. Why does that matter for the subject investigated in this 
research?  
Projects of any kind require careful and competent 
decision making.  In the public sector, these 
decisions relate to the expenditure of taxpayer’s 
monies to achieve a benefit to the wider society.  
Therefore, individuals making decisions should feel 
responsible for their actions as well as they should 
be held accountable for them.  
The key to this is seen in establishing elevated 
levels of transparency - the more transparent the 
process, the more exposed the decision makers are.  However, as some of the 
literature indicates, the balance between the provision of transparency for decisions 
and the creation of a fear of blame environment can lead to decision paralysis and 
ultimately to achieve the opposite of what is sought.  
2.3. Project estimation 
2.3.1.   Context  
Projects, Project Management (PM) and project performance has increasingly raised 
the interest of academic researchers over the last few decades. This is particularly the 
case in relation to the public sector, where high profile project failures, such as the 
cost overruns at the Defence Information Infrastructure Project of £4.8bn and the NHS 
National Programme for IT of £3.6bn (Hayhow, 2017) have been reported.  This is not 
limited to the UK public sector only, as the ongoing problems with the Airport Berlin 
Brandenburg demonstrate. (Landesrechnungshof Brandenburg, 2015). 
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The MRC has undertaken some major estates projects in recent years (Laboratory of 
Molecular Biology in Cambridge with £212m investment and the Francis Crick Institute 
in London with over £600m) as well as numerous medium and small projects. As 
described in the introduction (Chapter 1), these projects pose some unique 
challenges.  Technology in cutting edge science is often untested and therefore no 
previous experience of requirements on building engineering available.  Scientists, 
engineers, architects and project professionals embark on a journey of discovery in 
many of these projects.  
Consequently, management of construction projects in the MRC deal with technical 
complexities which often require a multitude of experts in various engineering fields, 
such as electromagnetic shielding, vibration and acoustic management, as well as 
containment of chemical and biological hazards.  These must be delivered within given 
budgets and timeframes, which may not necessarily fit with the natural schedule of the 
works to be completed.  Public sector accounting rules, such as the annuality of funds 
are a significant element of this. (Hyndman et al., 2005). 
2.3.2. The estimation in the early project stage 
The first stage of projects tends to be critical for the performance in later phases.  A 
mandate is being gained to proceed with the project by identifying the benefits it would 
offer versus the required funding (Office of Government Commerce, 2009). 
Estimates are at the heart of the project from the beginning all the way through to 
completion. Even at the very earliest stage of when an idea of an undertaking 
emerges, people will have very general views of costs or timeframes in their mind, 
irrespective of how realistic they are.  These estimates will be refined and revised 
throughout the development of the project as more information is gathered, and details 
of the plans emerge.  At each step, the calculations will have a certain confidence level 
attached to them, which continues to increase – upon the appointment of a contractor, 
one would expect these to be at approximately 90% (HM Treasury, 2015a).  However, 
it is unlikely to ever have complete accuracy in the estimates – specifically in 
construction project, not least due to the wide range of circumstances and events that 
impact plans.  
Even when taking the relevant confidence levels into consideration, the estimates 
often still show great disparity between forecasts at point of approval and the results 
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at actual completion. Information provided as part of the initiation process determines 
the approval of the projects and should enable the evaluators to make an informed 
decision whether the benefits outweigh the costs or vice versa. Grossly inaccurate 
estimates lead to investment decisions that are unlikely to achieve the desired 
outcome.  
Literature offers a wide variety of potential causes of these inaccuracies, but two areas 
emerged that dominate the discussion: strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias. 
Project management activity applies to all phases of a project and is influenced by a 
wide range of aspects.  PM guidance (Office of Government Commerce, 2009; The 
Chartered Institute of Building, 2002) often focusses on the delivery phase, where 
procurement decisions, change, risk and issue management are seen to have the 
most direct impact on the outcome of a project.    
But there are many actions taking place before this phase which are influential for a 
controlled and successful project delivery.  The complexities of project environments 
make a comprehensive approach to address all aspects near impossible, certainly 
impracticable. Practitioners generally agree that first steps of a project are critical for 
their later performance (Jost, Petros and Bullock, 2006), mainly because it implements 
all measures required to deal with risks and issues throughout the life cycle.  This is 
evident from the description of the purpose of the project initiation as defined by 
relevant bodies of professionals, such as the Association of Project Managers 
(Naybour, 2014), which refers to the justification of the project, what and how it will be 
achieved. It also sets out the responsibilities for the individuals involved.   
To develop a project from a vision to something deliverable, a comparison between 
the existing situation and the desired one is made (gap analysis) establishing the 
requirements. These requirements represent the key objectives that need to deliver 
the desired benefits.  Hjelmbrekke, Hansen and Lohne (2015) state that the failure of 
delivering these benefits is deemed to be the consequence of a lack of engagement 
with users throughout a project. This is argued to be the result of contract being formed 
between parties (sponsor and contractor), which exclude the user and therewith losing 
focus on the organisational perspective over project delivery.  
Research by Li, et.al (2018) involved a quantitative assessment of stakeholder 
influence and found end users of construction projects as the most influential 
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stakeholder after government representatives and owners. Importantly their main area 
of influence is considered the pre- and post-construction phases, the former to inform 
the needs and the latter to provide feedback on the project performance.  
Designers (architects, etc.) have the difficult responsibility to translate these 
requirements into tangible designs of facilities. This involves the balancing of many 
pressures: fulfilling the multiple needs of users, design within budget, design within 
stipulations of regulations and standards, etc. Afacan & Demirkan (2010) found that 
the priorities are different on projects and so are the specific understandings and 
details of the requirements. In the context of research facilities, this has resulted in the 
development of a specialist area of expertise for designers (Huler, 1991). Since cost 
and time schedules are based on the design of the facility, it is of significant importance 
that the design is suitable to achieve the envisaged benefits.  
At this early stage, estimates for project costs and time scales have a relatively low 
level of certainty, resulting in higher contingency allowances. Kim, Seo and Hyun 
(2012) note that producing cost estimates at an early stage of a project causes 
uncertainty due to limited project information being available. They further point to 
traditional processes of estimation, such as the application square meter rates and 
refer to the influence of estimator’s experience and preferences on the outcome of this 
activity. Kim, Seo and Hyun suggest the use of a hybrid method, which uses a mixture 
of information (historical and quantity-based) to overcome the lack of information at 
this early stage of a project.  
Inception stages of projects ultimately prepare a project for the first and critical hurdle 
– the approval by relevant groups or individuals, mostly with the respective award of 
funding.  Application for this is made in the form of a business case, setting out the 
benefit of the project for the organisation.  The UK Government template for the 
development and submission of Business Cases (Great Britain, HM Treasury, 2015b) 
guides applicants explicitly (via explanations under the various headings) and/or 
implicitly (via the “sponsors” within the respective government department) on how to 
word the proposal and which aspects to emphasise or prioritise.  However, my 
experience in the public sector is that evaluators rely to a significant degree on the 
statements of the bidder (particularly in highly specialist areas, such as fundamental 
science) that the project will provide a solution to the problem and deliver the identified 
benefits. 
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The overall funding availability for most of the UK public sector has continuously 
decreased and can be described as unpredictable or volatile over the last decade 
(Pope, 2017), intensifying a focus on effective decision making through improved 
certainty in the outcome of the projects.  Failed projects take sparse funding from other 
projects, which may be more viable and offer more success.  
Unfortunately, experience in the public sector is that early estimates are considered to 
be the final cost of a project and fail to acknowledge that they cannot not provide 100% 
confidence levels specifically within the public sector and with a fierce competition for 
available funds. It is human nature to gain certainty prior to making decisions, but this 
desire can result in just a perception of certainty and make judgement inconsistent as 
found in the research from Bazerman & Moore (2008). This issue affects both the 
bidders, in making sure they apply for enough funding to complete the project, and the 
assessors, who are seeking evidence in the applications that the estimates are 
accurate.  
2.4. Strategic misrepresentation? 
Literature provides an interesting range of views to the 
subject of strategic misrepresentation, specifically in relation 
to the extent and severity of its occurrence. Strategic 
misrepresentation is a term describing deliberate 
presentation of false data and it is argued by researchers that 
project teams would understate costs and overstate benefits 
to gain approval of a project and/or gaining funding.  My reading on this subject has 
found consensus that the phenomenon exists but opinions are divided over the level 
of influence and impact it has and what appropriate solutions can be employed.  
Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl (2002) make the argument that strategic misrepresentation is 
common in the public sector, where the chances of project approval are increased by 
understating the costs and overstating the benefits. Similarly, Jones & Euske (1991) 
claim that strategic misrepresentation is a “standard procedure” deployed by project 
teams, suggesting systematic, rather than occasional use.  However, this statement is 
not sufficiently evidenced. Systemic and wilful misrepresentation amounts to serious 
professional misconduct (Thurmaier, 1992).  In fact, in the British Civil Service it would 
be considered a breach of statutory law, attracting heavy penalties (Great Britain, Civil 
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Service Human Resources, 2015; Great Britain. Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010). 
2.4.1. Evidence for strategic misrepresentation? 
It is not easy to prove deliberate deceit in the context of project estimation, mainly 
because reasons for variances between project estimates and actual cost and 
programme of delivery are plentiful. Hence, the theory of strategic misrepresentation 
is not without critics.  It is considered to miss the multidimensional project framework 
(Osland and Strand, 2008) and being ignorant to the variety of strong project 
environments and influences, such as political aspects.  Criticism is particularly 
levelled at the statement that the misrepresentation is the major reason for the 
variances in project estimates and outcomes, despite recognition of the high 
complexity of large-scale transport projects and subsequent difficulties in developing 
estimates.  Additionally, these projects have a long life-span of such projects, 
inevitably resulting in some changes (design, technology, regulatory, etc.).  
The question of evidence is an important one.  In the literature research, no study was 
found that reviewed the presence of strategic misrepresentation in estimates of 
projects, which have not been successful in gaining approval. It is therefore unclear if 
these projects were unsuccessful because their estimates were more accurate and/or 
indeed, whether strategic misrepresentation was even present.   
2.4.2. Deliberate?  
The difficulty to detect evidence of strategic misrepresentation could also be the 
symptom of what is coined as “normalisation of deviance” (Pinto, 2014).  It is 
manifested by a creeping, incremental deviation from good practice in organisations 
to the point where the deviation is no more recognised within the relevant organisation.  
Key promoting factors for this phenomenon are optimism bias, superficial risk 
management and undue influences by senior management amongst others.  There 
are also elements of “motivational reasoning’ (Kunda, 1990), but the incremental 
nature of the deviation together with failure to identify faults in the system and 
processes are noted as main causes for the inaccuracies of project estimates as 
opposed to deliberate deceit.  
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Literature focuses mainly on large infrastructure or transport projects, presumably 
because they are prominent in the public domain, have high public interest and provide 
easier access to data.  No similar literature was found to smaller public projects or, 
more appropriately, for this research, on projects relating to complex laboratories and 
research facilities, but it is assumed that some, if not all, of the problems identified 
above would apply to such undertakings.  
2.4.3. Influences and causes of strategic misrepresentation 
I. Approval processes 
The review of literature identified that the problem of strategic misrepresentation is not 
seen as the sole fault of project bidders.  The publication of approval criteria, which 
favours a combination of low costs and high benefits, is considered an incentive to 
adjust project data accordingly.  Publications, such as the Green Book (HM Treasury, 
2015b), gives specific advice in this regard.   It allows project teams to cater their 
business case towards the identified “success” criteria resulting environment of the 
“survival of the unfittest” (Flyvbjerg, 2009) where the applications, which overstate the 
benefits and understate the costs and/or risks, are more likely to succeed in gaining 
funding. 
Furthermore, these business cases compliant with the Green Book (Great Britain, HM 
Treasury, 2015b), require an extensive range of skills and expertise that are rarely 
found within a single organisation.  Often, public sector organisations have to procure 
the services of commercial support and expertise to develop the business cases.  
This results in a vested interest by these experts in promoting the supply of information 
which present the project as attractive and economically viable (McLaughlin, 2004), 
as the approval is likely to allow the continuation of the appointments in the medium 
to long term. Interestingly, McLaughlin is asks for integrity of the professionals to 
ensure that they give honest advice (such as to not take unviable projects further) 
whilst urging clients to use strategists to “sell” the project to respective funders.  Other 
studies suggest, that the strategic misrepresentation is allowed to persist, because 
approvers believe external sources only, if they reinforce the existing believes (Dotti, 
2018). 
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II. Financial and economic environment 
A project that provides important benefits should receive approval.  However, the 
measure of the benefits tends to be set against the cost of the project (costs, time, 
resource, etc.) creating the notion of “value for money”.  Unfortunately, this is often 
just a question of affordability rather than a considered, balanced judgement.  After all, 
there is no point of approving a project when there is no available funding to pay for it.  
Funding availability has a significant impact on the behaviour of bidding organisations.  
First and foremost, it increases the competition for these sparse funds, which in turn 
can cause project teams and senior management of a bidding organisation to make 
the business case more compelling by misrepresenting the funding need or the risk 
levels involved.  If such an approach has been previously successful, then that will 
exacerbate this tendency.  Undoubtedly, organisations within the public sector are 
competing for restricted resources and use available tools (including unethical ones) 
to gain funding approval. This has been acknowledged in the research by Edwards 
and Roy (2017), although it focuses on this subject in the context of inappropriate 
incentivisation and measurement of aspects, which result in unintended 
consequences, such as decreasing quality of research papers (when measured in 
output number) or increasing time spent on writing proposals than undertaking 
research activities (measured on external grant funding). 
A further unhelpful aspect of public funding is that under-spending of budgets is 
considered more of a problem than exceeding available funding envelopes (Brian-
Bland and Rasor, 1986).  Departments and associated organisations tend to ensure 
all funds available will be expended within the relevant fiscal year.  This means that 
projects are less likely to show any underspend/savings in their reports hence 
counteracting any attempt to incentivise projects to achieve savings.  It also means 
that it is unlikely for unspent funds to become available to other departments and 
organisations.  
III. Organisational culture 
Some organisational cultures lend themselves more to strategic misrepresentation 
than others.  Environments where the personal or corporate interests override wider 
national concerns (Brian-Bland and Rasor, 1986) are deemed to be particularly 
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vulnerable to the promises of success via deviating practices with the US military being 
given as an example.  Status of an individual is based on the size of budget under 
their responsibility and their ability to fully expend this within the given time frames (i.e. 
fiscal years).  
This prevents the search for cost/budget reducing measures and increases the desire 
to use of strategic misrepresentation to expand this budget (and therewith influence) 
further. Sometimes this can also be observed in senior management following certain 
(often self-serving) agendas and their direct interference in the estimation and 
forecasting activities.  Instructions to amend calculations for required resources and 
finances to make projects more palatable result in “death marches” (under-resourced 
project making extraordinary efforts to reach the completion stage) and unrealistic 
budgets or schedules (Yourdon, 1997). 
IV. Third party interests 
The complexities of construction projects introduce another dimension to strategic 
misrepresentation.  The wide range of technical and economic factors of large and/or 
specialist projects require expert knowledge in various areas.  Most construction 
projects employ many professional services (for example designers, consultants, 
project managers, cost consultants, etc.).   
Designers have been accused to be unresponsive to the requirement to design within 
the given budget. Love, Edwards and Irani (2012) points out that mostly designers 
compete for work through the level of their fees, often resulting in rushed work and 
design errors. Once appointed, fees for these services are often based on a 
percentage of the cost ranges for the overall construction, motivating against the 
search for low cost solutions.  Although they are required to design within budget most 
projects experience significant budget problems, usually when the design is put to the 
market for quotes (McLaughlin, 2004).   
Consequently, many projects face having to carry out Value Engineering (VE) to 
recover back to their funding envelope.  VE is aimed to find cheaper and/or better 
solutions for the same level of function and quality, although it often just results in 
scope cuts.  This exercise itself attracts costs for re-design together with delays to the 
programme, making this a very inefficient way of managing a project (Flanagan and 
Tate, 1997).  
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V. Complexity 
Projects operate in complex environments.  They are situated within one or several 
organisations, each with their own politics, governance, strategy, vision, culture and 
so on.  In addition, project teams need to consider their internal and external 
environment addressing aspects such as market conditions, inflation, global and 
national politics, locations, skills availability, etc.  Many of these are influences, over 
which the project team has little or no control or are not fully understood in the context 
of project performance (Love, Edwards and Irani, 2012).  
These significant risks and issues to the potential outcome of the project are 
highlighted in business cases and thus may present the project as being high-risk.  
Therefore, there is a tendency by project teams to not delve into these aspects too 
deeply.  
2.4.4. Potential solutions found in literature 
Just like the range of views as to the causes of strategic misrepresentation, literature 
offers various solutions for curtailing this issue. Flyvbjerg, Garbuio and Lovallo (2009) 
suggests, that repeated “offenders” should face criminal charges.  Considering the 
difficulties in proving deliberate deceit, establishing a case for criminal charges would 
be problematic, making this an impractical approach.  
A common reaction to rising project cost and schedule overruns is to implement more 
rigorous controls and monitoring processes.  Managers in the public sector are 
caretakers for public money, accountable for its expenditure and therefore required to 
take control.  However, finding the right balance between control and empowerment 
of project teams is critical to ensure that the projects will not suffer paralysis of project 
activities and decision making. 
The desire to improve project performance in general and in the public sector 
specifically, is reflected by the drive to seek out and implement formal Project 
Management procedures.  In the example of the UK public sector this was focussed 
entirely on PRINCE2 and, more recently, Agile.  
There is evidence that the one-fits-all approach is not working.  First and foremost, 
despite the introduction of formal project management approaches and intense 
training of senior project staff (via MPLA) there has been no noticeable improvement 
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of the project performance in the public sector.  Secondly, the defining characteristics 
of projects are their uniqueness and being activities outside business-as-usual (Office 
of Government Commerce, 2009) because scopes, project environments, dynamics 
and influences are different on each project.  
Working within a complex environment and facing a multitude of risks and influences 
over their life cycle, a more adaptive style, such as with the management of complex 
systems might be more effective (Stacey, 2011). But project teams and professionals 
are not completely without tools for developing estimates and improving the quality of 
the calculations.  Whether they are appropriately used is questionable.  Research has 
shown that often models are used, which are known to have flaws or to be less 
accurate, in favour of more sophisticated ones (Næss, et al., 2015).   
This as such may represent a strategic approach but without knowledge of the reasons 
for not selecting the kind of models reasons (for example, costs, lack of expertise, 
unfamiliarity) the accusation of strategic misrepresentation remains unproven. Some 
of these tools will be considered in more detail, after reviewing literature on two further 
main influences of project estimation – optimism bias and planning fallacy. 
2.5. Optimism bias & planning fallacy 
 Optimism Bias and planning fallacy are two further influences 
on the estimation of projects. These do not represent wilful 
deceit, but a cognitive tendency to underestimate risks as well 
as the time frame required for completion of tasks.  
 
2.5.1. Optimism bias 
Optimism Bias is not only associated with pre-approval phases of projects, but affects 
the decision making throughout the life cycle of projects.  Investment decisions are 
linked to the expectation of a certain value to be delivered by a project and this will 
determine the choice of options, such as the termination, persistence or escalation. 
But as Meyer (2014) notes, optimism bias results in a low likelihood for termination of 
failing projects. 
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As such, optimism bias is a key component of the escalation commitment by 
managers.  Winch (2013) views this as the result of an either over-optimistic view on 
their own level of influence on the performance of the project or unrealistically positive 
perception of what benefits the project is capable to deliver. Other reasons for the 
reluctance to terminate projects include such as the argument of sunken costs or the 
desire by managers to be associated with successful projects and are evidence of a 
bias to adopt an optimistic forecast.   
2.5.2. Planning fallacy 
Planning fallacy is paradoxical in nature as it manifests itself through individuals 
maintaining an optimistic view despite knowledge of historical evidence proving 
otherwise (Buehler, Griffin and Peetz, 2010). This phenomenon represents an 
explanation for estimate inaccuracies, which is in direct contrast to the notion of wilful 
deceit.   
Optimism bias and planning fallacy are aspects to which project teams are prone to, 
mainly because of an “inside view” (Buehler, Griffin and Peetz, 2010) by team 
members. Literature is not clear in the definition of planning fallacy. Yamini and 
Marathe (2018) found a wide field of definition, including some, which see planning 
fallacy and optimism bias as the same phenomenon. Key is that the cognitive process 
in predicting future events is closely linked with a perceived view over one’s control 
over events and overoptimistic risk assessments. However, planning fallacy as defined 
by Buehler et al. is the over-optimism despite opposing previous experiences and 
data. So why is this information not used for predictions? 
The ignorance of historical information by project teams is rooted in several aspects.  
It is uncomfortable to admit personal shortcomings or one’s own contribution to the 
failure of a project.  Common responses are to dismiss similarities or risk scenarios 
with the argument that failure was caused by some unforeseeable, external factor or 
that the circumstances of the project are completely different, justifying the dismissal 
of lessons learned.  The fact that project planning and scheduling is inevitably a 
forward- looking activity and cognitively prevents the look backwards to historical 
information exacerbates the problem. 
One further interesting aspect of planning fallacy is the degree of motivation the 
relevant individual or group may have.  In the context of a bidding process for funding, 
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one must assume that the motivation of the bidder is great and consequently, the 
degree of optimism bias is greater.  At the same time, a third person perspective, which 
would be held by an observer (auditor, reviewer), is less motivated, has less emotional 
attachment and hence more likely to seek out facts and comparisons to the project.  
2.5.3. Risk and uncertainty  
Both optimism bias and planning fallacy are inextricably 
related to the perception of risk and management of 
uncertainties.  With uniqueness being one of the key 
characteristics of projects (Office of Government Commerce, 
2009) outlooks on their risk levels must relate to the specific 
circumstances of such undertaking.  
Uncertainty in the project estimation reflects the level of confidence in the calculations, 
which is different to risk, where the uncertainty relates to the chance of the risk 
occurring.  However, both require similar tasks than project estimation and are 
consequently equally vulnerable to the influence of planning fallacy and optimism bias.   
Some UK government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence have developed 
extensive guidance on both risk and uncertainty and implemented measures to ensure 
that these are adhered to.  It has established the Cost Assurances and Analytical 
Service (CAAS) to test the project estimates (Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Cost 
Assurances and Analytics Services, 2011).  
But defence equipment procurement still suffers from significant issues in the project 
delivery, as the cost increase in the delivery of the global combat frigates 
demonstrates (Norton-Taylor and Brooks, 2016). Options for de-biasing are to 
benchmark projects (RCF) or inviting neutral outside observers. The suggestion to 
minimise motivation and reducing social pressures as a mitigation for bias will not only 
be difficult to achieve but can be counter-productive (Buehler, Griffin and Peetz, 2010). 
It is impossible to accurately predict the future thus preventing accurate estimation. 
The line between optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation is very blurred, 
making the search for relevant individual mitigation actions very difficult (Næss et al., 
2015). 
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2.5.4. Potential solutions found in literature 
At this point, it is prudent to consider the view of practitioners on this subject.  There 
are significant and detailed data from over 70 years of projects available to analyse 
and learn from, yet there is no noticeable improvement on the performance of projects.  
Planning fallacy is the result of human nature, evidenced by the fact that laymen and 
experts alike are subject to the effects of planning fallacy (Sample, 2015).  An effective 
strategy to mitigate this effect may be the use of Reference Class Forecasting (RCF), 
invitation of external observers and task segmentation.   
Guidance for project risk analysis and management (Naybour, 2014) aimed at project 
practitioners does not indulge in considerations of causes or effects of optimism bias. 
It must be highlighted that input data to risks identification and assessments need to 
be verified and assumptions are to be recorded to eliminate possible bias.  This aims 
to promote a more realistic calculation.  One of the techniques to get better views of 
the potential outcomes of projects is the Monte Carlo Analysis.   
Software applications for this method will create vast amounts of random combinations 
of different risks, which may occur and provide a calculated potential outcome in form 
of an expression of confidence levels.  This again heavily depends on the quality of 
the input provided and is only considered a good method in combination with other 
approaches (Miller and Szimba, 2015).  
Caffieri, et al. (2018) have analysed the cost performance of major projects in 
Australia, which all show significant cost budget overruns. Their findings indicate that 
greater transparency results in the reduction of optimism bias. They make also clear 
that, even if this does not completely eliminate optimism bias or strategic 
misrepresentation, it increases the confidence in the knowledge of due diligence and 
scrutiny been applied to the project.  
Other methods involve the assessment of uncertainty by producing an extreme 
pessimistic and then a similarly extreme optimistic scenario and then define width 
intervals to mitigate bias and anchoring effects.  This process is also to be carried out 
for the probability scenario (Chapman and Ward, 2007).  Supposedly this should 
cancel out the extreme views however, it is likely that with a strong tendency towards 
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the optimistic judgement, the problem would remain.  Furthermore, looking at smaller 
projects, where less resource is available this approach appears impracticable.  
2.5.5. Reference class forecasting (RCF) 
Much of the literature agrees that RCF can provide some 
improvement to the quality of project estimates, but the views 
differ as to whether this approach on its own will be sufficient. 
One view is that the key causes of inaccuracies of project 
estimates are either optimism bias or strategic 
misrepresentation.  Flyvbjerg (2008) is an avid promoter of RCF and sees it as the 
ultimate tool to remove optimism bias but admits that it may not be effective, where 
strategic misrepresentation is present as there may be little interest in finding the 
accurate forecast. 
RCF has been tested in a commercial environment by contractors, who require more 
certainty as part of their bid work.  They have employed this method to estimate the 
price and schedule uplift required and found it a useful approach for improving the 
outcome of contracts (Bayram and Al-Jibouri, 2016).  
Testing RCF  
There are barriers to the effective use of RCF.  Statistically, best results can be 
achieved when there are large amounts of project data available.  Whilst this is the 
case on large infrastructure projects, other areas, such as in the education and 
research sector do not have this kind of information.  Access to project data is difficult 
across organisations and even with relevant data available, constant attention and 
update is necessary.  Furthermore, the data sets tend to range over a long-time span, 
which may result in the need for adjustments (such as for inflation), which would be 
self-defeating (Makovsek, 2014) as it re-introduces potential bias. 
Comparisons of different approaches to estimation have shown that RCF outperforms 
(with regards to accuracy) other methods, such as Monte Carlo Analysis.  It is 
considered more user friendly with the output remaining constant, unlike with Monte 
Carlo analysis, where each calculation will represent a different combination of 
scenarios (Batselier and Vanhoucke, 2016).  
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Further thought is given to the option of using the Monte Carlo analysis with historical 
details to achieve higher certainty and accuracy.  This method can be applied in larger 
construction projects but requires expert knowledge and experienced project 
managers to provide appropriate and relevant information to feed into the model 
(Peleskei et al., 2015).  
Some of the research indicates, that whilst RCF can provide an improvement of 
estimates, its full potential can be unlocked by using it in combination with other 
mechanisms.  Most feasibility studies for construction projects of any type are carried 
out by experts, such as architects and engineers, often with the support of professional 
cost consultants.  It is suggested that the combination of expert judgement in the form 
of three-point estimates together with RCF will provide the best results.  Similar 
warnings in this area of research highlight again, that the result is heavily dependent 
on the quality of the database as well as reasoning and examination of each individual 
project that should form part of the RCF (Leleur, et al., 2015).  
2.5.6. Why does that matter for the subject investigated in this 
research?  
Literature indicates that key influencing causes of 
cost and schedule inaccuracies are strategic 
misrepresentation, optimism bias and planning 
fallacy, although there are different views as to the 
extent of the influence of each or a combination of 
all.  
The presented research demonstrates that the 
solution for these issues is neither simple nor 
restricted to the project teams alone, extending to 
the evaluators and assessors of project 
proposals. Therefore, the tools to address these issues must be useful for both.  
A step forward is provided by RCF but not considered the ultimate answer. To use 
RCF appropriately, a statistically substantial number of project details must be 
available.  Additionally, selecting appropriate projects for the reference classes 
requires some skill and knowledge about this process.  This is directly relevant to this 
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research project, as it provides an indication of the potential usefulness of chosen tools 
and a probable time span for the full implementation of any new methodology. 
2.6.  Project selection, evaluation panels and evaluation criteria 
The annual bid process in the MRC starts with an invitation to bid for funds and 
explaining the evaluation criteria (Jones, 2012). Criteria used in the MRC are aimed 
to ensure that only the highest quality of research is funded.  Projects relating to 
construction or other non-science areas are assumed worthy, if they support or 
enhance research that has been judged to be high value.  However, some of the 
criteria are not always suitable to assess estates related projects.  Such projects often 
serve much wider purposes than supporting only one specific research programme 
and hence the assessment of “value” to research is more complex.  Additionally, the 
judgement of panels is sometimes altered at the end of the process to ensure the total 
value of awards fits the funding envelope.  The moderation and/or re-scoring tends to 
refocus on science programmes only and results in estates projects being judged in a 
different context than in the initial assessment.  
Use of criteria and scoring mechanisms is a widespread method for selection in many 
areas (Human Resources, procurement, etc.) and literature is therefore sought to 
gather evidence for effective scoring mechanism and/or where shortfalls of this 
approach are.  
2.6.1. Project selection and award process 
The public sector has long been criticised for its choices in the selection of projects, 
often questioning the value of them, as seen recently with the allocation of funds to 
foreign aid in full view of the financial difficulties of the NHS (Rogers, 2017). The MRC 
Royal Charter (Queen Elizabeth II, 2003) defines the purpose of the Medical Research 
Council as to “improve human health”, which is a wide ranging and non-specific target 
historically focussed on fundamental research.   
Much of applied research is undertaken by other government departments, such as 
the NHS and PHE, which are closer to the application in practice and the 
pharmaceutical industry.  These organisations focus on research directions, which 
promise a concrete outcome in form of therapies, medication, vaccination or other 
intervention. 
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The difficulty of establishing a definition of value in curiosity and knowledge driven 
research makes it equally difficult to develop criteria and find the best process to 
objectively assess its worthiness for funding. In the academic environment, Peer 
Reviews are the most appropriate way of assessing VfM for research proposals.  It 
brings experts in the associated fields of science together to evaluate applications for 
research funding.  
I. Commercial approach 
Commercial organisations, for example pharmaceutical companies select Research & 
Development (R&D) projects based on the potential of future profits (economic 
methods).  It is reliant on existing knowledge gained from fundamental research and 
must promise the development of a treatment, targeting a sufficiently large group of 
potential users (market factors) and have acceptable risk levels for any investment in 
the project. Such criteria and the expected benefit (profit) are quantifiable.  
II. Public sector 
Generally, governments and industry focus on the funding of research of diseases and 
health issues, that affect a substantial proportion of the population, such as cancer, 
dementia, diabetes, malaria, etc. and this is reflected in the respective funding criteria. 
But there are calls to fund research into rare diseases.  It is claimed that the summary 
of people affected by rare diseases is high and warrants funding and increased 
knowledge.  Such research is often funded through charities and self-help groups 
(Wissing and Bruckner-Tuderman, 2017).  
III. “Blue sky” research 
Fundamental research, particularly when venturing in new territories of science, lends 
itself to the use of qualitative criteria (Verbano and Nosella, 2010).  This tends to be a 
form of scoring method that uses a set of criteria to arrive at a ranking for the relevant 
projects.  It is a method that is more prone to subjective influences.  There are 
increasing tendencies to prioritise on the fit into specific portfolios as opposed to 
consideration of a project in isolation, providing a much stronger strategic coherence.  
Scoring systems are “user friendly” methods but have disadvantages over non-
qualitative methods, not least due to the potential bias influencing the decision.  
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2.6.2. Dynamics within evaluation panels 
Many organisations (including the MRC) publish the 
evaluation criteria that are used for the assessments to 
provide transparency of the process and award results.  
The way in which they are applied is often implicit and 
depends on the background of the assessors, status or 
gender of the applicant or the applicant’s organisation (van 
Arensbergen et al., 2014). 
These invisible dynamics and the subjective application of criteria are key reasons for 
the process of evaluation and the subsequent conclusion is perceived as a ‘black box’. 
For example, the definition of “excellence” in the context of research has a wide-
ranging interpretation: innovation, novelty, well-written, significance, interesting, 
presentation of a good track record and can vary with the discipline of science (Mow, 
2011).   
Panel reviews rely on assessors being impartial but there is evidence for panel 
members promoting applications, which are close to their own discipline or area of 
expertise as well as research applicants who they are familiar with or have knowledge 
and association with the respective organisation (Lamont, 2010). The increasing 
number of multidisciplinary research projects reinforces the need for panels to have 
experts in the relevant fields of research as members.   
It introduces another unintended dynamic, in that panel members will be aware of the 
specialist expertise and rely the judgement of those experts.  A tendency to make less 
effort by individuals to understand the various aspect themselves can be observed as 
a result (Langfeldt, 2004). But this can also have a positive influence in that the experts 
present their views and the panel discusses and comes to an informed decision.  
A distinction between formal rules (for example impartiality and thoroughness) and 
informal rules can also be observed.  The latter are consequences of constraints, such 
as size of the funding envelope and time frame available to undertake the evaluation. 
Some of these constraints can be in direct opposition to the formal rules.  For example, 
the need for thoroughness can be constrained by a very restricted time frame available 
to undertake the assessment.  Evaluators would sacrifice thorough research into the 
capability of an applicant, because he or she is known to the assessor and focuses 
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therefore more on those who are unknown.  This process has therefore introduced 
bias.   
The closeness of a reviewer’s expertise to the field of the application also has a direct 
influence on the result (Gallo, Sullivan and Glisson, 2016).  It seems logical, that with 
more expertise in the relevant field the assessment is “harsher” than if assessed by a 
reviewer with less expertise in the area or a non-academic assessor.  This is the key 
argument against the accusation of influence of social networks and cronyism.    
I. Power for the applicants or transparency? 
An interesting concept for achieving more transparency to peer reviews in science 
(particularly in the emerging interdisciplinary research) is to increase the 
empowerment of applicants in the review process (Laudel, 2006). Involving applicants 
in the selection of reviewers on panels is expected to encourage the discussion 
between reviewers and applicants.  Administrative efforts to establish review panels 
are considerable and the practicality of such an approach requires testing.  
Furthermore, by allowing applicants to suggest reviewers may introduce a bias with 
the relevant panel member and result in a protracted process for the proposal reviews.  
The way in which panel members are selected is not the only influence that can skew 
results.  Constraints in the funding envelope require more moderation to be applied to 
the initial ranking.  This means that once proposals are selected to be funded, panels 
would need to review and revise the scores to ensure that the awards match the 
funding envelope.   Therefore, the decision making of the review panels is arguably 
only effective, and without impairment, when there is sufficient funding available and 
they are not required to reject projects, which they otherwise may consider viable.  
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2.6.3. Evaluation criteria 
Peer reviews and panel decisions have developed over 
time and will continue to improve and change.  A recent 
example of this is the inclusion of criteria relating to the 
use of animals in the funding assessment.  Growing 
influence of the ethical standards identified and promoted 
by the NC3Rs have triggered a change in the thinking of 
funders, such as the MRC and other UK Research 
Councils not only regarding the criteria used but involving experts in this field as part 
of the evaluation process (Xanthos, 2015).   
I. Approval process and establishment of criteria 
Research grant funding starts with a call for proposals, identifying the direction of the 
research, funding criteria and overall process and duration.  Guidelines for the 
evaluators are prepared in the form of checklists with an explanation of the criteria. 
Many use internal and external reviewers to assess the submitted proposals. The 
general approach of determining research funding is a two-stage process in which an 
initial review is carried out by individuals, the result of which is then discussed and 
concluded in a committee. 
Criteria tend to focus on relevance for the call, amount of funding requested, track 
record of applicant, originality and methodology amongst others.  Reviewers spend 
between 2 hours and two days on the reading and reviewing of each proposal.  
However, if external reviewers or individuals with specialist expertise are involved, 
committees will rely heavily on their judgement.  Improvements to the process are 
mainly seen by increasing the transparency by allowing applicants to respond to 
reviewer’s queries during the process, clearer definition of the criteria and how they 
are to be applied as well as identifying the qualification of the reviewers (Abdoul, et 
al., 2012). The latter, however, is somewhat controversial, if it identifies the individuals 
making the funding decision.  
The reduction of public sector funding for research activity is not restricted to the UK 
only and many organisations worldwide have made adjustments to counter the effects 
of the harsher funding environment. However, there are warnings from unintended 
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consequences of changes in the award processes, such as peer reviews. Elias & Elias 
(2012) describe a range of negative consequences, which an amended funding 
strategy by the NIH triggered. This includes less distinction between the proposal 
scores as well as negative impacts on investigator development.  
Literature does not unite in the support of peer reviews and panel discussions as the 
best method for the selection of research projects.  Shortcomings are individual bias 
of panel members and that process demands unanimous decisions. Calls for 
amendments of the process by introducing machine-learned methods (Devyatkin, et 
al., 2016) or other combinations of peer reviews, expert opinion and panel discussion 
(Fogelholm, et al., 2012)  are viewed to enhance the reliability of selection processes.  
2.6.4. Why does this matter for the subject investigated in this 
research? 
The way in which the selection process works is important for two reasons. First, it 
must ensure that selected projects are promising benefits that are relevant to the 
organisation’s aims and vision and are viable to do so. Second, the selection process 
must be transparent and establish trust of bidding organisations in it.  
Existing processes in the MRC need to be assessed in view of these two aspects. An 
understanding of the panel dynamics and/ or power relations will enable to create 
transparent approaches and therewith build trust of all relevant stakeholders. Similarly, 
the criteria for the selection should be examined in view of a general suitability in the 
respective environment (change of research focus, research landscape, national 
ambitions, etc.) and whether the panel experts are in a position to judge the bids in 
line with the criteria in an objective way. The literature review in this element has 
demonstrated, that the aspect of the selection criteria cannot readily be separated from 
the process and dynamics within selection panels.  
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2.7. Value for Money (VfM) 
Most commercial projects are funded based on an investment appraisal, which 
includes assessments, such as accounting rate of return, 
payback, net present value (NPV) (Aston and Turner, 
1995) and similar monetary criteria. Funding decisions in 
the MRC are based on how the investment would benefit 
the research activities.   
Fundamental science is unpredictable in terms of its 
outcome and therefore the benefits can rarely be measured in monetary terms.  The 
main benefits are mostly the contribution to knowledge, and sometimes discoveries, 
that enable development of interventions, medications, diagnostic tools, etc. (Medical 
Research Council, 2013).  However, the latter is more the area of translational, applied 
or clinical research, which tends to be carried out by Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Universities, Charities and specific UK government departments and bodies, such as 
the National Institute for Health Research and Public Health England.  
Effective approval decisions are ultimately seeking to achieve “Value for Money”.  This 
phrase is often used but appears to mean different things to different people and 
organisations.  Value is subject to framing, which has a significant impact on decision 
making (Bazerman and Moore, 2008).  Without an agreed definition of “value” of 
fundamental research and supporting activities (such as estates projects) within the 
context of the MRC, no judgement of “Value for Money” can be made.   Consequently, 
criteria employed to assess the proposals are arbitrary without this.  
Ultimately, project approvers must judge the “value for money” of the presented 
proposals and it is therefore important to expand on this subject to gain an 
understanding of this term. Definitions of value are varied and subjective.  Value of 
fundamental research is difficult to quantify as it cannot guarantee specific (or 
potentially any) outcomes for its efforts.  The scientific community increasingly sees 
governments focus on funding of applied and translational research with the aim to be 
able to demonstrate delivery of benefits to the public within respective election cycles 
(dos Remedios, 2006.   
Governments are ultimately accountable to the public and therefore value in the 
context of the public sector should be seen in the eyes of benefits to society, e.g. the 
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social value.  The term is often used in the context of clinical research, but it is also 
difficult to define.  One approach is to consider social value in terms of knowledge 
creation and effect of interventions to human health or wellbeing.  To ensure this, the 
evaluation process of clinical research proposals considers potential social harm 
(ethical aspect of research activities) and aims to include social experts or members 
of the relevant community (Sibbald, 2014).   
However, this is focused on research, which targets specific diseases or health issues. 
Clinical, applied or disease specific research has the potential to show more 
quantitative measures of outcomes, but this proves still to be complex when assessed 
relating to monetary terms.  
2.7.1. Science funding in the UK 
The UK Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) distributes a 
significant capital expenditure to science projects, i.e. £5.9bn planned capital 
expenditure between 2016 and 2021. In 2014/15 a total of £1.1bn of funding was 
allocated to Science with £756m to Research Councils and the UK Space Agency, of 
this £427m related to capital projects (National Audit Office, 2016).  Historically, there 
has been a distinct lack of strategy for prioritising projects.  The decision-making 
process for the approvals was based on poor information with no details provided to 
bidders as to what information is required to inform the approval process.  The National 
Audit Office also stated that some projects were approved without any assessment 
and no evidence was found as to ability of the department to assess the “scientific and 
economic benefits of projects”.   
The NAO report does not only highlight issues with the accountability for the approval 
but identifies the absence of criteria to assess Value for Money in science projects.  
The NAO is the national “auditor” for government activities, specifically with the focus 
on VfM and provides guidance on VfM definition and measurement.  
Reviews by the NAO are mainly carried out retrospectively, usually upon completion 
of projects or at least at a significant milestone during the lifecycle of a project.  They 
do not reflect the information available at the point of approval.  However, the definition 
of VfM by the NAO is taking this into account, as it refers to the “optimal use of 
resources to achieve the intended outcome” (National Audit Office, no date).  
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This definition has two aspects open for interpretation and are difficult to define: 
optimal and outcome.  Both are heavily dependent on the context of the specific 
project, its aims and circumstances as well as events occurring throughout the life of 
the project, which may have an impact on the results being delivered.  Consequently, 
the judgement of good VfM may need to be based on the potential alternative results 
(Scharaschkin and McBride, 2016). 
Views on the best way in which governments should fund science varies widely.  The 
importance of this funding is generally agreed to be the attraction of world class 
researchers and students as well as innovative and highly mobile businesses, as a 
direct benefit for the economy.  The German and UK Governments have started to 
abandon the egalitarian funding approach and focus on the development and 
promotion of excellence in specific locations/organisations to ensure the best 
outcome.  In the UK, funding of sciences is a dual approach, where academic salaries 
and support functions are funded via HEFCE and the Research Councils fund specific 
research programmes, which is said to have resulted in less marginal research and 
improved quality of research programmes (Group of Eight, 2010).   This may now be 
changing with the establishment of UKRI, which has both Research Councils and 
HEFCE under its umbrella.  
When the Haldane principle (Hughes, 2011) was established, it acknowledged limited 
expertise by policy makers on research activities.  It resulted in the UK Government 
leaving the judgement on quality and worthiness of research proposals to experts, 
such as the various Research Councils.  However, this principle has been challenged, 
for example, by the Chairman of the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills 
Committee, who notes that there is a conflict between government policies and 
curiosity-driven research (Newman, 2010). There is an absence of a collective 
understanding of VfM between funders (Government) and the Science Community 
and looking at approaches of and other government departments may be of 
assistance.  
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2.7.2. VfM in applied medical research 
National Health Services have data sets showing the cost of treatment, amount of sick 
days, cost of care, etc. and can hence show a quantifiable benefit of a potential drug 
or treatment.  A different approach is used in the assessment of the value in view of 
their specific health benefits to patients, for example with cancer drugs.  Views on the 
meaning of value in the context of human life is contentious and on opposing ends 
between patients and policy makers.  Formulae, such as QUALY (quality adjusted 
year) and ICER (cost per QUALY) (Dilla et al., 2016), provide thresholds for approving 
bodies (i.e. NICE) to allow fiscal budgeting and considerations of approval of relevant 
drugs for free issue via the NHS.  But different values are applied to these thresholds 
in different countries, which is unlikely to be an indication of their view of the value of 
a human life, rather a reflection of buoyancy of economy, government and health 
service budgets.  
The research funded by the MRC is – with very few exceptions - not disease specific. 
It can therefore not claim to reduce treatment costs or sick days.  Nor are the outcomes 
predictable or immediate.  The path from fundamental research to clinical application 
takes many years.    
There are, however, clearly huge benefits in fundamental research, as the example of 
the discovery of DNA demonstrates, for which no real application was available until 
40 years later, when technology caught up (dos Remedios, 2006; Finch, 2008; Huxley, 
2013).  Researchers throughout the world undertake basic research, creating the 
knowledge that forms the foundation for applied and clinical developments. Without 
this, clinical and translational research has very little to work on.  
A different method used to assess value for money is the judgement of effectiveness, 
looking at goal or cost-based efficiencies.  The term of VfM is understood to achieve 
the same at lower cost or achieve better with the same cost.  This is often misapplied 
in the public sector by focussing on low costs in preference to the need for quality or 
innovation by confusing it with “cheap” (McKevitt, 2015). 
This is reflected in the UK Government guidance and regulations relating to 
procurement (Local Government Association, 2014, The Public Contracts 
Regulations, SI 2014/2705).  Scientific high-tech equipment is expensive, cutting-edge 
technology and often procured whilst still in the development phase and can therefore 
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not be purchased via a competitive tender process.  There is, in fact, a contradiction 
in the government messages in that it wishes to promote collaborative and innovative 
work with industry, however, actively prevents this through red tape and procurement 
rules. Design and construction of laboratories is an equally complex process, which 
relies very heavily on innovation, outstanding quality in workmanship and expertise, 
which come with a cost.   Quality has a price. 
Additionally, there is the ambition of the UK government to become a global centre of 
excellence in science (Great Britain, Office for Life Science, 2011).  Aiming to attract 
high profile scientists and experts requires the best facilities to be provided and 
competitive salaries to be paid.  Value in this context is the level of excellence, which 
one can attract, but also whether the scientists deliver results of the highest standards.  
2.7.3. Why does this matter for the subject investigated in this 
research? 
The MRC is funded by the UK Government and uses public monies for research 
activities.  It makes organisations responsible for funding activities and projects to 
represent a benefit for the public and good VfM.  Literature identifies a wide range of 
interpretation and application of the term highlighting the various perspectives 
depending on an organisation’s objectives.  There is no established definition aside 
from VfM being a complex interaction of the micro and macro environments of 
organisations, ambition, competition, market conditions and many more, making it 
impossible to be defined in exact quantitative terms, which could provide a generic 
benchmark. 
Fundamental medical research provides the basis for further applied and translational 
research but can be difficult to be measured in quantitative terms.   In researching the 
potential for improvement of funding decisions, a view must be formed as to which 
perspective is to be taken for establishing the value of fundamental medical research 
and identify appropriate evaluation criteria.  
There are very powerful stakeholders, such as the main funder (UK Government), 
science community, patients and patient groups as well as various charities, industry 
(pharmaceutics, engineering, etc.) and the health service, whose perspectives would 
need to be considered.  Not only is value difficult to define, but the context of VfM may 
require some comparison between different options or at least the consideration of the 
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benefit of action over doing nothing. Furthermore, such definition would require regular 
review and adaptation to the ever-changing environment.  
2.8. Implication of the literature for the problem 
In undertaking this literature review the author was seeking answers to aspects, which 
are expected to be key influences on the problem of inaccurate project estimates and 
establishing a fair and transparent funding award process. Findings from this research 
have provided direction for this research. 
Project estimation always works with assumptions, attempting to quantify the unknown 
future development and influences.  Whilst strategic misrepresentation cannot be 
excluded as a reason for inaccuracies in estimates, it is unlikely to be the only cause. 
The author has learned that estimation errors can not only be the result of genuine 
error, but a conditioning of the human mind to see things optimistically, when 
scheduling for future tasks (optimism bias) even in full view of previous experience to 
the contrary (planning fallacy) (Buehler, Griffin and Peetz, 2010).  This is not a wilful 
deceit as suggested by Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2002), but something which requires 
a tool, benchmark or other “unbiased” measure to enable correction of this issue.  
Reference Class Forecasting targets this problem by providing statistics from similar 
previous projects, which would provide this benchmark.  The author considers this a 
valid tool, although caveated by the need for sufficient and high-quality details being 
available and a careful project selection for the respective reference classes.  It might 
overcome the optimism bias but will not provide the ultimate answer to estimation 
inaccuracies.  Collection of project details from the construction sector in life sciences 
to test reference class forecasting will therefore form part of this research.  
Literature has shown that there are issues within organisations during the project 
development as well as influences from the approval process itself that motivate 
misrepresentation. Public sector projects are heavily regulated in terms of their 
financial performance, some of which are the fierce competition for very restricted 
funds and the difficulties relating to annularity of capital funding.  
The author has discovered that the approval processes themselves can cause the 
tailoring of project presentation to fit best with the identified criteria for approval.  Third 
party interests, such as professionals for whom the success of a business case 
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guarantees future income, target these criteria to maximise chances for funding 
approval.  
These and further organisational and cultural influences (Brian-Bland and Rasor, 
1986; Pinto, 2013), such as inappropriate governance, unnatural constraints to the 
project schedule and budget, etc., require careful consideration of potential measures 
to eliminate or at least reduce these influences.  
One area, which is the basis for judgement in both estimation and approval of projects, 
is “Value for Money”.  The literature research discovered a wide range of views on 
what represents VfM, depending on sector, organisation, even individuals involved.  It 
has become clear that, like governance, needing to be suitable for each organisation 
and project, VfM considerations must be contextual to the relevant organisation – there 
is no “one definition”.  This definition needs to be found for the purposes of the MRC 
evaluations. 
In conclusion, the Literature Review has guided me to an understanding of the problem 
as something much wider than what my problem statement in Chapter 1 suggested.  
It will be necessary to approach this in a more holistic way by gaining better knowledge 
of the commissioning and approval processes and what influences them within the 
MRC.   
 
FIGURE 4 - COMPLEXITY OF ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM 
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Figure 4 indicates, how project elements, such as governance, estimation, panel 
dynamics, etc. are interlinked with each other and how they are all influenced by and 
affect Value for Money of an undertaking.  
In view of the findings and learning from this literature review, the Author found that to 
fulfil the overarching aim to develop a fair and transparent processes for the approval 
of estates projects the following key questions need to be answered:  
What are the influences on processes and dynamics of project estimation and 
approvals in the MRC?  
Would RCF provide a workable tool for project estimation and/ or assessment? 
How can this knowledge be used to achieve a fairer and more transparent 
process for these aspects in the early project stages therewith achieving better 
Value for Money for medical research?
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3.1.  Research framework 
This research is seeking to address a real problem in the operations of the Medical 
Research Council. It is focused on workable solutions and the measurement of its 
outcome. Developing theories that may apply to some or most of the aspects identified 
in Chapter 1 make little sense, if they cannot be implemented. Finding measures from 
the research in this problem that would be palatable to the leadership and resolve the 
problem is paramount for the author as a practitioner and for the MRC, placing this 
research firmly in the scope of pragmatism. Practice-based research is particularly 
applicable to the testing of RCF, should it be considered for future use in the 
development or judgment of project estimates. 
As Aikin (2018) considers pragmatism as the starting place for developing theory 
which is what the author believes is required to investigate the stated problem. 
Pedanik (2018) notes the emergence of pragmatisms as key methodology for 
education studies. He points out that this methodology is seeking aspects of the 
relationship between humans and their environment and as such this should not be 
focussed on education alone but on the concept of problem-solving. Pedanik highlights 
the similarity of this principle with action research and demonstrate the application 
through linking a case study of action research with the aspects of pragmatism as 
identified by Dewey (1922). 
The environment in which the MRC operates is heavily influenced by political aspects 
(government aspirations, formation of UKRI and the need to prove it can deliver the 
anticipated benefits, competition for funding, etc.) including pressure from the public, 
charities, patient groups, universities and so on. Specifically, the question raised in 
relation to the suitability of the process for evaluation and award of funding will need 
to consider different, if not opposing views (bidders versa approvers). In this context 
my own expertise and knowledge is not only less important, but unhelpful, as it may 
not reflect those differing perspectives. 
The literature review has demonstrated that the subject matter has a multitude of 
viewpoints formed by stakeholders in relation to their own position in the processes. 
Their environment, experience and drives will result in different ‘realities’, which this 
research seeks to capture. From these constructs a bigger picture can be formed that 
establishes a more comprehensive understanding of the MRC as a whole. 
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The author is careful, not to subscribe this research to constructivism, being aware of 
the academic debate over the meaning of this term, but the learning process of the 
author as the researcher and the organisation is expected to create new 
understanding and knowledge from the views of participants and project data sets.  
3.2.  THE AUTHOR’S POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM 
There are benefits and disadvantages in undertaking action research in one’s 
organisation, some of which are discussed in the following. In her current position as 
the Director Capital & Estates the author is deeply involved in all aspects of the project 
development, estimation, evaluation and awards as well as being in a position of 
power to influence, how the organisation operates in these areas.  
Challenges to the author’s role are the three aspects of insider inquiry (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2010). First, the author has a pre-understanding of the processes and 
organisational environment and therefore a view on what knowledge exists and what 
is missing. She has also access to relevant data sets (in this case the project 
information from MRC) and needs to ensure that she analyses with appropriate 
distance to project information. 
Second, the author has a dual role in being a researcher and having a senior 
organisational role. Whilst this helps in gaining support from the senior management 
for actions that may need to be implemented, it can also cause conflict with the 
researcher role that should view the information without ties of loyalties, bias, 
preferences, etc. In terms of this research, which includes aspects of behavioural, 
procedural or political activities, the author sees inherent conflicts of interest.  
For example, the author engages with teams in the development of project proposals, 
as well as being an approver (although not the only approver) for these projects. She 
could encounter conclusions of faults or failures in both of these aspects and must use 
her professional integrity as researcher to avoid a distortion of the findings for the 
benefit of maintaining a reputation as effective manager.  However, the author has 
designed the methodology in a way that allows the scrutiny of anonymised information 
and decisions by the working group or others (senior management) that is mitigating 
this issue. 
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Third, the author has access to information that is difficult for external researchers to 
gain due to political aspects in the organisation (gatekeepers). Her seniority also 
supports the implementation of actions and gaining support from other senior players 
in the organisation.  
The design of the research was very much aligned with the findings and 
recommendations by Holian and Coghlan (2013) to avoid pitfalls that this dual role of 
the author may pose. But in reflection of their work, it is apparent to the author, that 
this is much of the principle of decision making in the MRC.   
For example, whether projects are “worthy” is a decision, which is made collectively.  
MRC RPG considers the benefits that the project will provide for the science or indeed 
if it is in line with the strategic direction of the unit research. Only then will a project be 
assessed in the wider perspective, such as technical solutions, cost and schedule 
estimates, risk, etc. Hence, the author’s potential interest in projects being successful 
is mitigated with the initial review being a science-driven one.  
Being a member of the MRC capital bid panel as well as the MRC Management Board 
represents a responsibility for the overall capital project budget (i.e. ensure that 
awards are made within the funding envelope) and required to review all bids relating 
to construction or refurbishment of facilities and any associated works. The authors 
assessments are presented to the panel members to aid the decision between 
approval and rejection. It is a powerful position and comes with the responsibility to 
make the approved projects deliver the identified benefits.  
In choosing to engage with groups of stakeholders as an action group, the author has 
been helpfully been challenged in her views and interpretations as well as been 
provided with a “third party” view from the outside of the organisation. Nevertheless, 
the author also sees advantages that her situation brings to the research. A deep 
understanding of the political and cultural environment within and outside of the 
organisation and how individuals deal with this environment allows to draw 
conclusions with a different perspective than an outsider would have. 
The benefit of insider action research in a public sector organisation with multiple key 
stakeholders is highlighted by Chauhan (2018) seeing the insider researcher as a 
knowledge broker and this allows others to take the ownership for required changes, 
rather than being forced through one individual.   
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3.3. BACKGROUND TO THE CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY 
In selecting the methodology for this research, the author considered the problem 
itself, the type of detail that would need to be collected, her position within the 
organisation and therefore the problem and practicalities to carry out meaningful 
research and produce actionable knowledge within the timeframe of approximately 12 
to 15 months.  
3.3.1. ACTION RESEARCH 
I. Why action research? 
Having identified the problem and ascertained the benefits, which solving this problem 
would provide to the MRC, the core aspect of action research was considered – how 
can it be ensured that the research results in outcomes that will be implemented and 
achieve the desired benefits? This included aspects of the authors authority within the 
organisation, organisational processes, cultures as well as appreciating the way in 
which knowledge is developed and disseminated in the organisation.  
 
FIGURE 5 - PRACTICAL KNOWLEGE CYCLE 
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To develop practical knowledge (McDonagh and Sullivan, 2017; Coghlan & Brannick, 
2010) the research needed to incorporate experiential, presentational and 
propositional knowledge (Figure 5). This combination would enable the organisation 
to undergo a cultural transformation in terms of triple loop learning (Tosey, visser and 
Saunders, 2012). 
Ø Experiential knowledge 
This research was initiated due to the perception of a problem. MRC staff and 
scientists experience the problem of funding constraints and how this is managed in 
diverse ways and with very different perspectives. Capturing these experiences is an 
important aspect of the research and the qualitative methodology in the first research 
cycle used the free discussion to gain insight to the organisation’s internal and external 
environment. During the second cycle the experiences were captured via 
questionnaires. Developing the experiential knowledge was a powerful contribution to 
the understanding of the problem and selection of effective actions.  
Ø Presentational Knowledge  
The way in which knowledge was presented varied throughout the research subject to 
the intended audience. Narratives (reports), presentations, meeting and individual 
discussions were used for this purpose.   
Ø Propositional knowledge 
Both experiential and presentational knowledge were used to arrive at proposals for 
measures to be taken in repeated research cycles. Undertaking two research cycles 
(and later further continuous improvement) enabled these areas to be tested and 
conclude in practical knowledge.  
It also enables learning at different levels, that are noted by McDonagh and Sullivan 
(2017). Addressing the problem identified targets practical improvements in the 
organisation. The process of researching, analysing, enacting and reviewing (research 
cycles) results in my personal learning and understanding of my organisation. This 
research has a wider impact, than just the MRC. The development of RCF for projects 
around life science facilities (be it initially as a pilot study) is of interest to a wide range 
of stakeholders within the research community (universities, charities, pharmaceutical 
industry) and government departments (HM Treasury, BEIS, Department of Health, 
Ministry of Defence, etc.).  
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II. Action research cycles  
This research activity is only the first step in a cycle of continuous improvement 
seeking to achieve a refined process, which provides benefits to all involved parties. 
Therefore, the methodology includes repeated collection of information (annually), 
which looks at project performance and understanding of the stakeholder’s views on 
whether the process has improved.  
An important aspect of this research is that it targets actionable outcomes, which in 
turn will be reviewed as to their effectiveness. Action research cycles involve the 
repeat of research, information collection, analysis of information, deciding on the 
action and reviewing the outcome. This triggers the starting point of the next research 
cycle. In this, the action research cycle fulfils the requirement of structured actions and 
assessments of outcomes followed by further actions (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). 
Beaulieu (2013) points out that action research is primarily a tool to improve a 
problematic issue and not to prove or disprove hypotheses, it does seek out the roots 
of a problem, better understanding of the truth through close engagement with 
stakeholders.  
This understanding has been taken forward into a programme of  continuous 
improvement that is to be progressed as a “Business as usual” element. Here the 
influence of action research continues in that evidence is gathered via surveys, project 
information collection, interviews, etc. to evaluate the effectivenss of measures and 
identify the next steps. 
3.3.2. MIXED METHODOLOGY 
Due to the nature of the elements to be considered, different methods were required 
to gather data and the subsequent analysis. Hesse-Biber and Johnson (2013) point 
out that the use of mixed methods research is as varied as the problems they being 
sought to solve. Reilly and Jones (2017) note that this approach is particularly effective 
in research complex issues. In this research, each cycle contained the activities for 
each the RCF work and the organisational research. The two areas had different 
timings – one driven by the annual capital bid process and the second by the speed in 
which sufficient project detail could be gathered. However, both underwent two full 
research cycles, concluding in the establishment of a comprehensive understanding 
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of the issues surrounding the process of project start up, estimation and project 
approval.  
The two strands of this research progressed independent. Both involved the collection 
of very different information and were subject to different time constraints. Work on the 
organisational research was bound to the cycle of the capital bid process, whilst the 
records for the RCF was collected and assessed without specific timelines. 
Furthermore, it was not intended to apply RCF to the capital bid process before it was 
tested and found appropriate.  Figure 6 is a schematic visualising this approach.  
 
FIGURE 6 - SCHEMATIC OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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Views by stakeholders over a range of aspects were sought. It included specific 
feedback on processes, such as the capital bid process as well as more philosophical 
considerations of the meaning of value in the context of medical science. Such data 
sets were collected using qualitative methods (in the following referred to as 
organisational research), in interviews and questionnaires. The second strand of the 
approach was the investigation of RCF as a tool to improve the estimation of project 
costs and schedules. This required quantitative methods for information collection and 
analysis.   
A further important aspect in choosing the methodology was the consideration of the 
audience. Undertaking action research in the MRC requires an understanding of what 
kind of output and presentational method would have the most impact and likely to be 
understood and accepted by the organisation. The MRC funds medical research, 
which in the majority is based on an ontology of realism using the establishment of 
hypotheses, undertaking of experiments and analysis of facts/ numbers to conclude in 
either confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012). Consequently, use of quantitative methods were felt to be more 
suitable for the analysis of some of the details. In the following the specific approaches 
for this research are explained in detail. 
3.4. ORGANISATIONAL RESEARCH 
3.4.1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ASPECTS 
The purpose of the organisational research was to develop an understanding of the 
underlying processes and dynamics that exist in the MRC, which influence the project 
estimation and approval. From the outset, this was intended to be undertaken via 
interviews to allow a free conversation and exploration of areas, which participants 
thought to be relevant. As this aspect related to MRC only, the health organisation did 
not participate in this.  
For this element of the research there was no formal action group established. 
However, the senior management team was involved to review the outcomes of the 
respective research cycles and agree the proposed actions. This added the benefit of 
the actions being supported by the top level of the organisation significantly reducing 
hurdles for implementation of the measures.  
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3.4.2. RESEARCH CYCLE 1  
I. Data collection 
Information gathered in this first research cycle was gained from interviews of a 
selection of participants. The development of the methodology for this first research 
cycle relied heavily on the guidance from Fontana and Frey (2005) in order to gather 
good information to provide a rich picture of the problem. 
Selection of interviewees 
Twenty-four individuals were identified and approached for the interviews based on 
their position in relation to project development and approval. These were categorised 
as  
Approvers:  Individuals, who are responsible for or involved with the approval of 
projects/ capital bids. These were expected to be exclusively staff at 
MRC Head Office.  
Bidders:  Individuals, who see themselves as involved with the application for 
funding only and have no role in any kind of project approval.  
Both Individuals, who have responsibilities and involvement with both above. 
These are mainly people, who are in a senior position, which involves 
the approval role within their scope of authority, but also making bids to 
the hierarchy level above.  
Advisor Individuals, who provide professional advice to any of the above. In the 
context of the approval process, such as business analysts, surveyors, 
engineers, etc.  
The participants were selected based on their role as perceived by the author. It 
represented a similar proportion of bidders and approvers in existence in the 
organisation overall (see Figure 7). Twenty-two interviews were conducted of which 
Twenty-one as a face-to-face meeting; three were conducted via telephone with notes 
being made during the discussion.  




FIGURE 7 - PERCEIVED POSITION OF INTERVIEWEE ROLES 
b) Interview content and structure 
The interviews were conducted in a way that ensured that the relevant topics of interest 
are covered but leaving enough freedom to explore specific aspects or areas, which 
may be associated with the problem. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were 
chosen for the qualitative data collection (Wengraf, 2001).  
The interviews were structured around a set of topics and questions (see 9.2. - 
Appendix B): 
Position of the interviewee: Has the participant a role as bidder or approver? 
Project Development: What is the experience of the participant with the development 
of cost and time estimation? 
Project Approval: What is the understanding of the participant of the approval process 
in the MRC? Does the participant know the evaluation criteria for the bids? Do they 
receive or provide feedback (depending on position) of the outcome of the evaluation?  
Value for Money: What does the participant considers to be good Value for Money in 
the context of funding of fundamental research? Is there a “tipping point” at which they 
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Project Performance: Does the participant consider projects to be delivered within the 
approved estimate of cost and time? Is risk management effectively applied in project 
management?  
Due to the varying roles of the participants, not all participants could contribute to all 
aspects of the interview structure. However, sufficient response was expected for each 
element to draw conclusions.  
II. Data analysis 
The analysis of interviews was based on a thematic analysis that allowed identification 
of themes arising from the conversations with the participants (Guest, MacQueen and 
Namey, 2012). However, choosing interviews for information gathering in this research 
cycle, the author had to acknowledge that the information gained would always be 
shaped by the participating individuals and the relevant situation at that point in time 
(Denzin and Lincoln (ed.) 2013). This is not considered as detrimental to this research 
but felt that aspects covered in the interview would provide insight to a multitude of 
aspects: cultural, political, personal, information about processes, power relations, 
rules, feelings, etc. for which the analysis would need to cater.  
Elements, such as the establishment of position of the participant was noted and 
presented as a percentage of the overall participants. Similarly, the feedback about 
knowledge of the capital bid process was based on an affirmative or negative answer 
was recorded and expressed in percentage of overall participants.  
Criteria identified by participants for VfM were ranked on the percent of participants 
choosing them. A further assessment was undertaken in comparing this output 
between participants from MRC HO and the Units. Responses to the project 
development and project performance question were not analysed statistically. The 
author judged that this information was valuable in its richness of individual experience 
and should be reflected on as a contribution to the consideration of future actions. 
In undertaking the data analysis for the information received in the interviews, the 
author had to make judgements on aspects of importance for the purpose of solving 
the stated problem, identification of multiple issues and influences and eliminating or 
ignoring information that was interesting, but not relevant for the problem.  
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III. Review of outcomes and agreement of actions 
The findings from this exercise were summarised and presented to the MRC senior 
management. Areas, where results were considered to be ambiguous or inconclusive 
were suggested to be inquired further during the second research cycle. Other aspects 
showed clear sources of the problem or areas promising improvement for the 
organisation. Here, specific actions were recommended to senior management and 
agreed and supported. Results from the RCF were used to test some of the feedback 
from participants or to seek evidence for areas, which were highlighted as a concern. 
The database also enabled an overview over the extent of the problem 
(underperformance), to put the findings from the organisational research in a wider 
context.  
3.4.3. RESEARCH CYCLE 2 
Research Cycle 2 was driven by the feedback and agreements with the MRC senior 
management and the need for further clarification. This also influenced the choice of 
method for collection of the details.  
I. Data collection 
In order to gain more focused feedback questionnaires were used for the collection of 
the information with the questionnaires being designed to force participants to make 
clear statements or indications of preference (Wilson, 2013). The content of the 
questionnaires (Appendices D & E) was based on two issues. One was the 
assessment of impact of the actions taken in research cycle 1 the other was to target 
specific areas, where the outcomes from cycle 1 were unclear or no real trend was 
identifiable. Questions were posed with Yes/ No decisions or with specific options, of 
which a maximum number of selections would be permissible. This enabled clear 
prioritisation on the available options, such in the element of VfM. The same 
participants (24) were to be asked to complete the questionnaires to maintain 
consistency and enable measurement of improvement.  
II. Data analysis  
Results from this information was compared with the findings of the first research cycle 
to enable identification of potential improvements as consequence of the actions. 
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Furthermore, the selection of the options was to identification of clear preferences or 
majorities of views on specific subjects, for example in relation to Value for Money.  
The nature of information collection in this second research cycle allowed a statistical 
evaluation of the details. Comparisons with the first research cycle – specifically on 
the aspect of the knowledge of the bid process were assessed in terms of percentage 
of participants giving affirmative responses, hence demonstrating improvement. Other 
areas, such as the VfM criteria and project performance elements were analysed by 
identifying those aspects, which were selected most and therefore representing 
preference.  
III. Review of outcomes and agreement of actions 
The outcomes of this research cycle were again analysed and summarised for MRC 
senior management. Actions were proposed in view of the findings, but these were to 
be form the first activities for a continuous improvement process instead of a third 
research cycle.  
At this point, both the organisational and RCF research concluded their second 
research cycle with more detailed and advanced findings. These were collated and 
assessed for a progressive strategy of continuous improvement that would be 
implemented in the organisation. Improvement cycles are to be repeated annually to 
provide some indication of the achievements and highlight potential new aspects to 
consider.  
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3.5. REFERENCE CLASS FORECASTING (RCF) 
3.5.1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ASPECTS  
Throughout the recent years, the Medical Research Council has undertaken small, 
medium and large estates projects, ranging from refurbishments of individual 
laboratories to major projects, such as the Laboratory of Molecular Biology (LMB) in 
Cambridge (£212m) and the Francis Crick Institute (£650m) and has therefore   some 
project information available, which can be analysed. This made a test of RCF a 
realistic prospect.  Additionally, the health organisation showed an interest in the 
approach and offered to contribute details from their projects. In the following, the plan 
for the research in the application of RCF is explained.  
I. Action group 
In organising the work with another health organisation on the development of the 
RCF, an Action Research (AR) group was established with key stakeholders from both 
organisations under the guidance by an external advisor, with expertise of RCF.  
The groups objectives were to: 
- Engage the gatekeeper for the information from each organisation and provision 
of updates on progress and use of the details; 
- Agree on the method which provides consistency of the data sets from two 
organisations, who manage their projects very differently, have very different 
approval methods and criteria; 
- Consider of actions to be taken in each respective organisation in response to 
the findings and provide feedback to their success. 
The meetings were planned to be held at key points during the research, particularly 
the following: 
- Start collection of information to agree 
• general definitions for “project start” and “project completion”; 
• budget elements to be included (for example transition costs, design 
costs/ professional fees) and 
• the projects to be included in the initial information collection. 
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- Completion of initial details results to discuss 
• Methods used for analysing the gathered information; 
• Results and their meaning; 
• Potential amendments to the methodology and  
• Agreement on further projects to be added. 
 
- Completion of full results to discuss 
• Results and their meaning; 
• Application of the results to current, ongoing projects or those in 
planning; 
• Responsibilities for continuation and extension of the database 
(inclusive data sharing) and 
• Continuation of the mutual support in applying reference class 
forecasting to projects undertaken by the organisations. 
Decisions for the next steps were discussed by the group but not expected to be 
implemented in both organisations. This is due to the differences in the way the 
organisations work, their culture, reporting systems and requirements of their parent 
government department.  
II. Project data  
a) Project cost 
Any cost information was compared on the basis of formally approved budgets only. 
Two key approval points were recognised; the outline business case (or earliest point 
of written approval) and the full business case.  Estimates from these two key 
milestone documents were compared with the actual outcome.  
The project costs were broken down (as far as reasonably possible) into design cost 
(where applicable), construction cost including fees of relevant professionals, such as 
project managers or cost managers, contingency or optimism bias allowance and 
transition costs (where available).  
Transition costs were introduced by the MRC, as the organisation expects both the 
construction costs and any costs associated with moving into a new or refurbished 
facility to be stated in the business cases, although they are usually represented in 
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different budgets. This allowed better oversight over the total costs of a project, bar 
the operations once in Business As Usual (“BAU”) mode.  
b) Programme and Schedule 
A similar approach was taken to assess the performance of the projects with regards 
to scheduling. Again, OBC and FBC approval details were to be taken as checkpoints 
and for the project completion the date of the issue of Practical Completion certificate 
(or the nearest date thereof) was to determine the project duration. This approach 
accepts, that there may be an opportunity missed to capture facts on durations from 
point of practical completion to the occupants taking up BAU mode.  
c) Other information 
It was anticipated that this database will be expanded with new projects, which will 
improve the quality of the analysis over the years. As much relevant details as possible 
was collected as it would be impractical to get back to the original documentation to 
add other aspects of projects at a later point. This includes: 
• Contract forms (JCT, NEC, others); 
• Source of estimates (external professionals, in-house resource); 
• Project specialism (generic laboratories, animal houses, data-centre, etc.); 
• Project type (new build, refurbishment, infrastructure, demolition); 
• Complexity: projects were given a score based on complexity in both design and 
construction ranging from low (score 1) to high complexity (5).  
• Procurement path, such as whether the procurement was managed by 
Universities (being host for most Units), or through the procurement arm of MRC, 
which is a unique aspect relating to MRC.  
• Geographic area of where the project takes place (to capture differences 
between regions, such as London, Scotland, etc.).  
III. Information sources 
The collected information was based on documentation only – no anecdotal evidence 
was used for this part of the collection. For any projects, for which no evidence at OBC 
Page 88 of 203 
 
was available only FBC would be used. However, projects for which no reliable details 
on the FBC was available have been excluded from this exercise.  
Some of the information was derived by triangulations from various documents, rather 
than specific dates or statements over duration of the project.  
a) Documents 
Both the MRC and the health organisation have a significant amount of documentation 
available relating to each of their projects. Format and types of documents available 
to verify details varied amongst the organisation however, key documents used for 
arriving at details were: 
- Project descriptions provided by the health organisation and MRC; 
- Business case documentation (submission documents, approval correspondence, 
such as letters, email, etc.,); 
- Cost reports prepared throughout the project for reporting purposes; 
- Final account reports; 
- Project reports; 
- Practical completion certificates; 
- Correspondence referring to project specifics, such as the approvals from 
authorised parties, final account discussions with contractors, etc.; 
- Minutes of meetings (progress meetings or board meetings); 
- Gateway reports and associated documentation. 
These documents exist in electronic copy or hard copy but were not copied or removed 
from the relevant sites (at the health organisation) as part of the agreement for access 
to the documents. However, notes with reference to the source of the information have 
been made.  
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3.5.2. RCF - RESEARCH CYCLE 1 
The first research cycle for the RCF work was concerned with the establishment of an 
appropriate database and the relevant collection of the details. It was to deliver a first 
test of RCF in the field of projects for research facilities, determine if the method could 
be a useful tool and identify weaknesses and strength of this approach.  
I. Data collection 
The gathering of the information was undertaken via two different means. Details of 
projects from the MRC were collected from the MRC internal electronic archive. 
Information for projects from the health organisation was collected by visiting site and 
search the document archive for relevant information.  
Due to the arrangements with the health organisation, no hard copies were removed 
from site and notes made refer to the respective documents, from which information 
was derived. Key focus in searching for relevant details was the information provided 
at the key approval points, such as OBC or FBC and evidence of the final project 
performance. Costs and schedule information was broken down in sub-sections of 
design phase and construction phase with the aim to support project teams with 
indications of expected performance on these key phases.  
It was also necessary to establish the actual outcome of the various projects both in 
terms of schedule and budget. Information for these areas were not available in form 
of a particular set of documents but had to be validated and verified via other 
documents. During this phase the format for the database needed to be established, 
which would be flexible enough for a range of analyses and hold a significant amount 
of detail – potentially more than what was needed for the calculations under RCF 
methodology. This was produced as a excel spreadsheet, where details could be 
filtered and analysed using statistical methods.  
II. Data analysis 
The analysis of the information was based on the methodology used by Flyvbjerg 
(2008), Sovacool, Gilbert and Nugent (2014) and Batselier & Vanhoucke (2016).  
A total of 31 projects were identified, of which only 3 were not finished at the time of 
the analysis. 
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The projects were assessed in view of the project types (refurbishment, animal 
facilities, infrastructure projects, new build laboratory, etc.) and complexities involved. 
The complexity was scored from 1 to 5 as follows:  
1 – simple, standard type of facility, such as generic offices or stores; 
2 – basic repair works (roof repairs, etc.) and refurbishments of very basic laboratory 
facilities; 
3 – Refurbishment and/ or new build of standard laboratories (primary, secondary and 
write up) 
4 – high complexity facilities, such as data centres, higher containment laboratories 
(CL3), animal facilities. 
5 – highly complex facilities, usually with a mixture of animal facilities and high 
containment laboratories or fine-tuned manufacturing elements as well as highly 
regulated through statute or regulatory authorities (Environment Agency, Home 
Office, etc.).  
Each of the category was assessed, calculating the average, mean, min, max and 
standard deviation for cost, contingency and schedule information. Due to the 
comparative small database the use of mode was not applicable.  
Comparisons were made between the three key points of the projects: OBC, FBC and 
actual outcome. This was to enable project teams to make judgements of the 
estimates in the context at the stage in which their project is at the time of the exercise. 
For example, in developing cost estimates for the OBC, the comparison of the 
performance of RCF output from actual outcome over OBC forecasts would be used. 
Different confidence levels at the various stages of projects would therefore be 
reflected in the respective results. Due to the significant differences in value and 
scheduled timeframe for the projects, the key comparison was presented in per cent.  
III. Review of outcomes and agreement of actions  
Findings from the analysis was summarised and presented and discussed at a 
meeting with the AR group. The full data set, any analysis and calculation and other 
relevant aspects were made available to the AR group for review.  
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The AR group formed a view of the applicability of the findings to their respective 
projects and considered specific actions and/ or focus for the work in the next cycle as 
well as potential changes in methodology. Review activities further included an 
assessment of how the findings of the organisational research informed the output 
from the RCF. Particularly, understanding of the processes applied for project 
estimation and approval were considered in explaining statistical findings of the RCF.  
3.5.3. RCF - RESEARCH CYCLE 2 
Research Cycle 2 was concerned in expansion of the database with further projects 
and reach a position where the data analysis can be applied to a life project as a test 
of RCF in the context of real project development and project approval requirements.  
IV. Data collection  
The information gathering in this second research cycle did not differ from the from 
research cycle 1. It was to add more projects, where available and/ or complete 
information on any of the projects which had not been completed by end of research 
cycle 1. 
V.  Data analysis  
Analysis of information in the second research cycle was undertaken in the same 
approach as in cycle 1.  An additional element was the application of the RCF to a life 
project using slightly different methods. 
Method 1:   
This involves the identification of any of the categories, which were applicable and 
identify a range in which the performance of the project in question was expected. 
Method 2: 
With this method all projects, which have similar characteristics were selected and the 
analysis (average, mean, max, min and standard deviation) used as a guideline for 
the expected performance of the life project.  
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VI. Review of outcomes and agreement of actions 
Similar to research cycle 1 the findings of the analysis were summarised and 
presented to the AR group for discussion. The benefits and disadvantages of the two 
methods were discussed and conclusions drawn as to which would be established in 
the organisations. Furthermore, at this point the AR group discussed the effectiveness 
of RCF overall and decided, whether the work was to be continued and if so, what the 
actions would be to expand the database to reach a position where the results would 
be statistically relevant. This would be necessary to ensure that the results of the 
application of RCF were more accurate. Last, but not least, the decision of the AR 
group as to whether implementing RCF as a tool in project development and approval 
would become part of the MRC plan for continuous improvement in combination with 
the outcomes and actions from the organisational research.  
3.6. CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT PROCESS 
Although the research activities for the RCF testing and the organisational aspect in 
the MRC progressed by referring to each other at review points, they truly formed a 
cohesive and unified conclusion, which informed the next steps. The definition of the 
programme for continuous improvement incorporated the results of each of the 
research approaches for project estimation and approval processes in the MRC. 
Success of the measures are to be tested annually through further surveys and 
interviews with regular reports to the MRC senior management on progress.  
3.7. ETHICS IN RELATION TO THIS RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Whilst this research methodology did some ethical considerations as required the 
collection of information, which could result in detrimental impact on the participating 
individuals and organisations, should it become attributable.  
Key for this research – both regarding the information on projects and the views 
expressed during the organisational research – was absolute honesty. In terms of the 
project details, this was largely achieved through the principles established (see 
3.4.3.), although it was noted by both participating organisations, that it would be highly 
undesirable would the extend of project under-performance become known to 
approvers, such as parent government departments.  
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In relation to the organisational research, the information was entirely dependent on 
the honesty and candour of the participants and reassurance was given that no source 
of information or views expressed will be released, published or in other ways be made 
available. It is for this reason, that neither individual participants nor the contributing 
health organisation is named in this thesis. Permission was given by the MRC to 
declare that details stems from the organisation, but no specific projects will be listed 
or named.   
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CHAPTER 4 – FINDINGS 
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In this chapter, the author will present the findings from the research activities and tell 
the story of how these findings influenced the actions for the next research activity. 
The findings will be presented by following the research progression (see also Figure 
6). This will start with the research cycle 1 of the organisational research concluding 
with the actions agreed and implemented as a result of the analysis of the interviews 
with the participants. The author will then highlight the results of the questionnaires, 
explain what conclusions have been drawn and actions agreed to progress to the 
continuous improvement stage.  
Research findings from the investigations in the suitability of RCF will also be 
presented in following the two research cycles and respective actions agreed and 
implemented.  
The author will conclude this chapter by bringing the findings of all of the research 
outcomes together to provide an overall overview.  
4.1.    ORGANISATIONAL RESEARCH – CYCLE 1 
Research cycle 1 of the organisational research is based on interviews, which lasted 
approximately 1 – 1.5 hours. A total of 24 semi-structured interviews were undertaken. 
The author has coded the participants to maintain anonymity with a simple coding 
referring to a single number allocated to each of the participants.  
4.1.1. ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS 
Interviews started with a reflection by the participants on their role in relation to project 
awards. The feedback received on this subject established a different perspective than 
what the anticipation (see chapter 3.5.2.) during the design phase of the methodology 
suggested (see Figure 8). The graphs demonstrate the difference between perception 
of the author of the roles of participants and the view by the participants themselves. 
50% of the interviewees identified themselves as both bidders and approvers, 33% as 
bidders and only 13% considered their role as an approver only role. Furthermore, 
many of the participants from MRC HO also felt that both roles applied to them. These 
interviewees are involved in the approval process for bids from units but also act as 
applicants for funding approval by the parent government department. 
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FIGURE 8 - COMPARISON PARTICIPANT ROLES 
Unexpectedly, participants, who the author assumed to be approvers, see their 
responsibility as “advisor”. In their view they are providing advice for funders to make 
decisions on aspects of Value for Money and scientific benefits.  
One participant described the responsibility  
‘…to ensure that the chair of the panel makes a robust decision which are 
in line with relevant guidelines of the MRC and therefore our awards are 
high value’. (Participant 8) 
That role is therefore more one of a gate-keeper without who’s approval and support 
funding approval would not be given. Participants, who considered themselves only 
as approver worked in government departments or were participants from MRC HO, 
who had not yet exposure to bid processes for government funding. Bidders only were 
exclusively laboratory managers, estates professionals or senior administrators from 
units and institutes.  
Analysis of this element of the interviews made it apparent that the participants could 
not be clearly distinguished by their role as approver or bidder, but in terms of 
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FIGURE 9 - PARTICIPANT'S ORGANISATIONAL BACKGROUND 
From this perspective the participants were in the majority staff of units and institutes 
(54%) with a lesser amount (38%) from MRC HO and the clear minority 
representatives of a government department (BEIS). A high-level analysis of the 
professional backgrounds highlighted similar proportion with 37% having no scientific 
background (mainly laboratory/ estates managers, unit administrators and the 
participants from government department). 
The outcome of this analysis required a review of the classification of the participants. 
An allocation into bidder and approver was correct in terms of understanding the 
capital bid process but was not presenting an accurate picture of where participants 
placed themselves. The latter presented a clear belonging to elements of the 
organisational structure (HO or Units). In the following the terms ‘bidder’ and ‘approver’ 
are maintained and it is to be noted, where the focus of the described issues is on the 
relationships between organisations rather than the approver and bidder context.  
4.1.2.  PROJECT DEVELOPMENT  
I. WHAT DRIVES PROJECT INITIATION? 
Three key sources for the initiation of projects were identified by participants: 
• Specific research needs, mostly relating to equipment, which either provides new 
insight to a research area (such as Cryo-EM, Super Resolution Imaging 
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Microscopes, PET scanners, etc.); offers more efficient science work (higher 
throughput of samples, etc.) or is a replacement for aged existing equipment. 
• Works or investments, which aid or are the consequence of recruitment of 
scientists (often regarding to Principal Investigators or Directors). This tends to 
occur after the QQR reviews, which allows to pursue new directions of research. 
Such recruitments result in the need to alter laboratories for the specific research 
requirements and tend to form part of recruitment offers for high profile scientist.  
• Requirements of estates maintenance, due to complexity of the buildings and 
laboratory facilities. This demands a high level of maintenance and rolling 
replacement of major plant, such as Air Handling Units (AHU), cooling systems, 
generators, etc. Due to the transition of most of the MRC Units into Universities, 
much of this requirement has significantly diminished (now responsibility of the 
Universities) and should only apply for intramural research facilities. In practice 
however, applications for shared contributions (MRC and Universities) continue 
to be submitted for funding.   
All three of the above represent essential needs for research activities. Without 
appropriate facilities, science cannot take place. Unstable environments, such as 
movement in temperature, changes in humidity or air pressures can have a significant 
detrimental impact on the validity of the research results, invalidate warranties for 
equipment or expose staff to health risks (for example pathogens).  
Recruitment of world leading academic staff increases the reputation and ranking in 
terms of publications & citations and, of course, attracts grants and high performing 
students and researchers. Going hand in hand with the above, facilities must be able 
to provide for research environments, which are flexible and adaptive for new, 
innovative technology and enable high quality research. 
Translating these needs in tangible requirements and specifications is difficult and 
often needs various reiterations before they are accurate enough to be of use for 
designers and project teams. Bidders identified, that most of the bids are urgent 
requirements that will ensure research continuation, rather than realisation of visions 
or strategies.  
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 ‘These projects develop out of a need. They are not to provide luxuries and 
therefore include what is necessary to cover the essential needs.’ 
(Participant 23)) 
Evidence was found in some rare cases, that projects were initiated on request by the 
government for specific initiatives against the advice by experts. 
‘One thing is the situation where the government makes unilateral funding 
decisions in science/ research … without the consultation with the 
organisation. However, we are asked to produce the business case to 
justify their decision, which we do not necessarily support, if not directly 
oppose. … these directly appointed funds interfere with science 
investments. It puts us in a very uncomfortable position.’ (Participant 11) 
I.  PROJECT FUNDING STRATEGY 
Both bidders and approvers pointed towards problematics of developing projects 
estimates in an environment, which is deeply affected by the scarcity and annuality of 
capital funding. It was highlighted that certainty over capital funding exists only for one 
FY and any allocation of capital beyond that time frame is made at risk. Consequently, 
schedules for projects and lead times for procurements shown in bid proposals are 
generally fitted in a 12-month programme to present a lower risk. However, that means 
that schedules are often unrealistic and reflect on the need to complete within the 
annual time frame, as a constraint for the approval of any project.  
Furthermore, there was a distinct lack of knowledge amongst units about potential 
approval processes outside the capital bid process. This includes an ignorance over 
levels of authority through which projects could be undertaken using the unit allocation 
of resource funding at discretion of the Director. Very little knowledge was found 
amongst bidders about what other paths are available at MRC to gain approval for 
major capital projects (over and above £3m). Bidders perceived this as a hurdle for 
developing an appropriate funding strategy. 
II. ENGAGING PROFESSIONALS 
Bidders raised the issue that they had great difficulty to establish a realistic estimate 
for the project, as this often requires the engagement of architects, engineers or 
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surveyors. This was noted as specific problem in securing a budget for the fees of a 
professional team.  Some of the estimates are produced by the in-house estates or 
laboratory management team or from quotes from suppliers. The latter are provided 
in the knowledge that the quote may not result in a works order. Often, these estimates 
are based on sqm rates from previous projects.  
‘Most of the estimates are built by asking suppliers. The units ask suppliers 
although they tend to tell you what you want to hear, which is the lower 
margin… It is not a very good system, but it ring-fences the money.’ 
(Participant 14) 
Most bidders agreed that larger projects need to involve professional services (design, 
quantity surveying, etc.) in order to establish a reasonable estimate. The 
conversations highlighted a clear gap in the knowledge by both Units and MRC HO of 
skills and expertise that is available across the organisation to gain support for specific 
aspects of producing proposals for approval or selecting the most appropriate funding 
approach.  
‘If you don’t know the answer, find somebody, who does.’ (Participant 6) 
HO staff were largely unaware of operations and plans in the Units and hence failed 
to provide guidance on how to gain funding approval. It also means that they, as 
approvers did not access potential technical advice, they could apply to the project 
reviews.  
III. CAPITAL PLANNING  
The majority of participants acknowledged the change in funding availability and hence 
the need to introduce a mechanism to allocate capital funding.  
‘5 years ago, we had loads of money and we would just allocate funds. We 
would calculate the amount available versus the QQR promises. The Unit 
had the choice of how to spend it. I don’t think, that was a good way to do 
this.’ (Participant 6) 
Many bidders noted that the focus of the capital bid process is to enable capital 
investment in science, meaning scientific equipment. Estates related bids are 
considered by both bidders and approvers as a lesser priority, unless they represent 
urgent issues for the research continuity. This is evidenced in financial years in which 
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funding was particularly low, where estates bids receive only funding, if catastrophic 
failure has occurred or was imminent.  
‘We apply for estates funding, when it is too late, partially, because projects 
get only funded when things are really at breaking point.’ (Participant 23) 
Many of the Units stated that they had to develop skills for maintaining and repair plant 
and equipment to continue operations well beyond the respective life cycle. This also 
included establishing good relationships to manufacturer and suppliers to source 
spares, not available anymore under normal circumstances. It was mentioned that 
maintaining these essential relationships has become increasingly more difficult with 
the government’s drive to force organisations into framework arrangements, on which 
specialist manufacturers and suppliers tend not to be represented. 
4.1.3. PROJECT APPROVAL  
I. TRANSPARENCY – TO WHAT DEGREE? 
 This part of the interview was seeking to explore the approval process and any 
associated aspects. The invitation to bid is issued to Units and Institutes with a 
guidance as to what bids are eligible, how it will be assessed (scoring system) and 
guidance for the completion of the form.  Despite this 43% of the bidders claimed to 
be unaware of how the process works and 64% did not know the criteria, which is used 
to evaluate the submissions. Those, who claimed no knowledge of the process 
referred mainly to the criteria and who may be on the panel, as opposed to the process 
as such.  
“I don’t know the process, apart from us filling in the bidding document. I 
am not aware of the process in head office that is undertaken to assess the 
bids. Neither do I know the criteria.’ (Participant 15). 
In analysing this section of the interviews, a clear gulf between the MRC HO and the 
Units and Institutes was apparent. MRC HO believed that the submission of the call 
for bids provides all necessary information about the process and the criteria, whilst 
the Units had mostly no or only vague knowledge about this and felt it was ‘opaque’.  
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II. EVALUATION CRITERIA GENERAL 
58% of those claiming no knowledge of the evaluation criteria felt that these should 
not be disclosed. The reason given was that awareness of the evaluation criteria could 
result in bidders tailoring their bid to match the criteria. All participants, who 
represented this view, highlighted that they submit their bid based on the merit for the 
science undertaken in their Unit without a view of whether this fits the approval criteria.  
This aspect demonstrated another conflict in the views about the approval process. 
On one side it was suggested that the process has not enough transparency – 
described as a “black box”. On the other side is the opinion that a non-disclosure of 
evaluation criteria would avoid the tailoring of bids, suggesting that less transparency 
was preferred. 
‘…I think, it would be good to know the criteria. Because then we can tailor 
our bid to suit the criteria – it would help. But on the other hand, it would 
make it harder to separate them out, because everybody slants it to the 
same thing.’ (Participant 2) 
‘If everybody knows the game to play, it makes it that much harder to 
distinguish the cases. Would it not be better to have real hard case criteria, 
such as if it is not linked to the QQR, it goes out?’ (Participant 9) 
‘The units should absolutely know the criteria; they need to know the 
arguments to present for their bid. … Applying for funds without knowing 
the criteria is like going into an exam without knowing the questions.’ 
(Participant 8) 
Bidders with knowledge of the criteria highlighted that the criteria miss a critical 
category relating to replacement of equipment (both science and estates related), 
which is of high priority for research and its continuity. The criteria (see Figure 2) are 
clearly favouring applications for funding of equipment or estates projects that enable 
the science to significantly progress or “leapfrog”. However, much of the funding, for 
which Units must bid is for replacement of existing, essential scientific tools to maintain 
ongoing research. Unit directors expressed their difficulties balancing priorities 
between new, cutting-edge equipment and investments, which merely ensure 
research continuity. 
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III. ROLE OF QQR RECOMMENDATIONS  
All participants referred to the importance of the QQR in the capital award process 
however, yet its relevance was not clearly understood by bidders. Many unit directors 
considered the QQR recommendation as a funding allocation, whilst HO participants 
highlighted, that the recommendation is just a supportive statement from the review 
teams but powerful support for funding at the capital bid process. However, funding 
award depends on the overall availability of capital in the respective FY.  
Evidently, this distinct difference in approach has not been clearly communicated to 
the Units and Institutes. Some bidders felt, that the QQR outcome had very little impact 
or that the time frame between QQRs was too long and science and/ or technology 
moved on after 2-3 years and require different investments. 
‘I would not say that out experience is that the QQR has been helpful in 
gaining funding for estates projects. A lot of the things we did in the estates 
development…did not come out of the QQR. The institute changed 
through the QQR and as a consequence, spaces had to be used 
differently.’ (Participant 3) 
‘Capital bid panel criteria… goes back to science decisions in the previous 
QQRs.’ (Participant 12) 
IV. SCIENCE OR ESTATE? 
Some participants referred to a perceived bias of the award panel to wards scientific 
equipment. This bias was confirmed by many approvers.  
‘Estates is an overhead for science and what you want to see is to have as 
lean overheads as possible with most money going into the science.’ 
(Participant 13)  
However, as the discussion about VfM will demonstrate, the key criteria was that the 
proposal furthers the science and none of the approvers singled out either equipment 
or estates related proposals as being considered as better investment. Many unit 
directors highlighted that basic equipment is used well beyond its respective life cycle 
in the attempt to use available funds for cutting edge technology. After 6-10 years of 
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this approach “work horses” start to fail and need to be replaced. All bidders confirmed 
that they have such elements in their bid submissions.  
Units, which have heavily serviced facilities, such as animal breeding facilities have 
suffered this more severely. Acknowledging the mandatory requirements for such 
facilities, the panel has in recent years not awarded any funds towards scientific 
equipment as it had to use funds for the continuation of appropriate maintenance of 
these buildings. Hence, the capital bid panel is increasingly forced to approve more 
bids of this kind to maintain research continuity as opposed to awarding funds for new, 
innovative technology.  
V. IMPLICIT EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Conversations with approvers identified underlying considerations, which are not 
related to the published evaluation criteria. These range from political to personal 
reasons as well as aspects of timing of bid submissions.  
Approvers stated that the timing of a bid in relation to the QQR cycle had a 
considerable influence on the approval rate of a unit. Bids from units, which are either 
in the process of undergoing their QQR or the start of this process being imminent are 
less likely to receive approval. The panel wants to avoid making awards to research 
programmes, which could be considered as not high quality in the view of the QQR 
review experts. Units, which have just concluded a successful review, received a 
higher success rate in their bids than other units.   
‘Proximity with your QQR plays an important role – if you are in year 4 it is 
hard to say that you envisaged a particular piece of kit at your last QQR, 
when you then not bid for it earlier.’ (Participant 9) 
Approvers highlighted the problem of underlying political influence both within MRC as 
well as within the Universities. There was a perceived competition between different 
individuals within senior management and some science boards in MRC were 
considered as higher priority or as more powerful.  
Some approvers stated that particularly prestigious units would receive much more 
positive scoring due to their respective importance for the MRC. Added to this, some 
approvers acknowledged that there was a consciousness of the implications of failing 
to award units with “difficult Directors”, resulting in continued objections and 
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questioning of the scores for the respective bids up to MRC Council level. It was 
accepted, that this resulted sometimes in a bias towards bids from these Units. 
‘Unit Directors are tricky beasts and sometimes it is better to give them 
something than to give them nothing. It keeps them quiet.’ (Participant 13) 
But it must also be noted, that there is a strong desire for equal treatment amongst the 
larger units/ institutes. HO staff highlighted, that all currently funded research 
programmes deserve equal consideration, as they have been judged to produce high 
quality science. The bid evaluation is concerned with an assessment of whether this 
particular bid will provide a significant benefit to this research, not a judgement of the 
worth of the science. Approvers noted, that the panel seeks to ensure that every unit 
would receive at least some funding. 
4.1.4. VALUE FOR MONEY 
The discussion about VfM and what criteria would represent this in an academic 
research environment was free, unrestricted and enlightening. Participants were 
invited to consider the concept and discuss what this means in the context of their 
disciplines and the wider research field- political, national and/ or global health area. 
This resulted in presenting criteria that could be applied to the capital bid process. 
Analysis of this feedback was encouraging, as many of the criteria were shared 
between bidders and approvers, although there was a distinct difference in how 
participants considered the measurement of these. Consequently, the graph (Figure 
10) tells only a small part of the story. Nevertheless, the mostly shared view of what 
VfM represents was positive, as it provided a basis for selecting actions to improve the 
evaluation process with agreement of both bidders and approvers. In the following the 
author will provide more detail in the elements presented in the graph (Figure 10).   
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FIGURE 10 - ANALYSIS INTERVIEW FEEDBACK ON VFM 
I. MONETARY VALUE OR RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
Despite being shared by the majority of the participants on both sides (bidders 71%, 
approvers 60%) this criterium highlighted big differences in which it should be applied. 
It was stated by both bidders and approvers that the QQR reviews are stringent in 
testing the quality of the research involving international experts in the respective field 
therewith establishing the value of the research. Recommendations by this group can 
make or break a unit. However, the criterium of VfM has no benchmark or similar 
shared definition. 
‘If a unit is not making the grade, then we should not fund the unit.’ 
(Participant 11) 
‘Value added – that is something that we do think about a lot, because that 
is how we are judged. The number of times that we were told - in particular 
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by visiting QQR committees: we have given you £26m, why should we not 
give £1m to 26 researchers in different locations?’ (Participant 25) 
Only one participant calculated the VfM in relation of return on investment in clearly 
defined monetary terms. This acknowledged that some research is more expensive to 
undertake than others, specifically, if expensive equipment or access to CBS facilities 
is required. 
‘The average paper in the MRC cost £75k. … That makes the papers very 
expensive. If you went to the people with this approach, they would maybe 
say that we should not do very many of those. … This also means that the 
investment of £100k for a piece of equipment, which expects to see 
publication of about 10 papers, would add £10k on top. Is that a reasonable 
value? It is an interesting philosophical question. Computational simulation 
is very cheap, animal houses are very expensive. ‘(Participant 22) 
However, many of the MRC HO participants referred to the cost of science without 
having a specific idea of what number would need to be attached, or how to calculate 
this. As such VfM is a concept that is not quantified. Both bidders and approvers noted 
the specific aspect of use of animals in research in the context of assessing value of 
research. Considering applications for funding of such programmes would include, 
whether the work can be done without the use of animals (for example due to 
increased accuracy of computer models) or if there are other research programmes 
already underway, which look at similar science questions.  
‘There is a good judgement amongst the board members, what the average 
research could cost. With new research, the first port of call is what 
resource you really need to do this. There would be …occasional studies, 
where we are asked to fund a study on primates, which is hugely 
expensive.’ (Participant 13) 
Approvers also highlighted, that investments in equipment needs to consider, whether 
the proposed investment is expected to be used only by one research group or if it is 
shared with other scientists and research organisations for a wider benefit. No exact 
formula for this assessment could be established, only the experience and expertise 
of the panel members.  
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II. SKILL DEVELOPMENT  
This criterium demonstrated another split in perspective between bidders (7%) and 
approvers (40%) and presented an unexpected outcome. With training of highly 
qualified, skilled and innovative researchers being one of the key objectives of the 
MRC, it would be expected to feature in the thinking of the involved parties.  
Despite this training taking place exclusively in the units, it was not highly represented 
in the consideration of the participants from the units. It is, however, an important 
aspect in the view of the HO staff. These participants noted, that the award of a grant 
to a young, promising scientist is often the start of a successful career.  
HO participants also explained that it would be unusual for a young researcher at the 
beginning of his/ her career to be awarded a grant with high value, because there is 
no prior experience of successful managing such large research programmes. But it 
is a very important step in their career. 
III. MAINTAINING RESEARCH OPERATIONS  
Maintaining research operations was not mentioned at all by approvers. It was 
exclusively raised by bidders and here mainly relating to estates issues. This was 
explained with the last decades have seen an explosion of technological advances in 
many areas, such as automation, imaging, artificial intelligence, etc. requiring a 
different type of research facility than historically provided. 
Many research facilities in the academic environment are over 30 years old and did 
not anticipate the recent developments in technology, when they were designed. 
Therefore, bidders expressed a keen interest in altering facilities in a way that makes 
them more flexible for future technological developments.  
‘There is an increasing disparity between the award of capital equipment 
and investment in facilities, resulting in an existing facility, which cannot 
provide for new technology and hence prevent the ‘leap frogging’ of the 
scientific work in the MRC. (Participant 20) 
In a smaller way, future proofing may just relate to increasing the power supply, 
higher server capacities or increasing flexibility in the use of the laboratories. Units 
felt that their science is too much restricted by the existing facilities, representing 
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hurdles to the acquisition and operation of innovative technology. Other 
considerations by bidders were Health & Safety and statutory requirements, which 
often need investment to maintain compliance.  
‘I don’t think, it is value for money by providing a return by providing a safe 
and reliable working environment, more of a return on Health & Safety. 
…And you get to a tipping point where infrastructure gets so old and rough 
that it is not much a value for money aspect, but more a point of really 
feeling uncomfortable with the situation.’ (Participant 3) 
Interestingly, compliance with statutory regulations ranked at a lower level. This 
represents a contradiction to statements that were made as justifications for many bids 
to gain approval. It also meant that whilst there is a clear consciousness of the need 
to comply, the contribution which this compliance provides for science is considered 
low. One bidder also stated, that the potential disruption, which a construction project 
would bring to the research would be weighed against the benefit the project would 
offer in the long term. 
IV. SCIENTIFIC IMPACT  
This criterium showed a clear disparity of views between bidders (57%) and approvers 
(90%).  It was generally related to research providing answers to specific science 
questions, offering an efficient path for intervention, publications and what was called 
leap frogging.  Many approvers considered scientific impact of fundamental research 
to be measured in terms of the reputation of the journal in which respective papers are 
published and citations of these papers in other publications. Approvers expressed 
their view that scientific impact has different measures depending on who’s 
perspective is followed.  
‘What the MRC does cannot be defended when you look at it in terms in 
which the NHS may look at this. However, it may reveal aspects of 
physiology and disease progress, which may inform of how you may treat 
the common cold or cancer. That is very hard to get across to people.’ 
(Participant 13) 
A further important aspect raised was that value of research was as much about 
disproving theories as it was about discovery and testing new ideas. Both bidders and 
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approvers stated that it is important to gain knowledge about what not to spend effort 
on as has been proven to be ineffective. 
‘We will look at whether the research will offer to provide a definite answer 
to a problem or just a fishing expedition. If we are going to nail a particular 
question, then that would be good value for money. The latter [fishing 
expedition, sic] would not really look good on value for money.’ (Participant 
11) 
Leap frogging was referred to by approvers as the ability to jump steps in the 
progression of the scientific development – mostly enabled by technological 
advancements (for example the cryo-electron microscope) or significant discoveries 
in other areas of science. This was consistently noted by participants as an important 
as it promises faster answers to scientific questions and a considerable advantage 
over competing researchers/ research organisations.  
V. RESEARCH SUPPORT AND ENHANCEMENT 
This aspect was considered to relate to promotion of collaborations, enabling scientific 
opportunity and making science easier. The latter was generally directed to the 
investment of equipment, which allows the automatization of research activities.  
Both bidders and approvers agreed that medical research is no more based on efforts 
of one research group or scientist, but the connection and contribution of many 
different experts within science in general and medical research disciplines (Su et al., 
2017). 
‘How is this piece of equipment doing the widest good for the unit and 
includes different disciplines? … Infrastructure should support the 
interdisciplinary approach. That is the value.’ (Participant 15) 
It was also highlighted that the ability to make significant contributions to larger and 
world leading collaborations is an important aspect of organisational reputation and 
personal career progression. Access to high-tech, specialist equipment often opens 
the door to join multi-disciplinary research activities.  Additionally, research opportunity 
was stated to be availability of equipment to other researchers within the unit or 
university therewith enabling different methodologies to progress answering important 
science questions. Again, this criterion was supported by both groups. 
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‘It will mean that … being co-located with other colleagues in the University. 
… It means we can widen our horizon with issues and researches, which 
we would not have approached as the MRC Unit on our own.’ (Participant 
21) 
Science support and enhancement was considered as highly important in equal 
measure by bidders (71%) and approvers (70%). Some of the other criteria, which 
participants identified, was “making research easier”, referring to automatization 
VI. SCIENTIFIC STRATEGY 
Scientific strategy was mentioned by both bidders (29%) and approvers (30%) as 
basic funding criteria. Both bidders and approvers were aware of the MRC science 
strategy and had an understanding of what research is done in Industry and 
Universities to prevent duplication.  
Most participants considered it inappropriate to award projects or pursue science, 
which would not align with the established research aims of the MRC.  In this context, 
the relationship to MRC’s main funder’s (government department) interests was 
important. As one approver noted:  
‘We have to be pragmatic. If we produce a strategy that is not acceptable 
to the government, then funding would not be forthcoming. The funding we 
receive needs to be spent on research that aligns with this strategy.’ 
(Participant 24) 
4.1.5. Project performance and benefit measurement 
Feedback from the interviews relating to this subject is based on a reduced number of 
participants. Out of the 24 individuals interviewed, 15 felt able to comment on project 
performance and benefit measures.   
I. PROJECT PERFORMANCE 
Discussions about project performance showed another split of opinions between 
MRC HO and Unit staff. This subject was mainly considered in relation to actual cost 
versus the approved budget value. Participants from units insisted that their original 
estimates were accurate as the project costs did not exceed the award. HO staff 
however, felt that the submitted estimates were rarely correct. 
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This represented a contradiction, which required further attention. When the subject 
of project development was discussed in the earlier part of the interviews, bidders 
raised concerns about a lack of access to professionals to develop design or cost 
estimates because it requires funds they do not have. Contrary, in the conversation 
about project performance and the accuracy of the estimates provided in the proposal 
only 20% of the bidders stated, that such support would be required.  
Claims regarding the accuracy of initial estimates vs outcome of the project were also 
reviewed. It was a concern that there were directly opposing views on the 
performance, which required further investigation. Projects, which the respective 
participants were involved with were assessed and where found to be completed 
within budget and schedule. The author also found that the views of the HO staff relied 
on a specific bad experience with one particular project, which was generalised to be 
the result of ongoing experience.  
II. BENEFITS MEASUREMENT 
In this part of the interview the conversation focussed less on the specific 
measurement of the benefits of project but more on why this would should or should 
not be done. Only one of the 15 participants declared that benefit measurement is 
undertaken for awarded projects. There was consensus that many projects were “too 
small” to justify separate benefit measurement. With a background of intense scrutiny 
of science performance in the MRC via the QQR and annual exercises via 
ResearchFish (Medical Research Council, 2013) benefit measurement was stated to 
be already in place. Most participants stated that they assume the benefits are 
achieved, when the respective projects are completed. It was pointed out that benefits 
feature heavily prior to approval but are not required to evidence at point of project 
closure.  
Participants from HO and the Units had concerns about the level of resource required 
for thorough and accurate management and measurement of benefits. The average 
number of awards per annum (capital bid process only) ranges between 75 – 120. 
Much of these relate to scientific equipment that either supports, maintains or 
enhances scientific efforts. With rare exceptions, the benefits of a specific award 
cannot be singled out of the wider performance of the units and institutes. Where the 
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award was to replace so-called workhorses, the benefit would simply be to avoid 
disruption of research activities.  
But there was also an acknowledgement on both sides (bidders and approvers) that 
estates projects that look at alterations, reduction or extension of facilities need a 
justification for the respective investment. Here, general acceptance existed that major 
investments of public money need to demonstrate that the promised benefits have 
been achieved. Many expressed the view that it was equally important to establish the 
failure to achieve benefits as proofing that they have. There was consensus in the 
view that senior managers, who headed up project, which did not deliver benefits 
should attract more intensive scrutiny on any future investment proposals.  
All participants pointed out that measurement of benefits in fundamental research is 
difficult and highlighted that benefits of an investment should be identified in the 
business case but only at very large investments should carry out benefit 
measurement after completion.  
‘I believe that we do well with delivering the scientific benefits, but we have 
got no evidence for it. The outcomes are really good, but could we have 
done it better in a different way?’ (Participant 6) 
4.1.6. COMMUNICATION  
I. COMMUNICATION - GENERAL 
During the interviews with both the HO and units significant time was spent discussing 
the level of communication between these parties. This is an area where the 
differences are not between bidders and approvers, but the MRC HO and its units. 
Considering the level of shared values (see 4.2.4.), it was unexpected to see such 
frustration expressed over the lack of meaningful contact.  
‘I know they are busy. I find it really disappointing, how little contact we have 
with the programme and board managers outside the QQR. … We go from 
the end of the QQR to the start of the new one without have any contact.’ 
(Participant 3) 
Participants from RPG were mostly unaware of any project plans in the units they 
support. Where they were informed, they did not share this information with their 
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colleagues across MRC HO. Responsibility for estates issues in University Units (20 
out of 23 MRC Units) rests with the hosting University. Consequently, there is no 
involvement by the MRC estates department with these units. However, the MRC 
needs to ensure that investment in these units through the core funding is protected 
and requires appropriate representation on the relevant project boards and often the 
MRC has to enforce the UU agreement terms with the University.  
In reflection of this the author realised that the focus of the department of Capital and 
Estates was mainly on the intramural Units/ Institutes (i.e. MRC liability) and those 
University Units, where larger projects were ongoing, which are co-funded by MRC. 
Communication with others were unstructured and infrequent, with some of the Units 
being no interaction in place.  
II. COMMUNICATION – BID PROCESS 
There was an obvious indication of a problem in communication in the lack of 
knowledge about the bid process shown by the bidders (43%). Following the 
interviews, the author reviewed the letters send out to the units requesting bids and 
found very detailed instructions for how to fill in the forms and a rough indication of 
timelines. However, they contained very little information of how funding decisions will 
be made.  
Some conversations with bidders regarding this, indicated that they were interested in 
the dynamics and priorities in the panel, for example, whether there was a focus on 
imaging or data processing, etc. It was unclear whether this information would result 
in a different approach by the bidders, such as in the allocation of the priorities, as the 
bids should be driven by what scientists require for their research.  
It was apparent that neither bidders nor approvers felt it necessary to initiate a 
discussion to inquire or clarify the bids prior to the evaluation. There was a clear 
expectation of the onus for action to be on the respective other side.  
‘I don’t talk to the Units about their bids prior to scoring. It could be argued 
that the programme managers should really talk to the units about that, but 
on the other hand the units could pick up the phone and talk to the relevant 
person in RPG when they send their bid in.’ (Participant 8) 
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Only one out of the participating units confirmed active communication with the RPG 
representative to ensure that the bid is fully understood, and the identified priorities 
agreed. Whilst that did not result in that unit receiving higher levels of funding, 
approvals were given in accordance the priority stated by the bidder.  The author also 
observed that bids of this unit had an evidently smoother approval process in the 
capital bid panel.  
‘We are making great effort to have an ongoing discussion with our 
programme manager in RPG. We want him or her to know what we are 
working on, what is needed, what we are good at, which new directions we 
may wish to take. This is not necessarily a targeted strategic approach, but 
just the way we are and how we work… Openness and approachability has 
brought us great opportunities so far.’ (Participant 15) 
Although it seems obvious and despite widespread knowledge about importance of 
effective communication in organisations, stakeholders, etc., the need for keeping a 
good relationship was not very well established. Evidence of a “them and us” culture 
was found on both sides. It was very apparent that HO staff was unaware of the 
pressures that the unit operations are under.  This was particularly evident in the low 
priority for funding criteria for indirect science support (estates, plant replacement, etc.) 
Opposing this, some MRC HO staff felt that estates aspects received an unduly 
substantial proportion of the overall funding, therefore preventing new, innovative 
research investment.  
III. COMMUNICATION – FEEDBACK PANEL MEETING   
Bidders unanimously expressed specific frustration about a lack of feedback from the 
capital bid panel. Although all acknowledged that a written approval letter is issued 
informing of funding awards, no information was provided regarding reasons for 
projects not being funded. This was particularly the case, when rejected bids were 
deemed by the bidder to be higher priority than those approved. Directors of units had 
no information on the panel’s reasoning for awarding projects without referring to the 
unit’s declared priority in the submissions.  
‘There is no feedback on the outcome of the capital bid process. Feels, that 
it would be important to understand, whether they [the bids, sic] were close, 
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for example if affordability was the key decision factor, or if they have been 
way off and therefore should not bother bidding for this again.’ (Participant 
10) 
This was reinforced by some approvers stating that bids are re-issued every year 
without ever having a chance of being approved. It was acknowledged that this has 
never been communicated to the bidders. Such a complete communication failure 
adds unnecessary irritation on both bidder and approver side and contributes 
significantly to a separation of MRC HO from its units. 
4.1.7.  RESEARCH CYCLE 1 – REVIEW AND ACTIONS  
The findings from this first research cycle provided a clear direction for actions to be 
implemented at the second research cycle. Senior management was particularly 
concerned about the failure to maintain close communication with the units and 
institutes. This lack of communication raised the risk of HO staff becoming detached 
from the science community.  
Furthermore, further work was to be undertaken to identify clear values for the 
fundamental science carried out in the MRC in order to establish evaluation criteria 
that reflect the entirety of the MRC family. The agreed actions reflect this concern.   
1) There is a need to clarify project approval pathways within MRC. First and 
foremost, Management Board should assess, whether the existing options 
should be reduced to two: The lower values up to £3m to be assessed by 
the Capital Bid Panel and any bids over and above this in accordance with 
the delegated authority (Management Board £10m, Council £15m, BEIS 
up to £50m, anything over that via HM Treasury).  
2) The agreed approval pathways should include a clear description of what 
kind of project needs to follow which pathway and what steps each of these 
approaches require (including relevant evidence, documentation, etc.). 
Dissemination of this guidance should be published on the MRC portal.  
3) As the problem of the financial annuality of capital funding is unlikely to 
disappear, its implications need to be managed. Projects, which are 
unlikely to be completed within one FY should not automatically dismissed. 
It is proposed to manage any movement between budget years via close 
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communication and reporting with the respective project teams. This 
involves a higher level of risk to the organisation in terms of fiscal 
management but is offset by a reduction of risk in disruption of operations 
and science.  
4) Active measures are to be taken to improve the communication between 
MRC HO and its units. The units are to be encouraged to speak to their 
respective programme manager and the estates team about their bids 
prior to the submission date. Similarly, the head office staff are to establish 
and maintain regular communication with the units and institutes. 
5) The publication of the invitation to bid for the annual capital bid process 
presents an opportune starting point for this, where head office staff should 
explain and discuss the process with the bidders.  
6) Upon conclusion of the capital bid process, more detailed feedback needs 
to be provided to the bidders about the respective decisions. Senior 
management expressed the view that this should be done personally 
rather than within the award letter and not be restricted to the awards 
made but providing insight of why other bids have not been successful.  
7) Award criteria must be reviewed in light of the importance of replacement 
of equipment and plant (estate) the continuation of research and 
operations. The panel needs to discuss, what kind of score this criterium 
should attract and how this is used for improving science and promoting 
innovation. 
8) Benefit measurement should be encouraged, and active support should be 
given to provide evidence for the impact of any investment in research. 
Knowledge that already exists in the organisation should be disseminated 
to the Units, other Councils and research partners to increase available 
information on benefits, therewith improving evidence available to 
approvers.  
9) A decision should be made as to what type of non-science projects should 
undertake formal benefit measurement. Measurement of benefit can be a 
resource intensive activity and should therefore be focussed on areas, 
where the measurement provides meaningful information.  
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10) Research activities in cycle 2 should focus on gathering information to 
identify shared values, which can be utilised for revised evaluation criteria.  
The above actions were considered by the Management Board and agreed to be 
implemented. They were to take effect as part of the capital bid process (starting 
December 2016 to panel meeting and decision in February 2017). The impact of this 
implementation was to be assessed during the second Action Research cycle with a 
view to return to Management Board with the findings. 
4.2. Organisational research - Cycle 2 
During this cycle the author investigated the effectiveness of the actions agreed and 
undertook a survey of views via questionnaire to establish shared values between 
MRC HO and the units.   
4.2.1. RESEARCH CYCLE 2 - GENERAL  
In this research cycle, information was collected via a questionnaire to aid a more 
targeted approach to the information gathering. During the cycle 1 and in the approach 
to cycle 2 the MRC suffered significant turnover of staff (specifically in HO). As a 
consequence, the availability of the original participants was significantly curtailed.  In 
total 14 questionnaires were returned, providing a much smaller pool of information 
than in cycle 1.  
These returns were from a mix of participants, some participants from the previous 
cycle, some new, but still with a similar split between bidders (units) and approvers 
(HO). The questionnaires were structured in a general part, where both bidders and 
approvers answered the same questions. A further part was split out to gain insight 
from the approver’s and bidder’s point of view respectively (Appendix E & F).  
4.2.2. ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED 
All of the identified actions were implemented or instructed, be it with different levels 
of success. A full description of the funding pathways was developed and provided to 
all unit directors. Both units and HO staff were encouraged to increase the discussion 
about the bids prior to the evaluation process and a category for approval was added 
to cater for bids relating to replacement equipment.  
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Work relating to benefits measurement was initiated, with in close collaboration with 
the newly established UKRI assurance group and delivery profession group. Whilst 
this work progressed, it has not delivered any specific outcomes other than an ongoing 
discussion about benefit measurement. The following description will therefore focus 
on the review on the effectiveness of the actions on the communication and outcomes 
of the questionnaires.  
4.2.3. ANALYSIS OF JOINED FEEDBACK 
The results from the questionnaire identified significant improvement on the 
awareness of both the bid process and the respective criteria (see Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2 - IMPROVEMENT AWARENESS REGARDING CAPITAL BID PROCESS 
This table shows a notable improvement of an increase of awareness of the process 
by 29% and of the criteria by 50%, although still identifying gaps. It is considered to be 
due to more explanation and a clearer description of both process and criteria in the 
letters issued with the call for bids, rather than to a closer engagement between RPG 
and the bidders in units and institutes.  
The analysis also found that the continuing ignorance of the process originated from 
individuals, who were preparing the estimates for bids, but were not necessarily the 
recipients of the correspondence relating to details of this process or were not 




 % of participating bidders 
Research Cycle 1 
% of participating bidders 
Research Cycle 2 
Participating bidders 
being aware of the 
process for capital bid 
rounds 
57 86 
Participants being aware 
of the criteria for the 
award of capital funding 
36 86 
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I. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND VFM IN SCIENCE 
The questionnaire contained a multiple-choice section, which listed the criteria 
identified during the conversations in research cycle 1. Participants were asked to 
choose a maximum of 3 of the 19 options to highlight the highest priority in these 
criteria. This revealed a change from the results of the free discussion in the previous 
cycle. Figure 11 compares cycle 1 with cycle 2 in relation to levels of agreement 
between bidders and approvers on most appropriate and important criteria for the 
assessment of  VfM of bids submitted.  
 
FIGURE 11 - COMPARISON VFM CYCLE 1 AND CYCLE 2 FEEDBACK 
This outcome indicates the following issues: 
Ø Both bidders and approvers have shared perspectives in relation to a wider 
definition of Value for Money in their area of science. This applies almost to a 
wider philosophy in science demonstrated by the consistency in strong 
response in area of scientific strategy – over 90%, science support - over 80% 
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(publication of papers, finding interventions, new technology allowing 
innovation in research, etc.). 
Ø A strong increase in the selection of skill development as a strong value for 
fundamental research was noted (68%) in comparison with cycle 1 (less than 
20%). More bidders considered this as a key delivery of their work (training 
next generation of scientists).  
Ø The author notes the consistently absence of agreement on maintenance of 
research operations as a shared value criterion. Despite this aspect having 
been raised throughout the first research cycle and provided as one of the 
choices in the questionnaire, it was not selected by any of the approvers as a 
possible criterion for the assessment of bids. This emphasises the 
observation from research cycle 1, that MRC HO staff (and approvers in terms 
of the capital bid process) have very little engagement with the units and are 
therefore removed from the operational problems, which the units must 
manage. 
Ø Significant decrease was found in the agreement over hard, monetary criteria 
for science. During research cycle 1 the difference between bidders and 
approvers was only 11%, notably with the bidders quoting this criterium more 
than approvers. Cycle 2 has shown a complete reverse of this view, with all 
approvers and only 28.6% of bidders selecting this.  
Anecdotally, the inclusion of a new evaluation criterium for the replacement of 
scientific equipment made classification of bids in terms of award criteria easier but 
made no difference to the process outcome or the evaluation of individual bids as 
such.  
4.2.4. BIDDER RESPONSES. 
In this part of the chapter, the author will highlight the findings from the element of the 
questionnaire, which was focused on the views and experience of the bidders. The 
focus of these questions was on seeking evidence of any improvement of the bid 
process.  
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One of the key actions resulting from research cycle 1 was to increase and improve 
the communication with the units, particularly about the capital bid process. This 
seemed to have had a significant impact by raising the basic awareness of the process 
and bid criteria amongst bidders by 29% (see table 2).   
But whilst this demonstrated a clear positive impact, there were other areas where 
very little or no progress was made. This became apparent in the question about 
communication with RPG on the specific items in the submitted bids. Two thirds of 
units highlighted, that they had no discussion about their submission with the 
respective programme manager in RPG. Reasons given for this were showing that 
50% of the respondents felt that their bids were simple and did not require explanation. 
10% expressed an expectation of approvers to approach them if there were any 
queries. It was notable that none of the bidders thought that a conversation with the 
approvers about the chosen priorities may improve the chances of the awards being 
made in line with the Unit needs.   
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Have you employed external professionals to
develop the project /bid costs and scope?
Have you received support and advise from MRC
HO Estates in developing your case for the project?
Did you submit request(s) for capital funding through
the capital bid process?
Did you gain funding approval for the bids you
consider highest priority?
Were you aware of the evaluation criteria applied to
the bids?
Were the bid(s) awarded already supported through
your QQR recommendations?
Did you discuss your bids with relevant
representatives from RPG prior to the evaluation…
If you answered with YES, did you approach RPG?
Have you been informed of the awards being made?
have you had feedback as to what score individual
projects/bids received and why?
Are you content with the decision made by the
panel?
Have the projects/bids you received awards for FY
2016/17 been completed?
If so, were they completed within the awarded
budget?
Don’t Know % No% Yes %
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Figure 12 presents the feedback from participating bidders to questions about the 
engagement with Head Office in relation to the bidding process. It confirms that they 
were informed about the awarded projects with 86% stating that the award was 
consistent with the priority bids identified in the submission. However, 57% noted that 
no feedback was received on individual scores of each item submitted (included failed 
ones). Similarly, some bidders were not clear why identified priorities were not followed 
in the awards, therefore funding an item, which had lower priority for the unit director.  
A specific measure for improvement of the process was to provide background 
information why projects received high or low scores to enable better judgement for 
the next funding round. This was not actioned.   
In relation to estates projects, 43% of the bidders confirmed that they had no support 
from the MRC Estates team in developing their projects, although they clarified that 
they have not requested such support. With one exception, bidders confirmed that 
their estimates were produced in-house without the use of external professionals.  
A particular gap in the communication was identified between the HO estates team 
and extramural units (University Units, UU). Universities are owners and in charge of 
the facilities and estates related bids are only eligible if relating to direct science 
requirements. All bidders confirmed that all awarded projects of the previous funding 
round have been completed in time and within the given budget. The feedback 
provided by the bidders highlighted the following problems: 
Ø Whilst an improvement in the awareness of the process and the criteria of the 
capital bid process was seen, there was still a distinct lack of communication 
relating to the specific submissions by bidders. Aspects of the capital bid 
process and respective criteria were communicated together with the letter 
inviting the bids, but individual conversations between bidders (units and 
institutes) and approvers (RPG) still does not take place. The reluctance of 
having a direct conversation indicates that the problem sits deeper and is 
embedded within the cultures of both bidders and approvers and would 
require a different approach to resolve.  
Ø A similar result was found regarding the feedback on unsuccessful elements 
of the submissions. Large groups of the bidders had no feedback to these 
items and were not made aware in which way bids fell short of the criteria. 
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With no requirement in the questionnaires to identify reasons, it could not be 
clarified, why this communication does not take place.  
Ø Whilst there was a greater awareness by the head office estates department 
over most of the estates related submissions, a large element of those were 
developed without any support by the estates department. A greater 
involvement by head office could provide improve quality of the estimates (for 
example by applying RCF) or as a minimum standardise the format and 
quality of the submissions.  
4.2.5. Approver responses 
In the following the feedback received from the approvers is examined. The figure 13 
below visualise their responses to more generic questions regarding the bid process.  
 
FIGURE 13 - FEEDBACK APPROVERS- GENERAL 
28.6% of approvers stated that they have not provided bidders with feedback on 
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Did you find the submitted bids concise and clear as
to their purpose and priority?
Did you agree with the priorities identified by the
bidders for the individual bids/projects?
Did you discuss your bids with relevant
representatives from the relevant
unit/Institute/bidder prior to the evaluation process?
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Have the bidders been informed of the award
decision in writing?
Have the bidders received feedback as to what
score individual projects/bids received and why?
Are you content with the decision made by the
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Are you aware of any funding approvals through
pathways other than the capital bid process (relating
to your area of responsibility only)?
don’t Know No Yes
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is given. That means that none of the approvers engaged in the de-brief of bidders on 
the capital bid process. All were aware that written communication had been issued to 
bidders confirming the awards.  
Responses about engagement with the bidders prior to the evaluation process 
demonstrated that a small majority of the approvers (57%) discussed the submissions 
with the bidders. This view is clearly not shared by the bidders, of whom 71% declared 
to have no contact with approvers (RPG) prior to the process although not always have 
the participating approvers been matched with a participant representing their 
respective bidders.  
Further investigation was undertaken to clarify responses to the last two questions 
shown on Figure 13 relating to judgements on quality of the submitted bids. This 
highlights that 57% do not know whether they agree with the priorities in the submitted 
bids and 29% could did not know whether bids were concise and clear about the 
respective purpose and priority. It is inconceivable that evaluators would review the 
submission and not be able to state whether they agree with the given priorities or 
establish if the bids were concise. Participants, who declared a “Do not know” on these 
two questions were senior to the programme managers, who look after specific 
research programmes or Units. These senior individuals have relied on the briefing by 
programme managers, rather than reviewing the bids themselves. Questions about 
approval pathways also revealed some interesting feedback. All participants with 
approver responsibility in MRC HO were aware of various pathways for approval of 
projects outside the capital bid panel, but do not pass this knowledge to units and 
institutes.  
There was more clarity over approval processes applied by BEIS. Approximately half 
of the participating approvers had experiences with projects being funded through 
decision by MRC Management Board or HO finance department. Only 29% of 
approvers confirmed that awarded projects having been completed within the given 
time scale and only 40% confirmed that they were completed within budget, whilst 
86% of bidders stated that their project was completed in time and within the awarded 
budget. This is consistent with the results from the first research cycle, where a similar 
disparity was found. Again, upon investigation, the reason for this appears to be an 
experience by approvers with a specific project rather than a performance pattern.  
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4.2.6.  RESEARCH CYCLE 2 –REVIEW  
The review of the findings from the second research cycle identified two key areas of 
interest. Firstly, the author noted the significant level of agreement between bidders 
and key measurements of the value of fundamental science (ranging between 60% 
and 80%) in the context of the MRC work. Despite significant efforts to raise the 
importance of facility maintenance amongst the approvers, this continued to be the 
area of greatest disparity between bidders and approvers, with none of the approvers 
selecting this as a potential criterium for a capital award. With an average of £2.5m 
bids received per annum for estates maintenance this poses a serious risk for the 
research continuity of the units.  It highlighted the lack of understanding of local issues 
with maintenance and research continuity is the consequence of the lack of 
engagement between HO and ‘frontline science’.  
Secondly, whilst the improvement of the awareness of the capital bid process was 
recorded (from 57% in cycle 1 to 86% in cycle 2), an unacceptably high proportion of 
participants were still unclear over the process and the criteria used (14%). The action 
to improve this was ‘completed’ by increasing the description on the invitation to bid, 
not through more informal approaches, evidenced by the fact that 71% of bidders 
declared to not discuss their bids with HO prior to submission. This raised concerns 
were raised over the persistent failure to re-connect with the units. In discussion with 
senior management a range of reasons for this were identified, such as heavy 
workloads preventing dedicated time for developing relationships, confidence of the 
individuals to initiate communications with senior unit staff, particularly in delivering 
not good news, etc. However, it was unanimously agreed that the relationships 
between MRC HO and its units has to be a priority for the future and more effective 
actions are to be taken to achieve this.  
A clear disconnect was discovered between the perception of bidders over project 
performance. In fact, the findings from the exercises to develop analyse RCF data has 
demonstrated that in average 52% of all projects (across all categories) are delivered 
with a cost overrun and 69% of all projects exceeded their agreed schedule. It 
suggests that part of the continuous improvement programme must include an 
educational aspect for both bidders and approvers on the statistical findings on project 
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performance. These actions are identified and explained in 4.5. – Continuous 
improvement.  
4.3. REFERENCE CLASS FORECASTING – CYCLE 1 
Information used for the quantitative analysis contains exclusively estates related 
projects; none of the awards for the procurement and installation of scientific 
equipment have been used for this database.  A total of 31 Projects was collected for 
this analysis, of which 26 were completed at the time of undertaking the analysis. The 
remaining 4 projects were still under construction and would not produce a final 
account or practical completion within the time frame of this research. 
Some of the analysis was driven by the needs and specific interests of the AR group, 
but in the assessment the methodology identified in Chapter 3 was followed. Caution 
must be applied to all the following findings, as the number of projects included is still 
relatively small and consequently individual categories may only consist of less than 
5 projects. Results will therefore only be indicative and serve as a “proof of concept” 
as opposed to statistically proven outcomes.  
4.3.1.  COST - GENERAL  
A first comparison was undertaken on how the various categories performed in terms 
of cost.  Figure 14 shows the percent of projects overall and in each of the categories, 
which concluded with a cost overrun. This unveiled some unexpected results.  
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I. BEST PERFORMANCE  
Most participants in the Action Group are individuals with vast experience in estates 
related projects. The group was genuinely surprised to see refurbishment projects 
outperforming all other categories by having only 20% of the projects experiencing a 
cost overrun.  
Refurbishment projects tend to contain significant elements of risk due to unknown 
conditions in, around and below the buildings. This may be the degree of deterioration 
of pipework or structural elements, presence of asbestos or, as in the example of 
research facilities, discovery of health hazards (such as elevated chemical, biological 
or radiation levels) that are remnants of the previous activities. 
In discussion with the Action Research group and professionals about this finding, it 
was suggested that this performance may be due to the knowledge of exactly these 
risks leading to more conservative estimates with more allowances for such aspects 
in the various work packages.  
The overall analysis (table in Appendix H) revealed that refurbishment projects had in 
average the lowest level of contingency (10.6%).  This indicates that the views of the 
AR group were correct in that the uncertainties in refurbishment projects are included 
in more conservatives estimates of work packages, rather than a generic uplift of the 
contingency.  
II. POOREST PERFORMANCE  
The category of animal facilities is the one with the worst performance in relation to 
cost. All projects with animal facilities exceeded the costs estimated at FBC. This 
category did only refer to pure animal facilities. The MRC and the contributing 
organisation have facilities, in which animal holding facilities and associated procedure 
rooms are operated. Whilst these facilities are difficult to design and construct 
correctly, they pose less complexity (complexity 4) than those where facilities have 
generic and specialist research areas and CBS facilities combined (complexity 5).  
Design and construction of animal facilities is complex and subject to very stringent 
and precise standards and regulation. These are tested and enforced by authorities 
or regulators, such as the Home Office or the Environment Agency (depending on the 
work carried out) and licenses are issued with clear identification of accountability for 
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the appropriate operation of these. Key reasons for the strong regulatory approach are 
the concern for welfare of staff (exposure to pathogens, etc.) and the animals 
(temperature, humidity, air changes, mental stimulation, cage density, etc.). 
Not only is the design and construction of such facilities complex in its own right; there 
is also a need for various backup options to avoid a risk of single point of failure. The 
complexity of the technology involved, relevant regulations and standards plus the 
ways in which different animal facilities are operated provide a higher risk of cost 
overruns. However, the knowledge of this has seemingly not helped to inform the 
estimates and its assumptions. 
So why the inferior performance in this specific category?  To understand this, the 
author reviewed the respective projects and found some decisions and milestones in 
the project, which were not be visible from the reference class approach only.  
All projects in this category made an original case for funding, that showed significantly 
higher costs than what was eventually approved. They were all approved via a 
government department and this process involved numerous versions of the OBC and 
then FBC to be submitted, until a definitive version was agreed. These negotiations 
did not relate to discussions about scope or validity of the cost or programme estimates 
but adjusting the case to fit a general funding availability. Consequently, the 
requirements and estimates were made to fit a pre-assigned budget rather than 
realistic requirements. During the life of the project, reality would force these costs 
back into the project. A further indicator for this issue is the very low average 
contingency in this category, which is approx. 3%- 6% below the average level of 
contingency in other categories.  
III. SIMILARITIES 
Whilst significant differences could be found within the categories of types of buildings 
and those of different values, very little difference was found between the different 
complexities of the projects / buildings. The success rate in staying within the approved 
budgets sits consistently around 50% (two of the six categories being slightly below 
with 43 and 46% respective. This appears to be a direct contradiction to the view that 
complexity is a potential cause for poor performance of projects in the category of 
animal facilities.  
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4.3.2. COST - DETAILED ANALYSIS 
The above analysis is very crude and high-level and provides very little insight to the 
actual performances within and across the categories. In the following the analysis will 
look at specific aspects within the database, which may provide further explanations.  
I. COST VARIANCE 
 
FIGURE 15 - COST VARIANCE RCF 
Figure 15 shows a comparison of the level of cost variance between all projects in 
each category and those with cost overrun. The largest disparity exists in the 
categories with complexity 4, 5 (and the combination of the two), refurbishment 
projects and those below a value of £1M. Due to all projects with animal facilities 

















Project value over £50m
Project value £10m - £50m
Project value £1m - £10m
Project value <£1m
Cost Overrun in % - comparison 
Mean cost overrun (projects with overrun only) Mean cost overrun (all Projects)
Page 131 of 203 
 
4.3.3. SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE - GENERAL 
The assessment of project performance in relation to schedule was very difficult, 
because much of the projects had no direct statements of time schedules. Except for 
three projects, none had a final document, such as a project closure report, which 
should hold verified (i.e. approved by project board) performance measures on cost, 
time and quality. However, with the help of project team members and wider searches 
within the documentation, information has been triangulated and the author am 
satisfied that all schedule related information is accurate to the tolerance of +/- two 
months.  
 
FIGURE 16 - SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE OF PROJECTS IN % OF RESPECTIVE REFERENCE CLASS 
Schedule overruns are much more frequent in all project categories than it is found in 
the cost aspect. In average across all projects 69% exceeded their approved 
programme and variances between the individual categories are less significant than 
it is apparent with the cost details (Figure 16).  
I. MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS? 
One category (projects with value between £10M and £50M) showed none of their 
projects completing within the estimated time frame. These projects are also 
represented in the category with the highest level of complexity and the ones in this 
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also contain small animal facilities. The combination of animal facilities with a value 
range of £10M to £50M appears to be the highest risk projects in relation to delivery 
within given time frame.  
The information relating to scheduling seems to proof the theory of planning fallacy 
(Buehler, Griffin and Ross, 1994) and/ or strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 
Garbuio and Lovallo, 2009). With projects, which conclude within an approved time 
frame being in a significant minority, more information was necessary to review to draw 
conclusions.  
4.3.4. SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE - DETAILS 
 
FIGURE 17 - COMPARISON TIME PERFORMANCE IN % 
I. DATA COLLECTION 
Developing the database regarding the scheduling aspect has been a real challenge. 
Documentation is usually quite unclear as to when a project started and when they 
officially concluded. Much of this information gained by triangulating information from 
a range of documents, such as minutes of board meetings, dates of cost reports, 
certificates (payment or practical completion, etc. and this provides me with sufficient 













Project value over £50m
Project value £10m - £50m
Project value £1m - £10m
Project value <£1m
Time overrun in % - Comparison
mean time overrun projects with overrun only (%) mean time overrun all (%)
Page 133 of 203 
 
assurance that the information used is correct within a tolerance to up to +/- two 
months. 
A further issue was the breakdown in various elements of the project schedule. The 
intention was to have details that allows comparisons of design development versus 
construction and how this varies across the various categories and groups. However, 
use of this information is limited. In a traditional procurement approach, a client would 
have a design team developing the full design, then tender the works. That approach 
provides a clear separation of the design and construction phase. This type of 
approach is now rarely used in public sector and in the two organisations involved. 
Historically, medium to large projects are procured as Design & Build projects, where 
the contractor provides a significant element of the design work, usually with the client 
design team being novated to the successful contractor. Consequently, the design and 
construction phase overlap and merge in that some elements of a facility would be 
designed quite late during the construction phase.  
II. BEST PERFORMANCE 
The best performing category in terms of project delivery on schedule are those 
projects with a complexity of 4. This is closely followed by refurbishment projects and 
projects with a value between £1m to £10m. There is overlap (i.e. some of the projects 
are represented in all three of these groups) due to the small sample size and no 
general similarity in the projects that are contained in each of these groups. 
Considering the performance in relation to the % overrun on schedule the lowest time 
overrun was found at projects with a value of £10m - £50m (7.5%). It is notable, that 
the refurbishment projects again perform well in comparison with other project types, 
which is early evidence (subject to further project details in the collection) for better 
awareness of potential risks in planning refurbishments.  
III. POOREST PERFORMANCE 
Categories with the highest percent of projects exceeding their schedule was seen at 
projects with a value between £10m to £50m. Whilst all projects in this category did 
not manage to complete within estimated time scale, the extent of that overrun was 
the lowest that could be found amongst any of the categories (7.5%). However, looking 
at the performance in terms of average % overrun within the category, the results are 
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quite different. The category with the highest percent time overruns is the group of 
projects with a value up to £1m (75.7%) and if looking only at the projects with time 
overrun this goes up to 100.9%.  
In reviewing these projects and respective details, the author has not found specific 
reasons, why these small value projects have such significant overrun (when they do). 
Nevertheless, there is an assumption that the planning, which goes into the 
development of these projects may be less thorough due to lower values involved or 
higher frequency of such projects taking place. In discussions with bidders, there was 
also the view that due to the low value of the projects there is a reluctance of spending 
funds on external sources, such as designers, engineers or estimators.  
It also must be noted, that projects with value over £50m experienced the majority of 
their delays during the approval process (general about 12 months), rather than during 
the construction and commissioning phase. Again, there is some, but no significant 
overlap in projects across the groups.  
4.3.5. RESEARCH CYCLE 1 – REVIEW AND ACTIONS  
If it was assumed that a larger database provides the same results, the outcomes 
would enable a prediction on cost performance and subsequent determination of 
required contingencies. It suggests that the argument that projects with higher 
complexity require larger contingency is flawed. The complexities levels made no 
difference in the project performance based on this database.  
The above findings were presented to the AR group in a meeting and discussed. 
General concern was raised about the size of the database and it was agreed that 
focused effort is to be made to increase the contributions by adding more projects or 
securing more contributing organisations. A target was set to double the number of 
projects included (to 60) but with a focus on larger projects, preferably with a value of 
over £50m.  
Hence, a key action was to approach other organisations with significant science 
estate and secure their contribution to the project database. Relevant procedural 
details, such as protecting anonymity, mechanisms for access to the information and 
responsibility for data maintenance were to be considered.  
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Furthermore, the AR group agreed that whilst the generic high-level analysis of various 
groups/ categories of project was interesting, its value for application for the 
improvement of project estimates and/ or decision making was limited. Research cycle 
2 was therefore to test the use of RCF (be it with limited information available) to a life 
project and report back to the AR group with the findings.  
4.4. REFERENCE CLASS FORECASTING – CYCLE 2 
4.4.1. IMPLEMENTED ACTIONS  
Research Cycle 2 was concerned with the expansion of the database and testing of 
the RCF against a life project. The expansion of the database was presented with 
some significant hurdles. Work commenced in both MRC and the health organisation 
to collect details from more projects however, since the initially selected projects 
provided the most complete information, no further projects could be identified so far. 
Those projects, which were incomplete at the conclusion of the first research cycle will 
be added, when completion is achieved.  
More difficult was the activity to recruit other organisations with significant scientific 
estates who could provide project information. Universities, NHS Trusts, Ministry of 
Defence, etc. were considered to be appropriate and where approached. Discussions 
with these have resulted in a better understanding of the complexity of developing a 
database.   
The biggest issue was how the anonymity of the contributing organisation would be 
maintained when using details, which is likely to be known in the industry. This drove 
the willingness of said organisations to provide information. In order to validate the 
organisation, the author would need to have sight of relevant documentation, which 
was denied by the respective gatekeepers. Provision of just the details as identified in 
the methodology, would not allow an informed selection of projects suitable for the 
comparison.  
Further aspects were the responsibility for holding, maintaining and expanding the 
database in the future, the cost and the format of this database. Similarly, questions 
of who will undertake the analysis, in which form would the database be made 
available, etc. for all of which no consensus could be achieved. Whilst this is a very 
disappointing result, it has provided a very good basis for developing plans for the 
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future and a realistic assessment of capability of RCF in the field of science related 
projects.  
4.4.2. APPLICATION TO A LIVE PROJECT 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MRC LONDON INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL 
SCIENCES (LMS) BUILDING PROJECT 
The LMS is located at the Imperial College Health Care Trust (ICHT) Hammersmith 
hospital campus. It is accommodated by Imperial College London, who the MRC and 
the LMS have a long association and collaboration relationship with. After long service, 
the buildings in which the Institute is located are aged and not capable of housing new 
innovative technology required for the continuation of the research undertaken. 
The MRC (through funding from BEIS) are co-funding with ICL the design and 
construction of a new facility, which is to provide the home of the LMS with a total 
budget of £75m. This facility will include generic lab space, write up, social areas as 
well as a highly flexible and high-tech imaging centre, which will enable the Institute to 
accommodate new, innovative technology, such as Cryo-Electron Microscopes, super 
resolution microscopes, etc. Additionally, the facility will have one floor dedicated to 
animal (mice) holding and procedure rooms allowing longitudinal research activities.  
With these parameters, the project would fall in the following categories: 
• Animal facility 
• New build facility  
• New build laboratory facility 
• Complexity 4 and 5 
• Projects with value over £50m. 
Contribution by government funding (£50m) is attached to the respective approval 
requirements. OBC has already been approved in December 2017 and the Final 
Business Case will require approval prior to concluding the procurement exercise. 
Furthermore, the project must get approval by BEIS or Cabinet Office for the 
procurement strategy, since the value of the contract exceeds £10m.  
At the point of undertaking this analysis, the project had received approval of the OBC 
and the procurement strategy by Cabinet Office.  This procurement has commenced 
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at the point where design stage RIBA 3 was completed (for review, approval and 
submission for planning approval).  
II. COMPARISON WITH REFERENCE CLASSES 
Table 3 shows a comparison of the project (LMS actual estimate at OBC) with 
categories with the most similarities of characteristics with this project. Due to the LMS 
project not being completed, no cost or time variances could be compared, however 
these figures from the categories gave insight in potential outcomes of the LMS 
project. It showed that the average contingency (at that point held at OBC) was much 
higher than those held in projects of all categories at FBC (in average 6.9%). This was 
a very healthy situation as with the increasing certainty on the design and construction 
cost (generally combined with the rise of the construction costs) the contingency was 
expected to decrease. The example of the categories of animal facilities highlighted 
however, that the level of contingency was by no means a guarantee for avoidance of 
cost overruns. It was also notable that all categories showed significant overrun on the 
schedule (average of 32.2%) suggesting overly optimistic planning and has impact on 




























variance in % 
12.8 11.5 47.6 9.6 13.0 5.5  
Average 
contingency in % 
at FBC 
13.0 13.2 7.2 10.9 13.1 12.0 18.5 
Average time 
overrun in % 
39.3 20.4 53.8 37.2 26.3 16.3  
TABLE 3 - COMPARISON CONTINGENCY 
Naturally, one would compare projects at similar approval points (i.e. OBC in this case) 
however, there were a number of problems with this approach. 
• The LMS project had quite advanced estimates at the point of OBC, based on 
design and construction logistics, which exceed the detail usually available at 
concept design (RIBA 2). OBC information for most of the projects in the 
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database is at much higher level and associated with much more assumptions 
than the LMS project. 
• With the procurement exercise and the conclusion of the RIBA stage 3, a 
comparison with other project’s FBC details would provide direction or 
guidance in the preparation of the FBC of the LMS project. 
• As a consequence, all figures in the respective categories were taken from 
FBC stage to determine what the target levels should be for the LMS building 
project.  
There were no details on cost or time overrun for the LMS as it just embarks on the 
delivery phase.  Table 4 provides a breakdown of the comparison between LMS and 
comparable categories. 
 
TABLE 4 - COMPARISON WITH RELEVANT REFERENCE CLASSES 
  
animal Compl. Est.
fac. 4 LMS (OBC)
Average % design cost 
of overall project cost 8.99 4.21 6.64 9.57 5.81 4.11 12.8
Average variance % 
(design) actual vs FBC 113.26 -8.08 42.22 -9.24 15.15 107.41
Average % construction 
cost of FBC 66.56 79.51 63.56 70.68 68.28 70.42 68.7
Average variance % 
(construction) actual vs 
FBC
142.07 82.02 71.42 25.74 141.82 26.18
Average % contingency 
of overall FBC 23 13.23 7.16 10.87 13.15 13.25 18.5
Average % design 
programme of overall 
FBC
29.66 27.19 31.41 23.61 29.67 29.3 26.67
Average variance % 
(design) actual vs FBC 59 110.63 0.44 0 -2.74 22.89
Average % construction 
programme of overall 
FBC
70.99 73.68 68.59 76.39 82.62 70.7 76.67
Average variance % 
(construction) actual vs 
FBC
38.9 46.1 56.27 40.42 35.68 15.86
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Again, the author has used FBC figures for the respective categories, because the 
design was more developed at the LMS at the time of OBC than in other projects at 
that point. The comparison confirms this with a higher percentage of design costs at 
the LMS project (3.23% above the highest and 6.3% above average design costs of 
the categories), since the proportion of the programme for this work is within the range 
of the given categories (23.61% - 31.41%).  
Whilst the cost of the design and the contingency at the LMS is higher than the average 
of these in the categories, it is unlikely to cover the potential gap represented by the 
respective overruns. Two of the categories show over 100% cost overrun in design 
costs or construction costs. Regarding the programme for the project, this applies too, 
especially, since the proportion estimated for the LMS is located within the range 
provided by the categories with no “buffer” incorporated. As a result, the author had to 
assume that the LMS project has made no sufficient allowance for the overruns in both 
cost and time, which similar projects clearly experience.  
III. COMPARISON WITH SELECTED PROJECTS 
The author then tested an alternative approach by selecting individual projects with 
similar characteristics to the LMS, i.e. new build laboratory facility, complexity of 4/5 
and value of over £50m. Only 2 projects were applicable to these criteria. The Table 
5 below shows the comparison derived from this approach (again on main aspects of 
cost, time and contingency).  
 






Cost variance in % of actual total cost 
vs OBC 24.9
Cost of fees in % of overall cost 
estimate at OBC 10.6 39.9 12.8
Cost of construction in % of overall 
cost estimate at OBC 60.7 77.9 68.7
Contingency in % of overall cost 
estimate at OBC 28.6 18.5
Time variance in % of overall time 
actual vs OBC 26
Design programme in % of overall 
programme at OBC 29.1 22.8 43
Construction programme in % of 
overall programme at OBC 70.9 27.2 56
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Table 5 paints a different picture. Most apparent is that the level of cost contingency 
is much lower than what was allowed in these projects. Additionally, these projects 
also had a very significant cost overrun when comparing between actual outcome and 
OBC estimates (77.9% on construction alone). Further disparity was found in the 
difference in the scheduling. The ratio between design and construction programme 
at the LMS is almost equal, whilst the sample projects had a short design phase and 
a longer construction phase (1:3). With the details derived from this last approach, a 
prognosis was made of where the LMS project would arrive, should these figures be 
accurate (Table 6). 
 
TABLE 6 - PREDICTION OF PROJECT OUTCOME BASED ON COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR PROJECTS 
In this table, the author has made predictions by applying average increases in cost 
and schedule derived from the average overruns identified at similar projects (table 5). 
It estimates the accurate costs for the project to be over £93m and significantly longer 
time scales for both design and construction programme than set out in the OBC of 
the LMS building project. Since this is based on the requirements not increasing, one 
must assume that by keeping within the approved project (last column table 6), 















Total project cost £74,879,317 £93,501,803 £75,000,000
Design fees £9,605,261 £11,154,765 £8,947,500
Construction Cost £51,410,000 £80,897,760 £64,890,000
Contingency £13,863,500 £1,449,277 £1,162,500
total time in weeks 192 302 241
Design programme in weeks 84 129 103
Construction programme in weeks 108 172 137
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4.4.3. RESEARCH CYCLE 2 - REVIEW  
I. GENERAL  
The results from the activities to expand the database and the practical application of 
RCF to a live project were presented to the AR group and discussed. It was 
acknowledged by the group, that the development of the database under the 
protection of the ethical approval of a research activity and specific consent 
agreements helped with a fast and uncomplicated progress. All participants 
highlighted that contractual agreements with similar, if not more stringent protection of 
data would need to be developed, if this database was to accept information from other 
organisations.  
Strategic decisions will need to be made as to who will own and manage this database 
in the future, which will require resources and expertise. Appropriate storage facilities 
would need to be identified (cloud, etc.) where information would be accessible to 
participants on other interested parties.  Discussions as to the level of analysis that 
would be provided need to take place. Agreed actions are identified in 4.5. – 
Continuous improvement. 
II. RCF APPLICATION  
The findings from the application of RCF to the LMS project were discussed with the 
Action Group. There was general interest in the findings, but due to the small database 
the results were considered only indicative. In presenting the results, the following 
issues were highlighted with the calculation itself: 
Ø In comparing the project directly with those of similar characteristics, the 
statistical basis of the calculation was severely restricted (to two projects 
only). Therefore, the results cannot really represent statistically sound 
evidence on which one should base one’s assumptions for a project. 
Nevertheless, there was a view that this approach could be reasonably 
accurate (provided it is based on a larger number of projects). 
Ø The calculation itself does not allow for aspects of political influences and 
similar unpredictable issues. For example, the budget of the LMS project is 
not derived from a build-up of the requirements, feasibility study and then 
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relevant cost estimate, but from an arbitrary allocation by the government 
based on funding availability. This is exacerbated by an established funding 
stop in March 2021 (end of 5-year spending review), which forces an 
unnatural and accelerated programme on the project.  Consequently, the 
comparison is not done between projects of similar constraints, only of similar 
design/ construction characteristics.  
Ø The actual outcomes of the projects do not show levels of contingencies, 
because they are used up by the respective cost overruns. A comparison 
between actual vs OBC (or indeed FBC) should take into consideration the 
contingency plus the overrun of the respective categories to arrive at an 
appropriate contingency level.  However, this cannot be broken down to the 
individual elements (for example design or construction), as it is not apparent, 
where these overruns occurred, nor is it feasible to establish this in a larger 
database.  
Ø RCF is to be tested in future capital award panel decisions by providing a 
statistical comparison for medium – large project proposals to understand, 
how this can support the award panel decisions.  
II. LONDON INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES PROJECT 
There were also positive aspects in relation to what the author learned from the 
comparison on the LMS project.  
Ø A high ratio of the design phase to construction phase at the LMS was based 
on a “waiting time” for approvals from various government departments. 
Whilst this seems reasonable, it was also discovered that similar large 
projects (and therefore with similar approval processes) tend to have between 
9 – 12 months delay due to this specific issue. Consequently, the project must 
either include more time for the approval processes or, as it will be the case 
with LMS, raise this as the key risk for both corporate and governmental level, 
with funding availability restricted until March 2021.  
Ø The findings from the comparison have triggered a risk review on the LMS 
project. Individual risks were reviewed in terms of time and cost impact as well 
as the issue of probability (considering the comparison with the categories) 
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and ownership. Using statistics has challenged the views by the team 
members on risks and has led to a more realistic risk assessment.  
Ø Whilst the project team has been aware of the aggressive programme for this 
project, it did not consider it to be 12 months short of what similar projects 
would require to be completed. This is now being addressed by seeking 
agreements with the co-funding organisation for the project to fund the 
extended programme, rather than the contribution towards the beginning of 
the project. It is thought that this will largely mitigate the issue. 
III. EXPERIENCED PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF RCF 
In discussion with the Action Group the following problems were identified with the 
use of RCF. 
Ø There is inconsistency in the quality of information. That does not only apply 
to different organisations, but different project teams. If RCF was to provide 
more accurate results, the collection of details must account for these 
differences. This may be done by establishing a quality threshold, such as 
that only direct evidence could be used (not triangulated from various 
sources) or similar. However, this poses a problem in how the database is 
maintained and increased (responsibility, quality check, etc.). As a result, 
there may be a reluctance by potential other contributing organisations, as 
they would need to disclose more details than they are prepared to.  
Ø The author found several approval routes for projects. Most notably, the 
different organisations have reporting lines to different departments, who 
themselves have a range of approval pathways. Some projects go through an 
OBC approval, some just have FBC, some (particularly smaller projects) 
produce none of the above but submit justification through the capital bid 
panel only. It is very difficult to establish all three “check points” (i.e. OBC, 
FBC and actual performance at completion). As a minimum, projects to be 
included in the database would need to have gone through an FBC and a final 
assessment at completion. 
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Ø The process of selecting similar projects for the example of the LMS has the 
potential of introducing bias. This in turn negates the effect, which RCF is 
supposed to have on the accuracy of estimates according to Flyvbjerg (2008).  
Ø The action group was unsure over the required size of the database to 
provide statistically meaningful results. It was agreed to actively work on 
growing it, but regular testing would be needed to gain more certainty of the 
use of RCF.  
4.5. Continuous improvement 
Over the two research cycles both in the organisational and RCF research a significant 
amount of details was collected, analysed and reviewed. Progress was made in some 
areas, less so in others. Whilst the conclusion of these two cycles define the end of 
the research as anticipated in the constrains of this thesis, they represent the 
beginning of a continuous improvement process at the MRC. 
In this approach the two methods come together to form a cohesive strategy for the 
improvement of the quality of decision making in the organisation. This section will 
explain the actions taken forward to the continuous improvement process and 
successes already achieved.  
I. ACTIONS ESTABLISHED  
This research set out to improve the quality of the decision making in the organisation. 
Progress has been made in identifying evaluation criteria, which are shared by within 
the community. A database has been started to provide some historical information 
for an assessment of viability of proposed projects. Better communication between 
bidders and approvers, HO and units has been agreed, which should support the 
understanding of the mutual positions, be it the need for equipment or the lack of 
funding availability.  
The continuous improvement strategy aims to combine all of these aspects by taking 
the following actions: 
a) All estates related bids will be tested against the RCF database. Whilst there is 
acknowledgement that this database is not yet statistically significant, it can 
provide some guidance on viability of projects or indicate, where weaknesses 
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in the estimation may be. Particular focus will be on the size of the contingency 
proposed for the project and potential time scale. The work to expand the RCF 
database will continue and senior management will actively support and 
promote this with other partner organisations.  
b) Capital bid evaluation criteria are to be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure 
they represent the circumstances and priorities of the MRC overall and the 
research community in particular.  
c) Details is to be collected to establish evidence for the state of the science 
equipment overall. Asset registers are expected to provide the best basis for 
this information, as these are standardised across the organisation and have to 
be updated annually by the units.  
d) The estates team will undertake a tour of all intramural and extramural units 
and institutes, discussing with the respective directors three key subjects: 
ambitions for the future, science equipment concerns, estates related concerns. 
These will be summarised and discussed at MRC Management Board. Actions 
resulting from this will be communicated back to the Units.  
e) Both RPG programme managers and unit directors will be actively encouraged 
to discuss the capital bids prior to the evaluation, if not prior to submission. 
Similarly, personal feedback of the outcomes of the process to each unit is 
encouraged.  
II. ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED AND INITIAL FINDINGS  
Some of the above actions have already been implemented and are now in a process 
of reiteration. The most successful of these has been the visit to the units. These were 
undertaken in 2018 and resulted in a collection of information, which supported the 
development of the MRC science strategy. Here the feedback from the units relating 
to  
Ø Scientific vision: This includes the view of the Director of whether the 
direction of their science needs to change or be fine-tuned prior to their 
next QQR or in preparation for it. Part of this discussion was also to look at 
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aspects, which arise from some of their research activities, which may 
indicate to other areas or elements of science, that would be worth 
exploring. The outcome of this discussion is to be collated and presented 
to the MRC Strategy Group and Research Programme Group to review 
and select those, which should be actively supported and/ or flow into the 
UKRI capital road map.  
Ø Replacement capital scientific equipment: Evidence is needed to 
establish the minimum capital requirements to maintain the research 
activities at a status quo plus the level of funding required to make the UK 
research world-leading therewith establishing the UK as a global centre of 
excellence in medical science. This work will be presented to UKRI and 
the government departments to lobby for higher and more reliable levels of 
capital funding levels in the mid- to long-term future. Basis evidence for 
this aspect will be the asset registers of units and institutes.  
Ø Estates maintenance capital funding: Like with the scientific equipment, 
there is a need to determine minimum funding levels for capital plant 
replacement as well as larger investments, such as when the life cycles of 
research buildings come to an end and the need for major refurbishment 
or replacement must be considered. Units and Institutes for which the 
MRC has estates responsibility have been asked to provide a rolling plant 
replacement plan for their facilities in consideration of replacement time 
and cost. Additionally, head office records will be consulted to establish 
ages of various research facilities and establish, which would need to be 
refurbished/ replaced in the next 5-15 years.  
A database of capital science equipment was established, which contains the 
information from 17 units. It has permitted an analysis of the status of MRC science 
equipment, evidencing the aged equipment that all units have to work with. Basic 
estimates of capital funding requirements to rectify this situation has been submitted 
as part of the details for the government’s spending review to underline the importance 
of increasing the capital funding for fundamental research. Agreement has been 
reached to repeat the visits annually with the estates team being joined by the relevant 
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RPG programme managers. Initial feedback from unit directors has been very positive, 
welcoming this way of re-connecting to the science base.  
The questionnaires used in research cycle 2 will be re-issued to all MRC HO staff and 
the unit directors on an annual basis. It is expected to amend the questionnaires in 
view of arising issues during the previous year or seeking evidence of the 
effectiveness of actions that are implemented. A programme of visits by the estates 
team to all MRC University Units and MRC Institutes must be established to develop 
closer relationships with the units and gather more information and evidence to inform 
the strategy of the MRC.  
4.6. Summary – findings of organisational research and testing RCF  
In completion of the two research cycles in the organisational research and the testing 
of RCF for the purpose of estimation and approval has provided the author with 
significant insight in the organisation and the dynamics of the bid process. And whilst 
each of the research streams were undertaken individually and separately, they 
contributed to an overall benefit of better understanding of causes of the problem 
identified or areas, which exacerbate it.  
 
FIGURE 18 - SUMMARY FINDINGS 
Figure 18 demonstrates some of the key findings of each research element and how 
they come together to inform the actions on continuous improvement. Throughout the 
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organisational research the author noted the very positive view that both bidders and 
approvers had over the activity in general and that they felt that this will lead to a closer 
relationship between parties in the MRC.  
The combination of the more social aspect of the findings with the statistical approach 
of RCF is expected to provide more transparency and confidence in the process. With 
the total lack of acceptance of operational needs by approvers poses a risk to the 
research continuity in that scientific equipment is generally promoted over capital 
estates issues unless it is already impacting on the scientific activities. Hence, the 
preferred way forward should be a separation through a separate process avoiding 
direct competition between science and estate.  
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION 
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This research started out with the aim of  
Developing a fair and transparent processes for the approval of estates projects 
by establishing more accurate estimation and assessment tools for bidders and 
approving bodies.  
The author then researched in literature about the problem and realised the complexity 
of influences on the early development of projects is significant and resulted in three 
key research questions expected to identify effective actions to achieve the said aim: 
Ø What are the influences on processes and dynamics of project estimation and 
approvals in the MRC?  
Ø Would RCF present a workable tool for project estimation and/ or assessment? 
Ø How can this knowledge be used to achieve a fairer and more transparent 
process for these aspect in the early project stages therewith achieving better 
Value for Money for medical research? 
The discussion is structured around these three questions and how the author believes 
the findings to contribute to the target. With this the author also reflects on how this 
compares with her insight from literature on these aspects.  
5.1. INFLUENCES ON PROCESS AND DYNAMICS ESTIMATION AND APPROVALS  
Both the research in the organisational aspect and the collection of information for 
RCF have provided insight in this area of concern.  
5.1.1. STRATEGIC MISREPRESENTATION AND OPTIMISM BIAS 
Findings from this research have identified a very complex situation of organisational 
and economical influences. The key driver for projects in the MRC is the progression 
of science. Science breakthroughs and high-quality research results support the 
outcome of the quinquennial reviews and hence the continuation of the research 
programmes and units as such. The author has found strong passion by both bidders 
and approvers over the social benefits of fundamental science, sometimes not 
understood or shared by funding government departments. This is leading to opposing 
pressures, in that the funders support projects that support their policies (Dotti, 2018) 
whilst the bidders (in the MRC case) fight for the approval of their projects with the 
belief that this serves the wider public and with the careful management of information 
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in their applications (Steinel and Dreu, 2010), partially evidenced by the view of some 
bidders  that evaluation criteria should not be made public, as it would be used 
strategically.  
All of the above are reasons for both bidders and approvers to adjust estimates to 
align with the most suitable circumstances. However, this research has also found a 
declared disinterest in knowledge by bidders that would provide higher chances of 
success for bids. They have highlighted concern about potential misrepresentation, 
should they be aware of the evaluation criteria. This indicates a high integrity of the 
bidders within the MRC and suggests, that the inaccuracies of project estimates are 
less the result of strategic misrepresentation than other influences and therefore 
confirm the findings of critics of the theory of strategic misrepresentation, such as 
Osland and Strand (2008).  
Continuous strain on capital funding over the last decade has resulted in deterioration 
of science estate and equipment, leading to situations, where the research 
continuation is threatened. Annuality of funding allows public sector organisations 
certainty for only one financial year, resulting in a bias towards projects, which do not 
exceed 12 months duration. Deliberate misrepresentation was suspected as an 
influence on estimates, particularly in view of the time restrictions of funding certainty, 
but it could not be evidenced.  
Anecdotal evidence was provided in interviews that the cost estimates from third 
parties, such as suppliers, would be low due to the desire to be looked at more 
favourably at a later tender stage or to enable the start of the project as such. That 
aligns with the findings of Love, Edwards and Irani (2012) that the combination of 
competitive fees, failure to project manage by designers result in rushed work and 
design errors. Yet, the author has found unexpected evidence of strategic 
misrepresentation, which was initiated by approvers, particular in the context of 
projects being initiated by government departments resulting in funding applications 
being made to suit the government proposal despite differing views on the 
effectiveness or delivery of the solution. From the interview results this research sees 
political influences as a significant cause for strategic misrepresentation, similar to the 
findings of Steinel & Dreu (2004) on the social motives of strategic misrepresentation 
and Dotti (2018) on political actors promoting projects within their policy area.  
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The findings from this research does not support the view of strategic 
misrepresentation being ‘standard procedures’ (Jones & Euske, 1991), rather than 
confirming the view of Osland & Strand (2008) that the complexity of projects and their 
political environment result in the variances of project estimates and outcomes.  
Stronger influences were found to be optimism bias and planning fallacy. Significant 
disparity of views over the performance of projects highlighted that perceptions of 
project performance depend on the position as bidder or approver. RCF analyses 
suggested that projects in the science environment generally perform poorly with high 
percentage of cost and schedule overruns.  
RCF analyses however, relate to larger projects, which cannot be designed 
constructed and completed within one FY.  Smaller projects, such as those that feature 
regularly may be subject to a combination of the need, the desire to complete within 
12 months and the believe that this is possible. This is considered to be triggered by 
the implicit constraint of the funding being only available within the current FY.  
Bidders, who are developing estimates have noted, that they use information from 
previous projects, yet this does not extend to performance data. This would suggest 
that in offering the RCF analysis as opportunity to benchmark the estimates at an early 
point could be a successful strategy.  
5.1.2. DYNAMICS OF PROJECT APPROVALS 
Information gathered during the two research cycles provided some information on the 
underlying dynamics of the approval process. Evaluation criteria for the capital bid 
process are published with each call for bids but does not communicate the exact 
process or the representation at the panel. The criteria are focused on science benefits 
and as such closely related to the shared values that were identified in the second 
research cycle. Feedback from bidders indicated, that their view of the process being 
not transparent is related to the detailed methodology and the understanding of the 
panel membership, which is not identified to bidders. This lack of transparency is a 
cause for questioning the legitimacy of the decision (Kieslich and Littlejohns, 2015) 
and loss of trust by bidders into the process if not the approvers themselves (Lyrio, 
Lunkes and Taliani, 2018). 
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The author has found considerable confusion by bidders, over the role, which 
recommendations from the QQR play in this process. However, approvers were very 
clear, that the QQR recommendations are an important influence on the decision for 
approval. Furthermore, the point of time of the bid submission between QQRs is also 
an important, indirect aspect of the approval decision. A unit, which will undergo such 
a review in the following year, will have considerable difficulties to get funding approval 
than one which has just completed this process, where the research has just been 
reaffirmed to be worthy of funding. Reasoning for this is that these reviews set out a 
new vision for the next 5 years, which may change the direction of science and 
therewith the requirement for respective technology. Items procured in the last year of 
the existing review cycle may be not contribute to the new vision. The author found, 
that this contributed significantly to the perception of bidders that the process is a 
‘black box’ where the actual evaluation process and considerations are unclear (Mow 
2011), because they felt unreasonably harshly judged despite their science being of 
unchanged quality.   
There are also dynamics between panel members, the most obvious one is between 
the representative of the estates team and RPG. The process is considered to be 
mainly for science benefits and the role of facilities is considered to be secondary. One 
approver referred to it as “overhead to science” and with the majority of panel members 
being representatives of RPG the panel overall has a bias against science support 
aspects, such as estate (Lamont, 2010). Additionally, some units, specifically 
intramural ones, have heavily serviced and expensive facilities and struggle to balance 
the need for updating the facilities with the need for new innovative technologies for 
research. Overall, findings have shown that panel members are not necessarily 
exerting their expertise but promote the case of their specific interest. The author has 
therefore dismissed the concern by Langfeldt (2004) that assessments are not fully 
undertaken by each panel member because they rely on the judgement of experts on 
the panel.  
Anecdotal evidence was found that there are implicit rules for the approvals of projects 
at the capital bid process as identified by van Arensbergen et al. (2014) although in 
this study they relating to difficult and powerful directors was made, implying that they 
needed to be appeased to avoid uncomfortable discussions and additional work. On 
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the other hand, the research has also found that approvers considered all ongoing 
MRC research was worthy of further investment, as is undergoes rigorous scrutiny to 
gain research grants. As a result, there is a desire to ensure that all bidders receive 
some funding.  
5.1.3. Evaluation criteria 
Research on the subject of the evaluation criteria is closely related to the aspect of 
VfM. It was positive that criteria of values of research was generally shared between 
bidders and approvers, hence providing a base for explaining approval decisions with 
a mutual understanding. However, as the findings from the first research cycle 
indicated, interpretation of many of the criteria was different, for example, in which way 
scientific impact could be measured. With the views ranging from measuring 
publications to finding effective health interventions demonstrate that there are 
potentially very different approval decisions being made, depending on the opinion of 
the respective approver. This is consistent with the findings by Mow (2011), who 
highlighted the difficulties to interpret criteria in the context of the evaluation, but from 
a perspective outside the evaluation team. 
In this context the research from Laudel (2006), who suggested increasing 
transparency through active involvement of bidders in the process or the increased 
use of peer reviews with the introduction of experts on particular subjects (Fogelholm 
et al., 2012) , become potential solutions. Kieslich and Littlejohns (2015) see audit 
tools as an efficient method to establish transparency and consistency in decision-
making. In consideration of the desire by MRC HO to have much closer engagement 
with the units, engaging of unit representatives by way of rotating membership on the 
capital bid panel will open the process to more scrutiny and enforce the accountability 
for the decisions made. Also, the bidders would develop much more understanding of 
the financial pressures that dictate the decisions (for example, that generally there is 
only £1 capital funding available for every £3 to £4 of submitted bids). A counter-
argument would be that this would introduce an obvious bias and so the alternative 
would be to seek agreement over the criteria amongst bidders and approvers.  
5.2. RCF as a workable tool for estimation and assessment? 
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The work of gathering information for and the development of a database for RCF has 
identified benefits and shortcomings of the method as a tool for more accurate 
estimation and approval.  The AR group considered this work as a successful proof of 
concept, however with some caveats.  
I. BENEFITS  
 RCF is based on results of fairly simple statistical calculations, such as mean, 
average, maximum, minimum, etc. The detail, which is required to be used to build the 
database is understood easily by project professionals and laymen and can be very 
clearly defined (Batselier and Vanhoucke, 2016). The output of data analyses can be 
tailored to the preferences of respective project teams and/ or approving organisations 
and bodies. The methodology allows the expression of ranges represented in various 
categories or specific benchmarks on similar projects. This would be a feature, that 
makes RCF very desirable as a tool for approvers to test the viability of projects that 
are proposed for funding.  
More importantly, it has the potential of providing forecasts for the outcome of a 
particular projects, based on this historic information. Such details can be used to 
scrutinise the estimates for costs and schedules for evidence of bias or gaps. The 
application to a live project has also shown that RCF could provide details for the high, 
medium and low confidence estimates and in combination of a risk analysis (such as 
Monte Carlo) allow information, which is triangulated between different methods of 
calculation. Key to the use is a clear definition of baseline, which depends on what the 
user wishes to understand (Flybjerg et al., 2018) therewith proving highly desirable 
flexibility for approvers, although this comes with a risk of re-introducing bias by 
showing the desirable aspects of the project.  
II. DISADVANTAGES 
Whilst RCF showed great promise for the improvement of estimation accuracy, the 
work in the two research cycles has also identified its limitations. In order to become 
a reasonably reliable tool, it requires a more comprehensive database. By experience 
from two significant research organisations, the establishment of a sufficiently large 
database would need the collaboration of a number of large organisations, such as 
Universities, etc.  
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This leads to the next difficulty. Both the MRC and the health organisation were 
conscious that details contain evidence of what could be considered a failure by their 
respective funders and a detriment to the organisation’s reputation. Whilst input 
information that is required for the calculations can easily be anonymised, the detailed 
knowledge of the projects, which is required to understand its categorisation and/ or 
selection for specific groupings is difficult to achieve without risking the identification 
of the project and owning organisation. Mechanisms could be agreed between a group 
of relevant organisations to overcome this problem. Quality of the information being 
used in the database will have significant impact on the output. It is critical that the 
input detail is accurate and validated to have assurance on the output and therefore 
requires experienced individuals to understand the data provided (Peleskei, 2015).  
The claim that RCF removes bias (Flyvbjerg, 2008) is questionable. As mentioned 
above, the database must have a sufficient number of projects and there is a risk that 
these will cover a medium to long-term of project history. This means that adjustments 
may be required (such as for inflation). Additionally, the activity of selecting specific 
projects for comparisons and statistical analysis as well as the most appropriate and 
possibly challenging baseline (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018) is based on the judgement of the 
individual that undertakes that selection. Both activities have the potential to introduce 
bias to the process (Makovsek, 2014). Last but not least it should not be forgotten, 
that the estimates for the cost and schedule of a project will reflect a project, that is 
well managed and has a clear target in terms of performance. Failures in establishing 
good governance in all levels of the organisation (Brunet and Aubry, 2019) and 
inappropriate use of project management methodologies (Ng, 2018) will undo even 
the best of estimates.  
5.3. How does this contribute to fairness and transparency for 
the capital bid process at MRC? 
In section 5.1 and 5.2 the findings were considered in the context of identifying specific 
tools and actions, which would improve the accuracy of the project estimation or 
decision-making during approval process. These are valid actions and mechanisms in 
themselves but will not provide a comprehensive and transparent solution for the 
project approvals.  
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Throughout the research cycles, particularly in the organisational research, the 
frustration over lack or quality of communication within the MRC was expressed and 
the findings have shown, how this affects the perception of both the project estimation 
(as perceived by approvers) and the approval process (as perceived by bidders).  The 
way in which this research was received by both MRC HO and the units demonstrates 
the desire for more unity as an organisation as whole. It should be noted, that none of 
the participants chose not to communicate for principle reasons, but it appeared to be 
the lowest item on a list tasks with higher priorities. Heavy workload, uncertainties of 
future structures (UKRI) and roles were considered to be contributors to this situation.  
Many participants expected the respective other party to initiate the communication in 
a case of need. Whilst this is a usual approach in managing by exception, it contributes 
to a growing gap between the MRC HO and its science community. Furthermore, it 
results in a failure to understand the needs (both operationally and scientifically) of the 
units and subsequent misjudgement in approval decisions.  
This causes issues for the governance and accountability. MRC HO should make the 
decisions in the knowledge that they will need to justify these decisions to the Units. 
Absence of transparency reduces this accountability to the units and raises concern 
or suspicion over the methods of decision-making by MRC HO. In summary, the 
application of most of the measures and tools identified as useful, will not be effective, 
if not a significant improvement of the communication amongst the MRC is achieved.  
The unit visits undertaken as part of the continuous improvement process have 
demonstrated the power of making the first step. Good communication and the 
development of better relationships should be the highest priority in resolving the 
problem.  
5.4. Summary 
The findings of this research have provided results, which have contributed to the 
understanding of the influences of decision-making in the assessment of funding 
allocation for projects at the MRC. It has highlighted strong dynamics within the 
organisation, which affect approval decisions. Whilst there is an overarching 
agreement on the greater purpose of fundamental science, views on the respective 
criteria or measurements of this vary.  
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Findings of this research have also identified strategic misrepresentation in the context 
of development of projects. However, this was not a simple issue of making a bid fit 
the evaluation criteria. A complex environment has been discovered, where funding 
constraints (such as the annuality of capital funding), stakeholder interests, political 
pressure, requirement for research continuity, etc. forced projects into being or 
directed in their strategy for project planning and approval. Anecdotal evidence was 
discovered, that projects have been initiated by approvers against the judgement of 
the experts, who then had to apply for funding for this initiative.  
The author discovered a split in the organisation with a clear demarcation between the 
head office and the units and institutes. General reluctance on both sides to initiate 
conversations was identified, although both sides confirmed that a closer relationship 
would be helpful. Furthermore, evidence of a culture, where head office stuff has 
distrust of the actions of the units – although only in relation to operational aspects, 
not science – which were almost mirrored by the opinion of units that head office staff 
makes decisions and strategies, which do not work for the units. 
This lack of communication was found to be one of the detrimental influences on the 
quality of decisions for capital awards. Distance between evaluators and the units and 
therewith ignorance of operational needs, contribute to failure to understand priorities 
set by the bidders. Neither the bidders nor the evaluators made efforts to improve the 
understanding of the context of the submissions prior to the scoring. 
It was promising that in the process of completing two research cycles, the desire by 
both the units and HO to improve relations was very apparent, providing a basis for 
the further work in the continuous improvement. Findings from this research identified 
a disparity of views between HO staff and units over the accuracy of the estimates or 
the capability for delivering projects.  Cautions by HO staff over this issue were 
evidenced by the results of the RCF analyses, which demonstrated the majority of 
projects to overrun either budget or programme schedule or both. Development of 
tools to assess project viability during the evaluation of a bid would therefore be of 
immense benefit.   
Considerable progress was made in developing a database for RCF and assessing 
this as a tool for both bidders and approvers to improve accuracy of estimates for 
project proposals. It was found that RCF is a very useful method providing guidance 
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and benchmarking for project estimates on overall cost, contingency and programme 
schedule. Therefore, the aim of testing RCF as a proof of concept has been achieved.  
However, the work in this research has also identified considerable conditions to the 
appropriate use of RCF. Results discussed in research cycle 1 and 2 acknowledged 
the small database and the need to expand this to gain more confidence in the 
statistical analysis.  Quality of the contributing information and the knowledge of 
circumstances and specifics of the relevant projects are critical to allocate the right 
class and category consider the analysis in the context of the project in hand.  
The process of collecting information also identified some details as being unsuitable 
for RCF analysis (for example the breakdown between design and construction phase) 
as they could not be clearly defined and validated.  
RCF was found to be useful but would not eliminate strategic misrepresentation or 
planning fallacy entirely. However, it was considered to be a useful tool if not used as 
the sole judgement of the viability of a project. All of the above cast a view on the level 
of transparency of decision-making in the MRC and associated organisations and how 
or if individuals are accountable for their actions. Outcomes from the interviews and 
questionnaires suggest a close relation between those two, in that a lack of 
transparency for the decisions and actions allows individuals to not be accountable. 
This was particularly the case with the capital bid panel, where decision makers sit 
behind that term are therefore not identifiable as being responsible for decisions.  
The continuous improvement process is supported by all parties within the 
organisation as a result of this research, particularly the effectiveness of some of the 
actions taken. This process is working on all of the above aspects an annual review of 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION  
This research set out to develop a fair and transparent process for project 
development and approval by mitigating strategic misrepresentation. With this it was 
seeking out and test potential tools for better estimation by project teams and 
assessing viability of a project by approvers.  
The reading of literature refined the research question and resulted in three areas on 
which the research should focus: 
- Understanding the influences on the process and the dynamics of estimation 
and approval of projects; 
- Testing of Reference Class Forecasting as a tool for project estimation and 
approval and  
- Using the results of the former two areas to implement processes in the MRC 
to achieve better VfM for projects.  
These questions drove the design of the research methodology, resulting in a mixed 
methodology of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis.  
Organisational aspects were researched through interviews in research cycle 1, which 
were analysed and summarised for review by MRC senior management. Specific 
direction was given on proposed actions and for further detail on aspects, which were 
shown to be inconclusive. These actions were implemented in research cycle 2, where 
a questionnaire provided feedback on improvements. It also collected more detailed 
information on those areas, that required clarification.  
Research activities for the testing of RCF were also undertaken in two research cycles, 
but with the involvement of an AR group, consisting of stakeholders from MRC and 
the contributing health organisation. It resulted in an initial database of projects and 
tests to provide a proof of concept for RCF to be viable in the field of science estates 
projects.  
Upon conclusion of the two research cycles in each strand, the findings informed the 
proposal of actions for a continuous improvement process at the MRC.  
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6.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
Quality of decision-makings depends on the quality of information that is available to 
the decision maker. Of course, the accuracy of the estimation of project proposals is 
a significant element of this, but it is also important to consider the wider context of the 
project proposal and environment of the decision-maker.  
6.2.1. COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM  
Details from interviews and questionnaires indicated the view by bidders that project 
estimates have generally been accurate, whilst the evidence from the RCF database 
showed the majority of projects being delivered over budget or schedule. This is a 
powerful example of planning fallacy. Buehler, Griffin & Peetz (2010), describe the 
phenomenon in the context of planning of future activities. However, findings from this 
research evidence that the reluctance to acknowledge or consider past project 
performance (if negative) is evident, even in a retrospective context.  
It confirms what Buehler, Griffin and Peetz (2010) described the ‘inside versus outside 
view’. Project teams need to have external input to challenge assumptions and risk 
assessments. Difficulties in accessing or engaging with professionals in particular 
fields, such as cost consultants, results in an exclusive reliance on ‘inside’ sources for 
the project calculations.  
Inaccuracies of project proposals Flyvbjerg, Garbuio and Lavallo’s (2009) concept of 
strategic misrepresentation was present in the organisation based on the feedback 
from the interviews, but in a very different context. His definition of this strategy by 
bidders to a deliberately underestimation of cost and overstatement of benefits to 
make the project more suitable for approval. My findings have identified, that strategic 
misrepresentation can be found in a much wider scope and in more subtle forms. 
Projects are sometimes initiated upon suggestion by organisations or bodies with 
approval responsibilities, despite or against the advice from the bidding organisation, 
considered to be the experts in the relevant area.  
This strongly confirms the views expressed by Osland and Strand (2008) that project 
environments are subject to very significant political, economic and other pressures. 
Individuals, who approve funding are therefore custodians of the relevant public 
moneys, makes the reduction or elimination mere impossible and call for better 
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governance at all hierarchical levels, as indicated by Brunet and Aubry (2019) and 
Loch, Mähring and Sommer (2017). Simplistic approaches, such as Flyvbjerg’s 
suggestion to ‘cap grant for local projects at the estimated cost at the time of the 
decision to build’ (2008, pg. 19) do not cater for the event that project approvals are 
based on the available funding envelope rather than realistic budget need to fulfil the 
requirements or political pressure.  Flyvbjerg’s approach required proof of strategic 
misrepresentation, which in the context of the multitude of influences is unlikely to be 
produced and, more importantly, his statement that Reference Class Forecasting will 
eliminate deliberate deception is unconvincing.  
6.2.2. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
In view of this it is even more important that findings from my research also confirmed 
the co-existence of explicit and implicit evaluation criteria that drive the decision by the 
panel as discussed in the literature review (Verbano & Nosella, 2010; Lamont, 2010; 
Langfeldt, 2004, van Arensbergen et al., 2014). The desire to appease particular 
personalities or ensure that every unit would receive some funding out of the process 
inevitably result in scores that do not reflect the viability of the proposals. Such issues 
raise concern about the accountability of the approver. Assessment of proposals for 
funding requires independence and integrity of the evaluators.  
Individual preferences, loyalties, closeness to specific disciplines or even the 
expectation of responses from unsuccessful bidders should not have an influence on 
the assessment. Within a restricted pool of experts however it may be very difficult to 
find individuals fitting all of these parameters.  
Furthermore, the process as such was considered by bidders to be a “black box” (Mow, 
2011), referring to membership of the panel and the process of the evaluation itself. 
This research has found evidence of a ‘harsher funding environment’ (Elias & Elias, 
2012) but also general agreement that the use of an expert panel is the best approach 
to separate bids with regards to their benefit to science through discussion by experts 
(Foeglholm, et al., 2012). 
Within a healthy organisational environment, the membership of a panel, such as the 
capital bid panel should not need to be kept hidden, as suggested by Abdoul et al. 
(2012). More transparency of membership or even a rotation of attendance by unit 
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directors at this evaluation process would greatly contribute to a higher level of content 
with the decisions. This would expose any of the aforementioned implicit criteria and 
arguably prevent these from occurring. Findings from this research confirm that the 
increased transparency and a consistent approach to the evaluation – including 
processes for challenging or appealing the decision will legitimise the decisions in view 
of the bidders and wider scrutiny (Kieslich & Littlejohns, 2015).  
The findings from this research have demonstrated the very importance of 
communication on all of the problems initially highlighted. There is a keen awareness 
by bidders of the potential of tailoring bids to fit evaluation criteria, if such criteria are 
made available. Similarly, this has also shown a determination by bidders to gain 
funding on their own terms – on merit of benefit to their specific research.  
In a wider context, higher levels of transparency can present risks. Identification of 
evaluators could result in these individuals being put under pressure, subjected to 
attempts of bribery or risking reprisals as a consequence of unfavourable decisions.  
6.2.3. COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION 
Communication, or the lack of it has been an unexpected, but most significant 
influence on the problem overall. A deeply rooted reluctance to have face to face, open 
and frank discussions between HO and unit staff was discovered by the author. This 
can be considered the cause of all of the issues identified in the outset of this research.  
Unawareness of the availability of historical details or individuals with expertise in the 
organisation is due to failure to talk about projects that are proposed, in development 
or just on the horizon. Unwillingness or lack of time to visit the units has resulted in a 
management of the research from a distance without understanding of the operational 
local pressures. This in turn resulted in establishment of evaluation criteria, that do not 
allow for a score for critical equipment replacement – a high priority for research 
continuity. In the preparation of the proposals, neither bidder nor approvers thought it 
to be helpful to discuss proposals, their context, background or priority, resulting in 
decisions being made that potentially do not suit the bidder’s priorities. Additionally, 
no information is provided to bidders to explain the decisions made.  
Detailed feedback about the reasoning for funding decision increases the 
transparency and therefore forcing accountability of the evaluators. It also offers the 
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opportunity to learn from the experience – it applies to all approvals or application 
panels, be it for funding, job applications, planning applications and so on.  
This short outline of failure to communicate demonstrates the chain of processes and 
decision points, which have detrimental implications on operations and mutual trust 
within the organisation.  
Good and effective communication within organisations is an area, which is generally 
well known and arguably understood by organisations but often not practiced Hersey, 
Blanchard and Johnson (2013). It is based on the two elements of effectively 
submitting and receiving information, both of which have found to be inadequate in the 
MRC.  
But it goes further. The issues around the subject of perception and reality of strategic 
misrepresentation are strongly coloured by the position of the relevant party in the 
process. Approvers assume that bidders are misrepresenting, bidders feel they are 
forced to provide bid due to instructions or circumstances of the funding environment. 
Similar to the increase of mutual understanding of drivers, pressures, financial and 
economic constraints also contribute to a higher level of acceptance for decisions 
being made and trust in the decision makers (Lyrio, Lunkes and Taliani, 2018).  
6.2.4. CONTRIBUTION OF ACTION RESEARCH 
Finally, there is a further significant conclusion from this research. The application of 
Action research has been a major contributor to the success of this research. Not only, 
was the use of research methods to practical problems a way of gaining a true 
reflection of the underlying issues for my problem, but the feedback, direction by and 
interaction with the experts in the AR group and the senior management of the 
organisation has been instrumental in choosing the next steps.  
Ownership for driving the process of AR is expected to sit with the researcher. This is 
implicit Coghlan & Brannicks (2010) explanations of how AR works. Therefore, 
decisions as to what methodology to apply rests exclusively with this person. However, 
the contribution of stakeholders and participants to the selection efficient actions, 
adjustments of research methods and/ or analysis of information cannot be 
underestimated.  
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In this research the true collaborative nature of the approach and an open-mindedness 
on all sides (researcher, stakeholders and participants) has resulted in a better 
understanding of a wide range of perspectives – internal and external to the 
organisation. 
 
6.3. FUTURE RESEARCH  
This research set out to find ways to improve the quality of decision-making in the 
context of project approvals in the MRC. Whilst the progression of the continuous 
improvement programme is providing more and more solutions, there are significant 
questions, which this research has raised.  
The most future research area arising relates to the complex environment surrounding 
the initial stages of a projects. Much of the evidence provided for strategic 
misrepresentation is derived from anecdotal evidence and would benefit from a 
thorough research relating to the drivers and expected benefits of the behaviour 
labelled as strategic misrepresentation. Such research would include a consideration 
of the different perspectives of organisations in an approval hierarchy and their 
respective aims and strategies. We know that national interests override 
organisational ones, but in which way does it differ in the judgement of effectiveness 
and benefit realisation. Can the effect of being seen to do something about a problem 
be higher than the effect of an action as such and for whom is this most beneficial? 
Offerings of an analysis of numbers as a solution (RCF) seems to address only a 
minute element of this wider context and hence the application as a comprehensive 
solution that is currently suggested by the UK government is unproven and unlikely to 
be effective. 
The mixed method of research as undertaken in this research has highlighted the 
effectiveness of this method in finding root causes for problems therewith enabling 
more appropriate actions for their solution. Joining up the multitude of disciplines in 
researching, risk, RCF, project performance in preparation in connection with 
organisational research and understanding of a wider organisational, social, political, 
economic and financial context could close a significant gap in knowledge both for 
academics and practitioners.  
Page 167 of 203 
 
6.4. THE FULL CIRCLE 
This research set out to find a way to develop fair and transparent processes that 
would mitigate inaccurate estimates in estates projects. It was to find tools, which 
would be used by both bidders and approvers to assess the calculations, adjusting 
where necessary or include in the considerations of project approval or rejection. 
Through the literature review this aim was further refined by finding answers to key 
questions, which looked at the underlying influences in the organisation that may affect 
project estimation and approvals and whether Reference Class Forecasting may be 
an appropriate tool for testing accuracies of estimates.  
My journey through the studies in the preparation of this research and the research 
itself has been deeply influential for a change in my approach to my work, in particular 
in relation to decision making. Essentially, it has widened my horizon, forcing me to 
delve deeper into the real roots of problems and allowing me to consider the position 
of others in relation to the problem. But it has also provided me with a better 
understanding of reasons for the failure of practitioners and academics to connect and 
interact.  
This research gave me a very deep understanding of how my organisation approaches 
project initiation and development and what constraints and underlying dynamics 
influence the approval of projects. It includes an appreciation of the concerns of unit 
directors, who need to progress science at the highest possible standards with very 
limited funds and the pressure on approvers in HO to allocated very small budgets to 
the most promising proposals.  
I have developed a database for projects in the technical estates area (focus on 
laboratories), which is promising to be a useful tool for the project teams to test their 
bias and approvers to test the viability of proposals. This data allowed me to step back 
from my own view of the performance of our projects and start to analyse other areas 
of concern in the organisation with similar statistics and the presentation of evidence-
based information proved to be a very powerful argument, not easily defeated. 
For example, I have initiated a review of all asset registers, analysing type and age of 
equipment, which has led to an evidenced based assessment of the requirement for 
capital allocation for replacement of scientific equipment as a contribution to the 
submission by MRC to UKRI as part of the spending review. It has provided a strong 
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argument and better comprehension of the problem as opposed to the plain statement, 
that fundamental research is underfunded and that other countries spend a higher 
percentage of GDP on this than the UK.  
I was surprised about the extent of communication breakdown between MRC HO and 
its science community. In discovering this significant missing link, I unlocked a key 
element to the improvement of transparency and fairness. Without feedback from 
approvers regarding the funding decisions, bidders viewed the decisions as arbitrary 
and lost trust in the process. Equally, by promoting and encouraging Units to discuss 
their bids with the relevant Programme manager at HO prior to submission a much 
better understanding of the importance of proposals could be established, informing 
decisions for approval.  
Regular visits and face-to-face communication have hugely improved the perception 
of the process and the amendment of the evaluation criteria to allow replacement of 
equipment has given units the confidence that their concerns are heard and acted 
upon. I am seeing more engagement by my colleagues with the units, be it with still a 
very formal (structured) way.  
Is the process fairer? Not necessarily, but it is more transparent and the level of 
satisfaction and acceptance by bidders is significantly improved just by been given an 
understanding for the reasoning behind rejections for proposals. I have now initiated 
a consultation for a thorough review of the bid process and with a view of removing 
the estates related aspects from the competition with science focused bids, much 
supported by the units and the majority of the panel members themselves. This 
research formed the first step on a road to a much-improved situation in the 
organisation. It has identified action research as a very useful tool to approach larger 
issues in an organisation through structured fact finding to inform appropriate 
measurements as solutions.  
Reflecting on the overall process of AR to solve the stated problem, I feel strongly that 
it has provided a higher level of acceptance for the findings and therewith support of 
the actions within the senior management of my organisation. It may be, because it 
reflects the approach in science and what our senior management (with a science 
background) consider to be thorough and robust. The interviews have been hugely 
beneficial in that I took a significant amount of time to talk about an area of concerns 
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by all participants and a way for them to express their views without the worry of being 
identified and seen as difficult or obstructive. I found a vast range of views of the 
problem, all valid in their own right and many of them not identified or considered by 
myself in my work.  
However, as a practitioner, I recognise the need for speed in making decisions in the 
management of organisations. There is a place for AR in solving wicked problems, 
rather than applying a response that is suggested in management handbooks. It is not 
however, a method that should or could be applied to all aspects of organisational 
management as it takes time.  
I see a gap between practitioners and academics in the lack of flexibility. The academic 
need for establishing a specific philosophy feels alien to me as a practitioner, who 
seeks to find ways to solve the problem. However, the requirement for establishing a 
robust methodology with a clear view of what kind of information is collected and how 
it will be analysed is important for the validity of the results and the acceptance of the 
findings.  
There was a huge benefit in undertaking the literature review. It has alerted me to 
potential sources for the problem that I did not consider before and altered my route 
in this research (breakdown into three key questions). I have found myself diving much 
more often into online libraries to find articles on other issues I am facing in my work, 
but not to the extent as I have done as part of the research presented in this thesis.  
I do note a significant aspect of difference in language between practitioners and 
academics, that may account for some of the barriers. As a practitioner, I like to write 
straight to the point avoiding long explanations as I need to focus the audience on the 
key problem and proposed solution. Lengthy papers are counter-productive in a 
management environment as they tend not be read thoroughly or draws readers to the 
areas, they have an interest in, therewith diverting from the real issues. Academic 
writing is very different to this and I could imagine that it prevents practitioners from 
submitting papers to a wider academic audience.  
Personally, I have hugely benefitted from the engagement with the academic approach 
and believe that this could be mutual, because practitioners apply the theory in 
practice and can contribute to a debate with the experience from this.  
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8.1. APPENDIX A – LIST OF DOCUMENTS 
Document Description document type 
  
Approval by School of Management, DBA Ethics Committee, 
dated 28th March 2016 hard copy 
Consent forms (completed and signed by participants) hard copy 
Participant information form electronic 
recordings of interviews electronic 
transcripts/ notes of interviews electronic 
responses questionnaires (bidders) electronic 
responses questionnaires (approvers) electronic 
Interview list  electronic 
MRC capital bid approval data hard copy 
notes from project files (information from contributing organisation)  electronic 
project data MRC electronic 
database for RCF electronic 
presentation to working group RCF - first analysis electronic 
presentation to working group RCF - full analysis electronic 
Capital awards 2012 electronic 
Capital awards 2013 electronic 
Capital awards 2014 electronic 
Capital awards 2015 electronic 
Capital awards 2016 electronic 
Capital awards 2017 electronic 
report to MRC senior Management (findings from interviews in 
cycle 1) electronic 
notes of meeting working group RCF, dated 7th April 2016 electronic 
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notes of meeting at health organisation, dated 4 August 2016 electronic 
notes of meeting with working group, dated 03.01.2018 electronic 
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8.2. APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 
 
1. Position of the individual: 
- Are you making applications for funding to the organisation? 
- What is your involvement with the development of the project proposals 
(Project team member, SRO, SU, etc.)? 
- Are you choosing the project team? 
2. Project Development: 
- Can you explain your experience with the inception (start-up) of a project? 
- Are you involved in the development of the project estimates? 
- If Yes, can you describe your experience with the development of the 
estimates? 
- If No, can you explain, what your understanding of the estimates is? 
3. Project Approval: 
- What do you understand to be the process for approval of projects in your 
organisation? 
- Are you aware of or do you understand the scoring criteria? 
- Do you receive/ give feedback regarding failed project bids? 
4. Value for Money 
- How do you define Value for Money from your perspective? 
- Can you establish a generic tipping point, where you would feel a project does 
not provide Value for Money? 
5. Project Performance 
- How accurate you experienced the project estimates to be? 
- How effective do you feel the risk management at projects to be? 
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8.3. APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
  
ID key reason Date  interview comment
1 unique position to see the issue from 
the bidder and approver side
11.07.2016 complete, face to face
2 project member from inception to 
completion and beyond.
13.06.2016 complete, face to face
3 Project member from inception to 
completion and beyond. Key 
individual for the development of 
project estimate
15.06.2016 complete, face to face
4 Senior User for this project and 
applicant for funding
13.06.2016 complete, face to face
5 bidder for funding and Senior User 
for these projects
15.07.2016,   
11.00am
complete, face to face
6 Senior User for this project and 
applicant for funding
16.08.2016 10.30am complete, face to face
7 initiator for bids and key initiator for 
project estimates
09.08.2016, 9.00am complete, face to face
8 bidder and key team member for the 
project from inception to completion 
and beyond
20.07.2016 3.00pm complete, face to face
9 Senior User for this project and 
applicant for funding
16.08.2016 1.00pm complete, face to face
10 key player in approval process and 
knwolegdgeable of approval 
processes in BIS
12.07.2016 11.00am complete, face to face
11 project team member 13.06.2016 complete, face to face
12 Member of MRC Capital Bid 
Approval Panel
28.06.2016, 12.30 complete, face to face
13 Member of MRC Capital Bid 
Approval Panel
05.07.2016 complete, face to face
14 SRO 05.07.2016, 3.00pm complete , via teleconference




complete, face to face
16 Senior User and applicant for the 
project funding
08.07.2016 1.30pm complete, via skype
17 Project Manager for MRC and 
Transition manager
14.06.2016, 12.00 complete, face to face
18 finance director during major 




complete, face to face
19 Unit Director/ senior User. 12.07.2016, 3.00pm complete , via teleconference
20 business anlayst 11.08.2016, 
10.00am
complete, face to face
21 policy maker 21. 7.2016, 9.30am complete, face to face
22 member of capital bid panel and 
programme director for DRI 
(application to BIS)
11.08.2016, 2.00pm complete, face to face
23 Member of MRC Capital Bid 
Approval Panel
25.07.2016, 1.00pm complete, face to face




complete, face to face
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8.4. APPENDIX D – RETURNS QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
  
ID key reason for selection (for interviews Cycle 1) Questionnaire 
returned
comment
1 unique position to see the issue from the bidder and 
approver side Yes
complete return
2 project member from inception to completion and 
beyond.
Yes complete return
3 Project member from inception to completion and 
beyond. Key individual for the development of project 
estimate
Yes complete return
4 Senior User for this project and applicant for funding No left organisation
5 bidder for funding and Senior User for these projects No no comments given
6 Senior User for this project and applicant for funding No no comments given
7 initiator for bids and key initiator for project estimates Yes complete return
8 bidder and key team member for the project from 
inception to completion and beyond Yes
complete return
9 Senior User for this project and applicant for funding No left organisation
10 key player in approval process and knwolegdgeable of 
approval processes in BIS Yes
complete return
11 project team member Yes complete return
12 Member of MRC Capital Bid Approval Panel Yes complete return
13 Member of MRC Capital Bid Approval Panel Yes complete return
14 SRO No left organisation
15 Member of MRC Capital Bid Approval Panel Yes complete return
16 Senior User and applicant for the project funding No not available
17 Project Manager for MRC and Transition manager No left organisation
18 finance director during major projects applications and 
member of approval panel No
left organisation
19 Unit Director/ senior User. Yes complete return
20 business anlayst No not applicable (external to 
MRC)21 policy maker No not applicable (external to 
MRC)22 member of capital bid panel and programme director for 
DRI (application to BIS) Yes
complete return
23 Member of MRC Capital Bid Approval Panel Yes complete return
24 initiator for bids and key initiator for project estimates Yes complete return
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1.1. Project Approval Process YES NO Don’t Know
1.1.
Did the capital bid call (for funding 2017/18) clearly identify the 
process of bidding, evaluation and award?
1.2.
Have you noticed an improvement of the process for capital award in 
general?
1.3. Are you aware of available approval pathways for funding within MRC?
1.4.
Do you consider the evaluation criteria applied for the capital bid 
awards to be fair and relevant?
1.5.
What criteria represents " value for money" in science? (Please choose 
up to three criteria).
a) cost of science
b) enabling career development
c) providing a definite answer to a specific scientific problem
d) achieving a "wow" factor
e) providing research opportunity
f) enabling future proofing
g) supporting the science strategy
h) reducing level of disruption
i) enabling the publication of papers
j) enabling / increasing grant funding
k) offering an efficient path to intervention
l) economic/ monetary value
m) offering scientific impact
n) making science/ research easier
o) providing pay back/ return on investment
p) enabling leap frogging of science
r) providing business continuity
s) enabling compliance with statutory  regulations
t) enabling compliance with Health & Safety
YES NO Don’t Know
1.6.
Did the submissions identify the benefits, which the projects/bids 
provide?
1.7.
Have the benefits of awarded projects/bids for FY 2016/17 been 
measured?
Tick relevant box










2 BIDDERS ONLY YES NO Don’t Know
2.1.
Have you employed external professionals to develop the project /bid 
costs and scope? 
2.2.
Have you received support and advise from MRC HO Estates in 
developing your case for the project?
2.3. If your answer is "No", have you requested that support?
2.4.
Did you submit request(s) for capital funding through the capital bid 
process?
2.5.
Did you gain funding approval for the bids you consider highest 
priority?
2.6. Were you aware of the evaluation criteria applied to the bids?
2.7.
Were the bid(s) awarded already supported through your QQR 
recommendations?
2.8.
Did you discuss your bids with relevant representatives from RPG prior 
to the evaluation process?
2.8.1 If you answered with YES, did you approach RPG?
2.8.2.
If you answered with NO, can you explain, why you did not approach 
RPG (tick appropriate box):
a) bid too simplistic/ straight forward, needed no explanation
b) time constraints
c) expect evaluators to approach me, if they need further information
d) don't wish to comment
YES NO Don’t Know
2.9. Have you been informed of the awards being made?
2.10.
have you had feedback as to what score individual projects/bids 
received and why?
2.11. Are you content with the decision made by the panel?
2.12.
Did you receive funding approvals through pathways other than the 
capital bid process?
2.12. If so, please identify, how /who provided approval 
a) Management Board
b) BEIS
c) direct approval from MRC HO Finance
d) other
YES NO Don’t Know
2.13.
Have the projects/bids you received awards for FY 2016/17 been 
completed?
2.14. If so, were they completed within the awarded budget?
2.15. If not, has HO Finance or RPG  been informed?
Tick relevant box
Tick relevant box
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1.1. Project Approval Process YES NO Don’t Know
1.1.
Did the capital bid call (for funding 2017/18) clearly identify the 
process of bidding, evaluation and award?
1.2.
Have you noticed an improvement of the process for capital award in 
general?
1.3. Are you aware of available approval pathways for funding within MRC?
1.4.
Do you consider the evaluation criteria applied for the capital bid 
awards to be fair and relevant?
1.5.
What criteria represents " value for money" in science? (Please choose 
up to three criteria).
a) cost of science
b) enabling career development
c) providing a definite answer to a specific scientific problem
d) achieving a "wow" factor
e) providing research opportunity
f) enabling future proofing
g) supporting the science strategy
h) reducing level of disruption
i) enabling the publication of papers
j) enabling / increasing grant funding
k) offering an efficient path to intervention
l) economic/ monetary value
m) offering scientific impact
n) making science/ research easier
o) providing pay back/ return on investment
p) enabling leap frogging of science
r) providing business continuity
s) enabling compliance with statutory  regulations
t) enabling compliance with Health & Safety
YES NO Don’t Know
1.6.
Did the submissions identify the benefits, which the projects/bids 
provide?
1.7.
Have the benefits of awarded projects/bids for FY 2016/17 been 
measured?
Tick relevant box














YES NO Don’t Know
2.4. Have the bidders been informed of the award decision in writing?
2.5.
Have the bidders received feedback as to what score individual 
projects/bids received and why?
2.6. Are you content with the decision made by the panel?
2.7.
Are you aware of any funding approvals through pathways other than 
the capital bid process (relating to your area of responsibility only)?
Tick relevant box
2.7.1. If so, please identify, how /who provided approval 
a) Management Board
b) BEIS
c) direct approval from MRC HO Finance
d) other
YES NO Don’t Know
2.13.
Have projects/bids that received awards for FY 2016/17 within your 
area of responsibility been completed?
2.14. If so, were they completed within the awarded budget?
2.15. If not, has HO Finance or RPG  been informed?
3.
YES NO Don’t Know
3.1.
Did you find the submitted bids concise and clear as to their purpose 
and priority?
3.2.
Did you agree with the priorities identified by the bidders for the 
individual bids/projects?
3.3.
Did you discuss your bids with relevant representatives from the 
relevant unit/Institute/bidder prior to the evaluation process?
3.4.
If you answered with YES, did you approach the relevant 
Unit/Institute/Bidder?
3.4.1
If you answered with NO, can you explain, why you did not approach  
the relevant Unit/Institute/Bidder (tick appropriate box):
a) bid too simplistic/ straight forward, needed no explanation
b) time constraints
c)
expect Units/Institute/Bidder to approach me, if they wish to provide 
more insight to their submission
d) do not wish to comment
Tick relevant box










































































































































































































































Number of Projects 
N
26.0 8.0 13.0 15.0 4.0 9.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 4.0 13.0 13.0 3.0 3.0 12.0 8.0 
Number of Projects 
with Cost Overrun
13.0 4.0 7.0 6.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 6.0 7.0 1.0 2.0 7.0 4.0 
Number of Projects 
with Cost Overrun 
in %
50.0 50.0 53.8 40.0 100.0 33.3 50.0 42.9 55.6 50.0 46.2 53.8 33.3 66.7 58.3 50.0 
Mean 10.2 11.5 12.8 4.2 47.6 -1.7 -1.0 9.6 12.9 -4.9 13.0 7.5 5.5 15.6 2.4 21.8 
Min -43.9 -7.4 -13.0 -43.9 18.1 -43.9 -7.4 -43.9 -25.5 -32.2 -43.9 -32.2 -4.0 -7.4 -43.9 -17.9 
Max 117.0 59.6 59.6 72.2 117.0 72.2 59.6 117.0 72.2 22.0 117.0 72.2 21.2 36.2 59.6 117.0 
Media
n
4.3 4.9 10.6 -0.8 27.6 -14.0 8.7 -13.0 9.7 -4.6 -0.8 8.7 -0.8 18.1 2.0 4.8 
Mode N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mean 34.7 27.1 28.9 33.3 47.6 33.6 38.0 51.0 30.7 15.3 44.5 26.3 21.2 27.1 25.8 55.2 
Min 8.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 18.1 9.6 18.1 17.0 9.6 8.6 17.0 8.6 21.2 18.1 8.6 9.6 
Max 117.0 59.6 59.6 72.2 117.0 72.2 59.6 117.0 72.2 22.0 117.0 72.2 21.2 36.2 59.6 117.0 
Media
n
21.2 19.1 21.2 20.1 27.6 19.0 36.2 19.0 21.2 15.3 27.6 21.2 21.2 27.1 18.0 47.1 
Mode N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Contingency in £ 
(FBC) projects with 
overrun only mean
1,019.3 2,346.2 1,807.4 1,602.1 781.9 106.9 1,096.6 97.4 1,864.5 173.2 597.0 1,381.3 8,747.9 1,439.5 241.4 43.9 
Contingency in % 
of FBC cost 
estimates (overrun 
only) mean
9.4 10.2 10.5 10.2 7.2 14.2 6.5 8.2 8.9 14.5 7.8 11.2 12.2 7.0 5.5 21.3 
% of contingency 
(of FBC cost) of 
projects without 
cost overrun mean
13.7 13.6 13.6 13.7 N/A 10.8 13.6 12.6 5.9 24.3 13.6 17.5 13.4 25.9 17.2 10.1 
all projects 
Average 
Contingency in % mean
13.0 13.2 13.0 13.3 N/A 10.6 13.2 10.9 10.8 21.1 13.1 12.0 13.2 12.2 10.2 8.6 
Cost overall - all 
projects  (%)
Cost escalation (%) 
projects with 
overrun only











































































































































































































Number of Projects 
with Time Overrun
18.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 7.0 3.0 8.0 10.0 2.0 3.0 7.0 6.0 
Number of Projects 
with Time Overrun 
in %
69.2 62.5 76.9 66.7 75.0 55.6 66.7 42.9 77.8 75.0 61.5 76.9 66.7 100.0 58.3 75.0 
Mean 39.7 20.4 29.3 28.2 53.8 35.0 14.9 37.2 61.0 35.3 26.3 53.1 16.3 7.5 29.6 75.7 
Min -10.2 -10.2 -10.2 -10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.2 0.0 0.0 -10.2 -10.2 7.0 -3.8 0.0 
Max 200.0 78.1 170.0 116.7 200.0 116.7 35.0 200.0 170.0 100.0 200.0 170.0 35.0 8.3 170.0 200.0 
Median
8.7 15.7 8.3 9.1 7.7 3.7 8.3 0.0 78.1 20.6 7.1 37.5 24.2 7.1 6.6 92.6 
Mode 0.0 N/A N/A 0.0 N/A 0.0 N/A 0.0 N/A N/A 0.0 N/A N/A N/A 0.0 0.0 
Mean 58.1 35.4 39.4 43.7 71.8 62.9 16.3 86.8 80.4 47.1 42.8 70.4 29.6 7.5 51.3 100.9 
Min 3.7 7.1 4.2 3.7 7.0 3.7 7.0 27.8 4.2 3.7 7.0 3.7 24.2 7.0 4.2 3.7 
Max 200.0 78.0 170.0 116.7 200.0 116.7 35.0 200.0 170.0 100.0 200.0 170.0 35.0 8.3 170.0 200.0 
Median 33.8 32.7 26.0 33.8 8.3 91.7 8.3 32.7 91.7 37.5 26.0 84.9 29.6 7.1 32.7 96.8 
Mode N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Time overrun in % 
(overrun projects only)
Time variance overall 
in %
